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In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a paradigmatic example of a transitional post-conflict society 
governed by an externally-driven process of neo-liberal state-building, police reforms have 
played an important role in supporting the transposition of a particular variant of liberal order 
through security governance at the national and sub-national levels. This order is primarily 
constructed to reflect the interests of BiH’s supranational architect and benefactor since 2003: 
the European Union. It is less responsive to the interests or the needs of BiH citizens or 
constitutionally established governing institutions (Chandler 1999). Historically, prescriptions 
for police reform in BiH have been defined by various representatives of the international 
community in BiH rather than domestic policy makers or practitioners.  They have also been 
glocally-responsive in their design. In other words, they have been introduced to generate policy 
alignment and to support the harmonisation of local policing mentalities and practices with the 
EU’s security interests in the Western Balkans as well as dominant ‘European’ approaches to 
controlling crime (Juncos 2011; Ryan 2011). In practice, however, it is evident that the outputs 
and outcomes generated by police reforms in BiH regularly deviate from their initial design. 
This is particularly evident in relation to a handful of community policing initiatives introduced 
in BiH over the past decade (e.g. Deljkic and Lučić‐Ćatić 2011).  
Using a meso-level analysis of two community-oriented policing projects implemented in 2011, 
this research draws on the conceptual framework of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 
2006) to illuminate the agentive capacities of international development workers and local 
police practitioners and their role in shaping the conceptual and programmatic contours of 
glocally-responsive policing reforms in BiH. My first case study examines the translational 
capacity of international development workers at a major multi-lateral international 
development agency in BiH using an ethnographic account of my three-month placement with 
the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) ‘Safer Communities’ project in BiH in 
2011. My second case study is used to illustrate the translational capacities of police 
practitioners working to implement an externally-initiated community policing project in 
Sarajevo Canton.  
Drawing from these case studies, I determine that the international political economy of global 
liberal governance and the interests of powerful global actors play only a limited role in 
affecting outputs and outcomes generated by internationally-driven police reforms. Rather, I 
argue that the concept of policy translation demonstrates that relatively disempowered actors 




agency and institutional resources to shape these policy making processes and in doing so, 
potentially contribute to more democratically responsive policing outputs and structures. My 
findings further suggest that important opportunities do exist for motivated reformers to foster 
deliberative forms of security governance in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH 
and recognising and enhancing these can help to alleviate the potential consequences of 
introducing contextually or culturally inappropriate Western policing models to these societies. 
This is significant because it highlights the prospect of addressing the structural inequalities 
associated with global and transnational policing (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012), police reforms 
pursued in the context of liberal state-building projects (Ryan 2011) and donor-driven 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This is a thesis about police reform and the ways in which different reformers and practitioners 
work to collectively shape the mentalities and practices of local policing in weak and 
structurally dependent societies. It is also a study of glocal policing
1
 and its function in a 
developing and transitional society affected by neo-liberal governmentality and supranational 
governance. It is a thesis about the interplay between structure and agency inherent to policy 
translation, a concept that illuminates the capacities of relatively weak and disempowered policy 
actors to assert their preferences and designs over the contours of internationally prescribed 
policing reforms.  Finally, this thesis emphasises the capacities of individuals and organisations 
to affect positive change and promote deliberative forms of security governance amidst coercive 
and asymmetrical power structures that reflect the interests of powerful global actors.  
In the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), a paradigmatic example of a transitional post-
conflict society governed by an externally-driven process of neo-liberal state-building since 
1996, police reforms have played an important role in supporting the transposition of a 
particular variant of liberal order through security governance at the national and sub-national 
levels. This order is primarily constructed to reflect the interests of BiH’s primary supranational 
architect and benefactor since 2003: the European Union (EU). It is less responsive to the 
interests or the needs of BiH citizens or constitutionally established governing institutions 
(Chandler 1999). Prescriptions for police reform in BiH have been defined by various 
representatives of the international community in BiH rather than domestic policy makers or 
practitioners.  They have also been glocally-responsive in their design. In other words, they 
have been introduced to generate policy alignment and to support the harmonisation of local 
policing mentalities and practices with the EU’s security interests in the Western Balkans as 
well as dominant ‘European’ approaches to controlling crime (Juncos 2011; Ryan 2011). In 
practice, however, it is evident that the outputs and outcomes generated by police reforms in 
BiH commonly deviate from their initial design. This is particularly evident in relation to a 
handful of community policing initiatives introduced in BiH over the past decade (see Deljkic 
and Lučić‐Ćatić 2011; also Chapter Six).  
                                                     
1
 Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 25) derive their concept of ‘glocal policing’ from the work of Hobbs and 
Dunnigham (1998) on ‘glocal organised crime’ and Cain’s (2000: 250) work on ‘indigenous-yet-




Analysed as policy transfers, it is possible, and indeed popular, to account for disrupted police 
reforms in developing and transitional countries like BiH as examples of policy failure. It is 
argued, for example, that community policing initiatives in particular are often miscalculated or 
poorly designed from the outset (e.g. Ellison 2007) or that weakened police institutions in 
transitional societies are inadequate for supporting these reforms (e.g. Ryan 2007). Other 
critiques suggest that ‘off-the-shelf’ models for democratic policing or community policing may 
fail to resonate with enduring cultural and historical understandings of police work (Brogden 
and Nijhar 2005). These critiques suggest that international reformers either struggle to translate 
their reformative prescriptions into locally-viable practices and structures or that they neglect to 
do so.  
Rarely, however, do studies of police reform projects in developing and transitional states 
actually delve into the translational mechanics of these policy exchanges. In other words, the 
existing literature on international policing reforms and police development assistance tends to 
feature overly-linear and deterministic representations of the processes that generate these ill-
fated policy outputs with the effect that the extent to which mediatory actors affect these 
processes are rarely addressed. Using a meso-level analysis of two community-oriented policing 
projects that were implemented in BiH in 2011, this research uses the conceptual framework of 
‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006) to illuminate the agentive capacities of 
international development workers and local police practitioners and their role in shaping the 
conceptual and programmatic contours of glocally-responsive policing reforms in BiH. Through 
these case studies, I address the following empirical research questions: 
 
1. What evidence is there to support the claim that processes of ‘translation’ account for 
the differences between international policy inputs and domestic outcomes in the field 
of community oriented policing in BiH? 
2. Does the translation work of local actors serve to mitigate the potential harms of 
externally imposed policy frameworks? 
3. To what extent do local translators form part of a framework for democratically 







Throughout this thesis, I also address the following conceptual research question: 
4. How do the concepts of translation and contact zones help to develop our understanding 
of the interaction of the policy preferences of powerful external actors and the situated 
knowledge and preferences of domestic actors in producing glocal forms of policing? 
 
I argue that the international political economy of global liberal governance and the interests of 
powerful global actors play only a limited role in affecting outputs and outcomes generated by 
internationally-driven police reforms. Rather, the concept of policy translation demonstrates that 
relatively disempowered actors like international development workers and local police 
practitioners can draw upon their agency and institutional resources to shape these policy 
making processes and in doing so, potentially contribute to more democratically responsive 
policing outputs and structures. My findings further suggest that important opportunities do 
exist for motivated reformers to foster deliberative forms of security governance in weak and 
structurally dependent societies like BiH and that doing so can help to alleviate the potential 
consequences of introducing contextually or culturally inappropriate Western policing models 
to these societies. My findings and conceptual framework represent important contributions to 
the established literature on police reforms in developing and transitional societies because they 
account for the possibility of addressing the structural inequalities associated with global and 
transnational policing (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012), police reforms pursued in the context of 
liberal state-building projects (Ryan 2011) and donor-driven international police development 
assistance projects (Ellison and Pino 2012).  
With the remainder of this chapter, I introduce ‘policy translation’ as a conceptual framework 
for exploring the nodal and poly-centric power structures of international police reform 
processes. I then proceed to justify my selection of BiH as a single-country case study and 
briefly summarise my methodology and outline the structure of my thesis.  
 
1.1 Policy Translation 
The conceptual development of policy translation is attributable to work by Lendvai and Stubbs 
(2006) who draw from Latour’s (2005) ‘actor-network-theory’, also referred to as ‘the sociology 
of translation’, to address what they identify to be a deficiency in the mainstream literature on 




(2005: 39), the conceptual distinction between ‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy translation’ is 
apparent in the roles of ‘mediator’ and ‘intermediary’.  Whereas an intermediary ‘transports 
meaning or force without transformation’, ‘[m]ediators transform, translate, distort and modify 
the meaning or the elements that they are supposed to carry’ with the effect that ‘[t]heir input is 
never a good predictor of their output’ (Latour 2005: 39). Mediators represent active 
participants in a process of transformation while intermediaries merely serve to transmit policies 
between contexts. Translation therefore implies that ‘...a series of interesting, and sometimes 
even surprising disturbances can occur in the spaces between the 'creation', the 'transmission' 
and the 'interpretation' or 'reception' of policy meanings’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 4). 
Borrowing from Pratt (1991), Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 6) describe these spaces as ‘contact 
zones’.  According to Pratt (1991: 6); quoted in Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 15), ‘contact zones’ 
describe ‘…the spatial and temporal co-presence of subjects previously separated by geographic 
and historic disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect’. These contact zones are 
important social sites where different actors interact and compete to shape policy meaning and 
content in relation to their individual and institutional preferences (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 
16). Contact zones are actively constructed ‘through actor networks’ and therefore, they do not 
represent ‘pre-existing categories’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006: 6). In other words, a contact zone 
represents a shared space in which various stakeholders seek to translate their institutional 
preferences into policy prescriptions and ultimately, policy outputs. 
Actors in the politicised space constituted by a contact zone and the security nodes that they 
bridge utilise different sources of influence in order to advance their own preferences within a 
shared system.
2
 Accordingly, Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 16, original emphasis) write, ‘[i]n the 
'contact zone' encounters are rarely, or rarely only, about words and their meaning but are 
almost always, more or less explicitly, about claims-making, opportunities, strategic choices and 
goals, interests and resource maximisation...’. Drawing on institutional resources, these 
translators compete to shape the language and prescriptions for policies in ways that reflect their 
own habitus. By habitus, I refer to the structured mentalities and dispositions that shape the 
practices and perceptions of individuals.
3
 The process of channelling one’s habitus through a 
                                                     
2 
Here Lendvai and Stubs (2007: 5) draw explicitly on the work of Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992).  
3
 This simplified definition of habitus draws from definitions by Elias (2000) and Bourdieu (1968). It is 
intended to emphasise the idea that habitus is shaped by the continuous interplay between structure 
and agency and between objective and subjective forces. The idea that these seemingly 
diametrically opposed concepts are in practice mutually reinforcing and a key determinant of power 
serves as a recurring theme of this thesis, one which is explored in greater depth at the end of 
Chapter Four. Both Elias (2000) and Bourdieu (1977: 73-76) dismiss objectivist, structural theories 




universally appealing framework affords a translator a symbolic mark of legitimacy that serves 
to authenticate their subjective worldview and objectify it through the contact zone.  
One can study the translational processes that generate policing reforms in developing and 
transitional societies as occurring within a nodal field or ‘network’ (Johnston and Shearing 
2003: 160).  Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) theory of nodal security governance provides an 
important conceptual framework for accounting for the interplay between the different actors, 
institutions and assemblages that collectively populate these poly-centric fields. Emphasising 
the mediated character of nodal security governance, they write: 
‘…[this] model refuses to posit any correspondence between mentalities, the objectives, 
institutions and technologies associated with them, and governmental ‘outcomes’. For that reason 
we have been able to ask…whether the same mentality might, under different conditions, support 
normative programmes and substantive outcomes different from those which it is normally 
associated.’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 160). 
 
Johnston and Shearing do not deny the existence of ‘power inequalities within nodal networks’ 
(Ibid: 160), rather they argue that structures alone are poor predictors of outcomes.  This model 
is therefore appropriate for exploring the ways in which mediatory actors and institutions use 
policy translation to shape police reform processes and outcomes in weak and structurally 




1.2 Why Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
BiH represents a paradigmatic example of a transitional, post-conflict, and post-authoritarian 
society (Aitchison 2011). BiH is historically significant with respect to the development of the 
police reform literature. It was in relation to the work of the United Nations International Police 
Task Force (IPTF) in the aftermath of the Bosnian War that the mantra of ‘democratic policing’ 
emerged as a universal prescription for pursuing police reforms in transitional and developing 
countries around the world (Bayley 2006: 7-8).  Since 1996, BiH has been governed in relation 
to a concerted programme of liberal state-building, democratisation and most recently 
Europeanization at the behest of the international community. The European Union (EU) as the 
                                                                                                                                                           
Wacquant 2009: 137) and subjective, constructivist theories of habitus (e.g. Sartre 2003) which 
overstate the case for the rational free will of individuals while overlooking the important role that 
social structures play in shaping their mentalities and expectations of what it means to be rational 
and what it means to be free. The implication is that both Elias and Boudieu see habitus as mutable. 
4




major ‘regional security assemblage’ in Europe is chief amongst the architects of state-building 
and police reform processes in BiH (Buzan and Wæver 2003).
5
 As of October 2012, the EU 
continues to play an important role in dictating the agenda for police reform in BiH, an agenda 
which is implemented via proxy through the work of different international organisations 
including the EU’s Special Representative to BiH, the Office of the High Representative in BiH 
(OHR), a European Union Police Mission (EUPM), the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and a 
host of bi-lateral development agencies including representatives from EU constituent nations. 
Over the past decade, these agencies have worked to implement a glocal policing agenda aimed 
at aligning the governance and provision of public policing in BiH with the EU’s interest in 
securing its periphery and eventually preparing BiH for accession to the EU (Juncos 2011).  
I focus my research exclusively
6
 on BiH in order to generate sufficiently detailed case studies 
that both complement and benefit from an established body of research that accounts for the 
international community’s involvement with peacebuilding (Fischer 2006), democratisation 
(Chandler 1999, 2006), criminal justice reforms (Aitchison 2011) and policing reforms 
(Collantes Celador 2007, 2009; Wisler 2005) over the past seventeen years. This literature was 
essential for initially identifying relevant nodes to research, sketching the contours of the fields 
which they inhabit, and contextualising my analysis. The existing body of literature on liberal 
state-building in BiH readily acknowledges the asymmetrical power structures that define the 
country’s relationship with the EU as well as their role in facilitating neo-liberal forms of 
governmentality in BiH (Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005; Ryan 2011). It further questions the 
effectiveness of these reforms (Aitchison 2011), the contextual relevance of their outputs, and 
perhaps most significantly, their lasting impact (Belloni  2007).  The asymmetric and coercive 
character of transnational, hierarchical power structures of liberal state-building are said to 
undermine the functionality of constitutionally established governing institutions and restrict the 
development of what Dryzek (2002) labels ‘discursive’ forms of deliberative governance 
throughout the country. It is in relation to this transnational, nodal field that police reforms are 
initiated in BiH and can therefore be studied.  
                                                     
5 
I elaborate further on the composition and structure of the global policing field and the idea of ‘regional 
security assemblages’ in Section 2.1. 
6
 Other countries in the Western Balkans that have undergone similar processes of ‘Europeanization’ with 
a concerted focus on police reforms might have provided viable case studies for this research and 
featuring multiple country case studies could have also added comparative dimension to my 
research on policy translation. However, I limited myself to a single country case study due to 
practical constraints (i.e. time, research funding) and my desire to explore multiple examples within 




Map 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina7  
 
 
1.3 Background: Bosnia and Herzegovina 
BiH is a former constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) 
bordered by Croatia to the north and west, Serbia to the east, and Montenegro to the South. It is 
a multi-ethnic country in the sense that it features significant populations of Bosniaks (Bosnian 
Muslims), Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Serbs as well as smaller Jewish, Roma and Chinese 
populations. The last census taken in 1991 indicates that none of these populations formed an 
absolute majority. In April 1992, BiH declared its independence from the SFRY.  During the 
three years which followed, the country experienced a particularly brutal interethnic conflict 
that prompted the international community to intervene and broker the Dayton Peace Agreement 
in December 1995.  While the Dayton Peace Agreement marked an end to the Bosnian War, as 
                                                     
7
 Adapted from ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina location map’ available at: 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_location_map.svg> [Accessed 24 




a constitution for BiH its constitutional prescriptions have been criticised for establishing 
fragmented and dysfunctional political institutions (McMahon and Western 2009), creating 
dependency on the international community (Belloni 2001), and establishing the country as an 
international protectorate (Chandler 1999; Knaus and Martin 2003).  As of August 2012, the 
international community remains an important source of influence over domestic governance in 
BiH due to the enduring presence of various international agencies and institutions in the 
country and the limited governmental capacities of the country’s political institutions.  
BiH’s Dayton-prescribed government includes a weak central government based in the 
country’s political capital of Sarajevo, two entity level governments (Federation of BiH and 
Republika Srpska) and the Brčko District. While the entity-level government of the Republika 
Srpska remains highly centralised, that of the Federation of BiH (also based in Sarajevo) is 
subdivided into ten cantons, each with its own governing institutions. The effect of this political 
fragmentation is that the governance of low policing
8
 in BiH remains highly decentralised. This 
means that the implementation of local policing reforms has not been uniform and a significant 
degree of internal variation exists in terms of police capabilities and practices (International 
Conflict Group 2005). The fragmented political structures also mean that the high policing 
capacities of the BiH state were initially rather limited. As of 2012, the state level agency that 
deals with issues relating to organised crime and terrorism is the State Investigation and 
Protection Agency (SIPA) which forms part of the state’s Ministry of Security.
9
  
In addition to various policing agencies and state, entity and cantonal governmental institutions 
that are formally charged with governing security in BiH, other security nodes can be identified 
in relation to the various international actors and institutions involved with policing reforms 
since the late 1990s. These actors primarily populate nodes concerned with what Wood and 
Shearing (2006: 115) describe as the ‘governance of governance’ which means that they are not 
formal participants in policy making processes and nor do they actively contribute to the 
provision of policing.
10
  Rather, their role involves influencing policy making processes from a 
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 Throughout this thesis, I make reference to Brodeur’s (1983; 2010) distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low 
policing’. ‘High policing’ refers to state-level policing designed to ‘protect national security’ while 
‘low policing’ describes ‘everyday policing performed by uniformed agents and detectives’ (2010: 
224). While Brodeur (1983) initially articulated this distinction in relation to the history of policing 
in France, he suggests that it is a relevant feature of policing in all modern societies, even though its 
structures and institutions may vary by context (2010: 224-225). 
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 At the state-level, there also exists the BiH Border Guards (previously the State Border Service) that 
was officially activated in June 2000.   
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 A possible exception is the Integrated Police Unit of the European Union Force ALTHEA (EUFOR) 
which is mandated to ‘conduct operations in support of BiH Law Enforcement Authorities, as well 




distance by lending their expertise, resources and influence to various initiatives that involve the 
governance of security. They also play an important role in facilitating policy transfers designed 
to modernise the police in BiH and improve its institutional capacities.  
Examples of particularly influential nodal actors in BiH include major multi-lateral 
supranational institutions like the European Commission (EC), the European Union Police 
Mission (EUPM), the OHR and the OSCE. Also important are: multi-lateral international 
development organisations like UNDP, international non-governmental organisations such as 
the Saferworld Group; and bilateral development organisations like the UK’s Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC). Collectively, these organisations foster glocally-responsive policing reforms in BiH and 
thus, represent important activators of neo-liberal governmentality in the country. In Chapter 
Two, I argue that these governing activities are problematic with respect to the prospect of 
establishing democratically responsive police institutions in weak and structurally dependent 
societies. 
This thesis examines this dynamic through case studies of two community-oriented police 
reform projects in BiH.  The first project, initiated by UNDP, operated at multiple municipal-
level sites in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS) 
while the second project, initiated by the SDC, operated at the sectoral level covering the 
entirety of Sarajevo Canton. While my research supports the idea that these projects were both 
heavily influenced by the interests and mentalities of powerful international donors, my analysis 
also suggests that this influence did not translate into predictable policy outputs or outcomes. 
The following section summarises how I proceeded to account for this idea of policy translation 
with my research design and further information relating to my methodology and methods is 
available in Chapter Five.  
 
1.4 Research Design 
My first case study examines the translational capacity of international development workers at 
a major multi-lateral international development agency in BiH using an ethnographic account of 
my three-month placement with the UNDP’s ‘Safer Communities’ project in BiH in 2011.
11
 I 
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 I triangulate my use of participant observation by referencing a secondary literature on the history and 




argue that this project, which was initially launched with UNDP ‘seed funding’ yet would 
subsequently attempt to redefine itself in order to attract non-core funding from European-based 
donors, constituted an important ‘contact zone’ (Pratt 1991) within the nodal architecture of 
security governance in BiH. My analysis of this contact zone suggests that the Safer 
Communities team’s institutional affiliation with UNDP afforded it important opportunities to 
utilise policy translation to define the Safer Communities model using concepts and project 
activities that were consistent with UNDP’s ‘capacity development’ ethos. Drawing on this 
ethos and their limited knowledge of the United Nations development system, I examine how 
the Safer Communities team devised creative solutions to this impending funding dilemma 
which allowed it to retain a local focus for the project.  
With my second case study, I illustrate the translational capacities of police practitioners 
through a five-week qualitative evaluation of the implementation of an externally-initiated 
community policing project in Sarajevo Canton. Specifically, this case study accounts for the 
role of local community police officers (henceforth  ‘RPZ officers/units’) in selectively 
implementing a model for community policing that was developed by the SDC and modelled on 
the ‘best practices’ of community policing in Switzerland and Anglo-American contexts (see 
Section 9.2). My data draws from: ethnographic observation and ethnographic interviews 
focusing on the two most experienced RPZ units in Sarajevo Canton (‘RPZ1’ and ‘RPZ2’); 
semi-structured follow-up interviews conducted with their station supervisors (n=2); semi-
structured interviews with additional RPZ units operating in other parts of the Canton (n=3); 
and a semi-structured interview with the senior police officer responsible for overseeing the 
implementation of the SDC’s prescription (henceforth ‘RPZ Coordinator’).
12
  
I use subcultural analysis vis-à-vis the dramaturgical metaphor (Goffman 1956; Manning 1977) 
to explore an evident disparity that existed between the SDC’s prescriptions for community 
policing and the actual practices that individual RPZ units generated  as a result of their use of 
‘dramaturgical translation’ to selectively implement these prescriptions. A preliminary analysis 
of the operational effectiveness of the implementation of community policing in Sarajevo 
Canton suggests that it is possible to characterise this initiative as a failed policy transfer. 
However, further analysis which accounts for implementation as a translational exercise 
                                                                                                                                                           
project documents (see Appendix 2), and information gathered from informal follow-up 
conversations with members of the Safer Communities team.  
12  
Additional perspectives are provided by follow-up interviews conducted with an active project 
associate for the SDC’s community-based policing project (henceforth ‘SDC Project Associate’) 
and Sead Traljic, one of the projects’ two external evaluators who had previously worked on 




indicates that the community policing was in fact utilised as an effective presentational strategy 
by officers from RPZ1. I argue that while dramaturgical translation may have limited the 
operational effectiveness of community policing in this context, it also provided these 
practitioners with a means of selectively incorporating desirable elements of the SDC’s ‘script’ 
into their habitus. Using strategic performances and audience segmentation, these officers also 
worked to translate the SDC’s prescriptions into mentalities and practices that they thought 
would better resonate with established subcultural understandings and societal expectations of 
police work. Thus, rather than analysing these translations as evidence of a policy failure, I 
argue that they illustrate selective adaptation and the incorporation of desirable elements of the 
SDC’s community policing philosophy into the local habitus of policing.  
 
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
With the remainder of this chapter, I introduce the structure of this thesis. 
Chapter Two is the first of two literature review chapters that I use to introduce the concept of 
glocally-responsive policing as a framework for analysing internationally-driven policing 
reforms as technologies of transnational, neo-liberal governmentality. The chapter begins with a 
review of Duffield’s (1999; 2007) work on global liberal governance which I use to account for 
the hegemonic character of liberal order since the Cold War. I link these themes to Chandler’s 
(1999) critique of liberal state-building processes in BiH in order to illustrate the coercive and 
asymmetric character of the international community’s role in promoting and maintaining 
liberal peace in weak and structurally dependent societies. I proceed to link this discussion to 
work by Ignatieff (2003) and Duffield (2007) and suggest that we can analyse these 
interventions as mechanisms of neo-liberal governmentality designed to secure global 
prescriptions for local order through the formal institutions of state governance from a distance.  
Chapter Three builds on this analysis by exploring the ordering function of glocally-responsive 
policing and police reforms amidst the coercive and asymmetrical power structures described in 
Chapter Two.  I account for the ways in which policing reforms represent important 
mechanisms for generating glocal order in weak and structurally dependent societies as well as 
the politicised nature of international prescriptions for ‘democratic policing’, a popular 
framework for pursuing these reforms. Two templates for establishing glocally-responsive 
models of democratic policing are discussed: community policing and community safety 




community’s role in promoting glocally-responsive police reforms in developing and 
transitional societies before reviewing an alternative framework for pursuing ‘democratically 
responsive policing’ in these contexts.
13
 Finally, I conclude this chapter by elaborating on the 
value of analysing glocally-responsive police reforms using a nodal framework to account for 
the diverse array of actors involved with these processes. 
Chapter Four introduces policy translation as my conceptual framework for exploring the 
mediated character of glocally-responsive policing reforms. I account for the significance of 
convergence in the era of globalisation and proceed to explore various critiques of ‘policy 
transfer’ as being overly linear and deterministic in its representation of how human agency 
impacts policy making processes.  Drawing on work by Lendvai and Stubbs (2006), I argue that 
it is advantageous to use the alternative concept of policy translation to analyse police reforms 
as mediated processes that are influenced not only by the powerful architects of global policing 
and global liberal governance, but also by policy translators.  
In Chapter Five, I review my methodology and the ethnographic methods that I used to 
complete my field work in BiH. I account for various challenges that I encountered while 
conducting my ethnographic case studies including access issues and reflexivity. I also account 
for how I analysed my extensive field notes and I conclude this chapter by briefly exploring the 
methodological limitations of my research. 
Chapter Six provides specific, historical contextualisation of my case studies with a brief review 
of the police reform process in BiH since 1996. This discussion touches upon important themes 
identified in Chapters Two and Three including the domineering role of the international 
community in steering the police reform process in BiH and the popularity of templates for 
glocally-responsive community policing reforms. Reviewing the implementation of two 
community-oriented policing projects that preceded UNDP’s Safer Communities project and the 
SDC’s community policing initiative in Sarajevo Canton also foreshadows concerns about the 
non-democratic character of police reforms as mechanisms for promoting neo-liberal 
governmentality and the limited responsiveness of important decision making processes to 
domestic political institutions. 
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part of an article that is forthcoming in the European Journal of Criminology (Aitchison and 
Blaustein 2013; see Appendix 3) however, my discussion of its discursive character which draws on 




In Chapters Seven and Eight, I present my ethnographic case study of the Safer Communities 
project and explore the translational capacities of ‘local’ development workers at UNDP.
14
 
Chapter Seven provides specific contextualisation for this case study by introducing the 
capacity development ethos that is central to the habitus of the international development 
worker at UNDP. This discussion also explores the extent to which this ethos problematized by 
the co-presence of core and non-core funding streams within the UN development system.  I 
then proceed to review the specific origins of the Safer Communities project and account for 
key developments leading up to the start of my ‘internship’ which commenced in January 2011. 
I conclude this chapter by identifying the Safer Communities project as an important ‘concrete’ 
contact zone that linked local security nodes (‘Citizen Security Forums’) to various 
transnational nodes including UNDP and the EC. 
 In Chapter Eight, I present my ethnographic account of the Safer Communities project. I 
account for the use of policy translation by reflecting on the team’s attempts to render the Safer 
Communities project attractive for prospective European donors and the team’s subsequent 
decision to retain the project’s local focus on capacity development work and sustainability. 
This analysis suggests that this contact zone afforded members of the Safer Communities team 
important opportunities to structure the contours of the project and to generate policy 
prescriptions and support project activities that reflected UNDP’s capacity development ethos. 
It also illustrates the extent to which individual and institutional motives shape these negotiated 
processes and the outputs they generated. In my discussion, I also address my third research 
question regarding the potential role of policy translation in fostering democratically responsive 
policing in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH.   
Chapters Nine and Ten account for my second case study involving the SDC’s community 
policing project in Sarajevo Canton. Chapter Nine situates the SDC’s project by reviewing the 
structure of policing in Sarajevo Canton. I then proceed to account for the SDC’s prescriptions 
for community policing before analysing their effectiveness as an operational strategy in 
Sarajevo Canton. While my analysis suggests that this reform was initially unsuccessful in 
terms of generating a consistent set of community policing practices, these inconsistencies also 
highlight the agentive capacities of RPZ officers. Based on this recognition, I determine that 
there is value in analysing and re-examining this initiative as policy translation.  
                                                     
14
 A previous version of these chapters has been accepted for publication by Policing and Society 




In Chapter Ten, I introduce a new concept of ‘dramaturgical translation’ that is useful for 
analysing the translational capacities of police practitioners tasked with implementing reforms. 
Linking the work of Goffman (1956) and Manning (1977)  to that of Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) 
and Pratt (1991), I define dramaturgical translation as the use of performances to selectively and 
strategically mediate the conceptual and programmatic contours of externally-defined 
prescriptions for institutional change in ways that reflect the structured entrepreneurial interests 
of ‘performers’ in an organisational setting. Using this framework to analyse my ethnographic 
observation of the officers from RPZ1, I account for the capacity of relatively disempowered 
police practitioners to affect the conceptual and programmatic contours of policing in positive 
ways using techniques involving performance and audience segmentation. 
Finally, in Chapter Eleven, I revisit my research questions and reflect upon the prospective 
benefits of policy translation as a means of mitigating the potentially harmful or anti-democratic 
effects of externally-driven police development assistance programmes in developing and 















Chapter Two: Global Liberal Governance as Neo-Liberal 
Governmentality 
 
This literature review chapter contextualises the function and implications of glocally-
responsive policing reforms in weak and structurally dependent societies like Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). It accounts for the coercive and asymmetrical structures of international 
interventions designed to establish and enforce liberal order through the domestic architecture of 
developing and transitional states in the age of global liberal governance. Section 2.1 reviews 
the phenomenon of global liberal governance and the relationship between development and 
security in the age of globalisation (Duffield 1999; 2007).  This accounts for the impetus behind 
international interventions targeting developing and transitional states since the 1990s as well as 
the coercive and asymmetrical nature of these interventions. Section 2.2 reviews Chandler’s 
(1999; 2002; 2006) work to illustrate the coercive structures inherent to liberal state-building 
projects and in Section 2.3, I argue that a comparable dynamic is evident in relation to the 
structural politics of the international development system (Hulme and Edwards 1997).  
Returning to Duffield’s (2007) work, I conclude this chapter by labelling these interventions 
forms of neo-liberal governmentality that serve to ‘distance’ the architects of liberal order from 
the coercive, non-democratic processes that establish and reinforce their prescriptions through 
the governing architectures of weak and structurally dependent states. 
 
2.1 Global Liberal Governance and the ‘New Humanitarianism’ 
Duffield (1999) provides a critical analysis of the origins of globalisation by accounting for the 
emergence of a ‘development security’ nexus during the 1990s. He writes that this development 
can be attributed to the demise of ‘Third Worldism’ and the subsequent decline of the bi-polar 
international system beginning in the 1980s. Essentially, he argues that the lack of ideological 
competition at the international level cemented the dominance of the liberal discourse and 
contributed to the ‘reproblematisation of underdevelopment as dangerous’. This was significant, 
argues Duffield, because it served to ‘[suppress] those aspects of Third Worldism and 
international socialism that argued the existence of inequalities within the global 
system…[have] a direct bearing on the extent and nature of poverty (Ibid:28).’ This suggests 




was intrinsically liberal and that the international system no longer exists as a contested 
ideological field.  
As a result of this important shift in the ideological power structure of the international system, 
characterized by the advent of what Fukuyama (1992) would enthusiastically (and prematurely) 
describe as ‘the end of history’, Duffield (1999: 30) argues that ‘development’, be it economic, 
political or social, emerged as an important strategy for consolidating liberal power and securing 
the preservation of liberal peace as prescribed by emergent ‘networks of global liberal 
governance’. In other words, the ideal of liberal peace is grounded in a belief that the causes of 
conflict are inherently linked with underdevelopment rather than structural inequalities. 
Development has therefore emerged as a strategy for not only reducing the risk of conflict in 
underdeveloped states, but also as a mechanism for preserving the integrity of the emergent 
liberal status quo (Ibid: 112).  
In relation to this emergent global liberal order, Duffield (2007) argues that a broadened 
definition of security has been embraced by both international policy circles and by prominent 
academics working in the field of international relations (e.g. Doyle 1983; 2011). This 
broadened definition emphasised the idea that threats to international security are no longer 
limited to conventional military conflict between sovereign states but also included threats to 
‘human security’ (Kaldor 2007), ‘a more diffuse and multiform threat associated with 
alienation, breakdown and insurgency emanating from the nominal populations of Southern 
states’ (Duffield 2007: 112). For powerful international actors of the Global North, facilitating 
the development of weak states through financial assistance represents an appealing strategy for 
regulating the risk that underdevelopment may lead to conflict. Managing this risk is significant 
due to a belief that localised conflicts can produce a ripple effect and threaten regional and 
global stability. 
Before I expand on Duffield’s (2007) discussion of global liberal governance, it is important to 
account for the different global actors that define the contours of liberal order and security. 
During the 1990’s and the early 2000’s, prominent scholars in the field of international relations 
generally associated the hegemonic power structures of the international system with a single 
state actor: the United States (Huntington 1999; Caraley 2004; Chomsky 2004). However, 
subsequent analyses of the structure of international security politics and global and 
transnational policing indicate that global liberal order cannot be reduced to the strategic 
interests of a single hegemon. Rather, liberal order and security politics represent contested 




are constructed through negotiated geo-political processes involving an array of ‘regional 
security complexes’ (RSC) such as the United States and the European Union (EU). Buzan and 
Wæver (2003: 491) describe RSCs as ‘set[s] of [political] units’ whose security interests ‘are so 
interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analysed or resolved apart from 
one another’. These RSCs are said to shape the contours of global governance by using their 
regional influence to structure the international community’s response to specific issues or 
disruptions that affect their spheres of influence. This analysis is consistent with Bowling and 
Sheptycki’s (2012: 23) discussion of the poly-centric power structures that shape the contours of 
global policing as well as Andreas and Nadelmann’s (2008:21) recognition of the fact that 
‘global prohibition regimes’ are shaped by various actors that include governments ‘able to 
exert hegemonic influence in a particular issue area’ and ‘transnational moral entrepreneurs’ 
with self-interested motives for promoting and advancing particular definitions for liberal order.  
The degree of influence enjoyed by these actors inevitably varies in relation to specific geo-
political contexts. For example, a regional security hegemon like the European Union plays a 
relatively greater role in shaping the agenda for regional security in proximate regions while 
relatively more powerful actors such as the United States or China appear to enjoy greater 
influence with respect to issues of global significance. The EU’s influence over regional 
security politics is particularly evident in the Western Balkans where this supranational polity 
has played the leading role in shaping agendas for governance and security since the early 
2000’s. The EU’s interest in shaping the region is linked with its desire to secure its periphery 
as well as specific concerns about the ripple effect of political instability and conflict in 
countries like BiH and Kosovo (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 357-359).  
The emphasis on securing liberal peace and preventing local conflict as well as the recurrence of 
conflict has thus created a powerful impetus for these Northern architects of global liberal 
governance to intervene in the domestic affairs of those states whose instability or 
underdevelopment is believed to jeopardise liberal order be it regionally or globally defined.  
Duffield (1999: 11) notes that during the early 1990s, this narrative primarily manifested itself 
in the form of ‘humanitarian interventions’ however, in the late-1990s, it was re-oriented 
towards ambitions of ‘conflict resolution and post-war reconstruction’. Duffield labels this 
emergent narrative ‘the new humanitarianism’ and suggests that it embodies a belief that 
international interventions have an ‘ameliorative, harmonising and transformational power’ that 




As Chandler (1999: 13) observes, this belief reflects an emergent consensus in international 
policy making circles that ‘…new democracies are seen to be so fragile that, ‘even without any 
immediate or direct threat’, they may be susceptible to collapse’. In other words, this mentality 
demonstrates the international community’s embrace of a ‘regulatory’ approach to promoting 
and supporting democratisation. At the core of this regulatory mentality was the belief that 
‘[w]ithout the cultural preconditions of civil society, the institutions of liberal democracy are 
seen to be little more than window-dressing’ (Ibid. 10). In the age of global liberal governance, 
this suggests that the autonomy of the liberal, democratic sovereign states is in fact problematic 
as there is no guarantee that they will independently and autonomously generate policies that 
reflect emergent global definitions of liberal order.   Accordingly, Chandler (2010: 3) argues 
that the autonomy of developing and transitional states in particular is viewed as a threat to 
global liberal order ‘rather than the unproblematic starting assumption’. It is in relation to this 
mentality that a paradigm of international intervention with a transformative emphasis on liberal 
state-building (also referred to as ‘nation-building’)
15
 and democratisation has emerged over the 
past two decades.   
 
2.2 Liberal State-Building in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Historically, Duffield (2007: 7) writes that there exists no ‘essential relationship between 
liberalism and democracy’. Rather, he suggests that liberalism represents a technology of 
government but not necessarily of democratic governance.  He illustrates this claim in relation 
to the apparent contradiction between the emergence of liberal democratic forms of government 
in Western Europe during the 19
th
 Century and the persistence of ‘non-representative and 
despotic forms of imperial rule overseas’ (Duffield 2007: 7).  This ‘paradox’, argues Duffield, 
has historically been resolved through the notion of a ‘developmental trusteeship’, a liberal 
construct which he argues ‘has once again entered the political foreground following the 
renewed wave of Western humanitarian and peace interventionism of the post-Cold War period’ 
(Ibid: 7). The coercive and asymmetrical character of international interventions designed to 
promote this ‘new humanitarianism’ is particularly evident in the case of liberal state-building 
projects.  
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 The terms ‘nation-building’ (Ignatieff 2003) and ‘state-building’ will be used interchangeably in this 
thesis to refer to ‘a mechanism of ongoing relationship management which is capable of 
ameliorating the problems of autonomy, or of government, through the extension of 




In relation to liberal state-building initiatives of the past two-decades, Chandler (1999: 3) writes 
that this notion of democratisation has emphasised ‘building the capacity of individuals to be 
able to use their already existing autonomy safely and unproblematically’. In other words, 
democratisation as a focus of liberal state-building is not concerned with generating political 
freedom at the grass-roots level. Rather, it aspires to align local mentalities with global interests. 
This helps to ensure that political sovereignty does not conflict with global liberal order and the 
interests of the actors who affect its contours. To promote compatibility, international actors 
exercise their coercive powers to shape domestic governance in weak and structurally dependent 
societies like BiH. Thus, while political democratisation represents an important rhetorical 
element of liberal state-building projects over the past two-decades, the relationship between 
state-building and the idea of representative democratic governance is problematic insofar as 
state-building generally involves non-democratic practices that in certain circumstances, may 
also prove to be anti-democratic. Exploring the experience of liberal state-building in BiH 
illustrates this argument and also, the extent that important governing processes associated with 
state-building are structurally responsive to the interests of supranational actors often to the 
detriment of constitutionally established, domestic political institutions. 
During the 1990s, BiH emerged as a prototypical case of international intervention and liberal 
state-building. Whereas the impetus to intervene in conflict-ridden states or humanitarian crises 
was previously evident in other countries including Somalia and Haiti, the international 
community’s role in overseeing the peacebuilding process in BiH was unique insofar as this 
intervention extended well-beyond conflict management or containment and included 
prescriptive aspirations for reconciliation and a long-term commitment to overseeing this 
troubled state’s ‘democratic transition’.
16
 Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 
December 1995, various representatives of the international and European communities have 
played a significant role in ‘steering’ the country’s liberal democratic transition with the 
ultimate goal of establishing BiH as a member of the EU. It is beyond the remit of this thesis to 
examine the intricate and complex history of BiH and nor is there room to provide an adequate 
review of pre-war BiH, the Bosnian War itself, or its immediate aftermath.
17
 Rather, I seek to 
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 Other attempts at ‘third-party state-building’ during the mid-1990s included UN-led international 
territorial administrations over East Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor (Caplan, 2004: 10).  
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 Malcolm (1996) provides an accessible history of Bosnia and Herzegovina leading up to the Bosnian 
War while Mazower (2002), Ramet (2005) and Silber and Little (1997) provide examples of 
competing explanations for the collapse of the SFRY and the events leading up to the Bosnian War. 
Bose (2002) and Chandler (1999) provide useful discussions of the Dayton Peace Agreement as 
well as the international community’s intervention in BiH during the late 1990s. Chandler’s work 




provide a brief account of BiH’s experience as a relatively advanced case of a transitional, post-
conflict society undergoing a concerted liberal state-building process.
18
   
BiH declared its independence in March 1992 following its 47 year history as a constituent 
republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). Even prior to this event, 
however, tensions were high between the country’s three constituent nationalities. The 
imminent prospect of conflict and its perceived threat to regional stability compelled 
representatives of the international community to take an active interest in BiH’s projected 
transition to an independent, democratic state. Chandler (1999: 39) describes how in September 
1991, the European Community’s (EC) Council of Ministers organised a peace conference 
which was specifically intended ‘to keep Yugoslavia as a loose federation composing one state.’ 
This is not to suggest that the international community initially supported BiH’s bid for 
independence but rather that these proposals projected a future role for the international 
community in ‘regulating’ or overseeing any future developments. In December 1995, the 
formalisation of the international community’s prescribed oversight over this transitional 
process coincided with the signing of a brokered peace agreement that ended the four-year 
Bosnian War.  The Dayton Peace Agreement, which served as both a peace treaty and a 
constitution for the newly created Bosnian state, lies at the core of the coercive and asymmetric 
structures of liberal state-building in BiH.  
 Chandler (1999: 33) writes in drafting the Dayton Agreement, the international community 
afforded itself a legitimate remit for overseeing the long-term reconstruction of the newly 
created BiH state. In this respect, BiH emerged as the prototypical case of liberal state-building 
during the 1990s, an experimental platform upon which various strategies of intervention and 
regulation could be tested for future application to other post-conflict societies. The legal basis 
for the international community’s involvement in the domestic, sovereign affairs of this newly 
created state is evident from the eleven ‘Annexes’ listed in the Dayton Peace Agreement (see 
Office of the High Representative 1995). Given that this thesis is primarily concerned with 
police reform and the governance of security, it is worth recognising that Annex 11 of the 
                                                                                                                                                           
community’s approach to generating democracy in BiH and the extent to which these themes 
continue to resonate with the wider literature on the relationship between global liberal governance 
and security as it effects transitional and developing societies (e.g. Duffield 1999, 2007). 
18
 By ‘relatively advanced case of a transitional, post-conflict society’ I argue that BiH began its 
‘transition’ years before other high profile examples of transitional post-conflict societies including 
Afghanistan or Iraq. Unlike these recent examples, the risk of a recurrence of conflict in BiH is 
perceived to be relatively low and external security forces play only a limited role in providing 
support and training to domestic providers. ‘Advanced’ does not imply however that BiH’s 





Dayton Agreement formally established the United Nations International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) to assist the signatories with ‘meeting their obligations’ in providing ‘a safe and secure 
environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions’ and with ‘maintaining civilian law 
enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and 
with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms’. However, 
the most influential source of enduring power for the international community in BiH is Annex 
10 of the Dayton Agreement which established the Office of the High Representative in BiH 
(OHR) as the institution tasked with overseeing ‘civilian aspects of the peace settlement’ (Ibid).  
The OHR was initially established to function as the United Nations’ (UN) formal 
representative in BIH. Accordingly, the OHR’s mandate was officially endorsed by Resolution 
1031 of the UN Security Council in December 1995 (Aitchison, 2011: 51; United Nations 
Security Council 1995). The true extent of this institution’s power can be inferred from Article 
V of Annex 10 of the Dayton Agreement which states that ‘[t]he High Representative is the 
final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian 
implementation of the peace settlement’ (Office of the High Representative 1995). 
Caplan (2004: 55) suggests that while the institutional mandate of the OHR was initially weak 
compared to those prescribed for other ‘UN transitional administrators’ in Eastern Slavonia, 
Kosovo and East Timor, its powers were subsequently bolstered in December 1997 as a result 
of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) meeting in Bonn. Aitchison (2011: 50) writes that 
the institutional enhancement of the OHR was most evident in relation to the greater executive 
function which the PIC afforded it. Notably, the Council concluded that the High Representative 
should have the power ‘to make binding decisions, as he judges necessary (Peace 
Implementation Council 1997)’.
19
 The enhanced authority of the High Representative was 
specifically intended to address those cases where domestic actors were unable or unwilling to 
fulfil their legal obligations as defined by the Dayton agreement. Aitchison’s (2011: 51) 
analysis suggests that these newly afforded powers had a direct and immediate impact on the 
ability of the High Representative to make decisions. For example, only one decision was 
released through the OHR in 1997 however, after the OHR was afforded its ‘Bonn Powers’, this 
number increased to 31 decisions in 1998 and to 91 decisions in 1999.  The nature and extent of 
these prescribed powers lead Knaus and Martin (2003: 59) to describe the OHR as a ‘European 
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Raj’ with respect to its capacity to  ‘ interpret its own mandate’ and its ‘essentially unlimited 
legal powers’ which mean that ‘…it is not accountable to any elected institution at all’.  
The international community’s role self-prescribed role in BiH has subsequently prompted 
influential academic dialogues regarding apparent normative and ideological contradictions 
associated with this form of prolonged international intervention. For example, Chandler’s 
(1999: 4) critique of the international community’s approach to democratisation in BiH suggests 
that ‘[t]he agency of democratisation is no longer held to be the ‘demos’ or people, through the 
growth of political freedoms or liberties, self-government and sovereignty, but the international 
regulatory bodies which are now overseeing the political process…’ In other words, Chandler 
argues that the international community’s prolonged intervention in BiH created ‘relations of 
dependency’ rather than relations conducive to empowerment and the activation of newly 
established BiH political institutions. Chandler accounts for this trend by arguing that 
democracy, as a blanket prescription for governance in transitional societies, describes a moral 
category rather than one with political significance.  This leads him to conclude that ‘the process 
of democratisation concerns societal values and attitudes rather than political processes’ (Ibid: 
28).   
Chandler (1999) argues that the moralisation of democracy is fundamentally problematic in BiH 
because it undermines the ability of a society to independently govern itself in a manner 
responsive to public interests.  The actualisation of liberal, democratic values and political 
processes through functional institutions of governance is precluded by prevailing structures 
that advance the interests of international actors while simultaneously limiting opportunities for 
domestic stakeholders to meaningfully shape this agenda. In this respect, it is evident that 
governance in structurally dependent societies like BiH is not consistent with deliberative forms 
of democratic governance (see Section 3.4). 
Chandler’s (1999) analysis further suggests that there is a functional logic underpinning liberal 
state-building projects. In the aftermath of the Cold War, he writes that ‘the drive behind 
democratisation can be located in the needs of international institutional actors for new forms of 
co-operation and new ways of legitimating their international regulatory role’ (Ibid: 93). In 
other words, Chandler argues that democratisation served as the ‘perfect form for this ongoing 
process of international co-operation because there is no fixed end-point’ (Ibid: 193). A key 
consequence of this ‘mission creep’ in BiH is that the capacities of domestic political 
institutions remain limited as local political elites have been rendered ‘superfluous to policy 




Building on his arguments in Faking Democracy After Dayton, Chandler (2006: 8) has 
subsequently characterised the enduring presence of the international community in BiH as 
evidence of an ‘informal trusteeship’. He further concludes that that after ten years of concerted 
state-building initiatives, ‘the main transition which has taken place [in BiH] has been from the 
ad hoc policy-ownership of self-selected members of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) 
to direct regulatory control under the aegis of the European Union (EU).’  In other words, 
Chandler’s analysis suggests that the overall effect of this transition is that BiH ownership of 
these newly created institutions remains ‘limited’ and that ‘[t]he Bosnian public has effectively 
been excluded from the transition process’ (Ibid: 32-33). 
 
2.3 From Faking Democracy to Empire in Denial? 
David Chandler’s discussion of liberal state-building in BiH serves as an important platform for 
his later work which analyses the motives underpinning international interventions in other 
post-conflict societies during the 2000’s. Notably, Chandler (2002) elaborates on his argument 
that democratisation and international interventions are pursued by self-interested actors by 
exploring their motives. Focusing his analysis primarily on American and British-led 
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, he associates these motives with the need for liberal 
actors to bolster their own domestic legitimacy ‘by exaggerating the legitimacy problems of 
peripheral or pariah states’ (Ibid: 224). In other words, Chandler suggests that powerful 
international actors embrace this ‘new humanitarianism’ narrative because it enables them to 
mask their own deficiencies by focusing on those of developing and transitional states like BiH.  
He argues that the actors who steer these interventions do so for reasons other than pragmatic 
security concerns associated with the idea of ‘human security’ discussed in Section 2.1. This 
argument also introduces an important distinction between ‘liberal imperialism’ of the 21
st
 




 centuries. Whereas the latter variant is commonly associated 
with economic interests and empire-building, Chandler (2002) argues that interventions pursued 
within the framework of ‘new humanitarianism’ must respect enduring liberal norms of non-
intervention, global justice and liberal peace.  
Seeking to legitimise these interventions, Chandler (2006: 190) argues that the architects behind 
liberal state-building projects employ a ‘practice of denying empire’ in order to present their 
motives as a-political and deontological. Denying empire relies heavily on concepts like 




responsive to local development needs.  Chandler (2002: 230) is dismissive however of the 
possibility that externally-driven democratisation processes may actually contribute to the 
‘empowerment’ of individuals in recipient societies.  Instead, he argues that prolonged external 
oversight of internationally governed democratisation or state-building processes actually 
undermine local responsiveness by ensuring the ‘dismissal of the political sphere as a viable 
mechanism for generating this change in recipient societies’ (Ibid: 230). This leads Chandler 
(2006) to conclude that politically ambiguous prescriptions for state-building and 
democratisation that emphasize the language of ‘local capacity building’, ‘local ownership’, and 
‘empowerment’ are frequently compromised by the underlying structural politics of global 
liberal governance. The symbolic transfer of power and responsibility for liberal governance 
from international actors to domestic political institutions of weak and structurally dependent 
societies is therefore important because it outwardly renders them a-political. It also suggests 
that these processes can be analysed as mechanisms of neo-liberal ‘governmentality’ which 
Foucault (1991: 102) defines as: 
‘The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations 
and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has at 
its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential 
technical means apparatuses of security.’ (Foucault 1991: 102) 
  
 
2.4 The ‘New Humanitarianism’ as Neo-Liberal Governmentality 
From Chandler’s work, it is clear that liberal state-building is driven by the interests of 
powerful, supranational actors and assemblages and that ‘the new humanitarianism’ promotes 
the relative subordination of local interests to those of powerful global actors. The emphasis on 
legitimacy and the need for these actors to respect liberal norms like sovereignty and non-
intervention further implies that liberal state-building constitutes an important technique of neo-
liberal governmentality because it enables powerful global actors to legitimately transpose their 
designs for governance upon domestic political institutions in weak and structurally dependent 
societies from a distance (Duffield 2007).
20
  In this respect, we might consider that interventions 
pursued within this ‘new humanitarian’ framework constitute important mechanisms for 
producing and securing glocally-responsive order in countries that are either unable or unwilling 
to do so on their own accord.   
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The hegemonic character of the governance that shapes these interventions is also apparent from 
the work of Ignatieff (2003) who describes liberal state-building or nation-building projects as 
manifestations of ‘empire lite’.  This hegemony, argues Ignatieff, is primarily structured by 
American foreign policy interests. Lacking the status of a global hegemonic power however, 
Ignatieff (2003: 18%) writes that the Americans have effectively co-opted Europe into 
providing legitimacy and multilateral support for its ‘peacekeeping, nation-building and 
humanitarian reconstruction’ initiatives. Ignatieff’s (2003) analysis of international security 
politics is dated
21
 and overly simplistic
22
 but his argument that it is shaped by hegemonic power 
structures contributes to our understanding of the neo-liberal character of transnational forms of 
governance because it associates ‘Empire Lite’ with neo-liberal technologies of domination 
(Lemke 2001: 2) that involve the use of conditionality and indirect coercion rather than direct 
coercion or political suppression. 
From Ignatieff’s (2003) work, it is also clear that governmentality is also a feature of the politics 
of the international development system. For example, he describes how powerful international 
actors use their political influence and economic capital to steer the work of international 
organisations in transitional, post-conflict societies: 
 
 
 ‘These agencies – UNICEF, UNHCR, the International Committee of the Red Cross, - are 
dependent on Western governments for their funding, yet they struggle to keep a space free to 
meet humanitarian need irrespective of the political wishes of their paymasters. Yet humanitarian 
relief cannot be kept distinct from imperial projects, not least because humanitarian action is only 
possible, in many instances, if imperial armies have first cleared the ground and made it safe for 
humanitarians to act.’ (Ignatieff 2003: 20%) 
 
Ignatieff’s (2003) analysis of the relationship between humanitarian aid organisations and 
‘imperial powers’ focuses on the early stages of a post-conflict intervention yet his 
characterisation is consistent with Hulme and Edwards’ (1997) analysis of the structural politics 
of the  international development system more generally.  Specifically, Hulme and Edwards 
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 For example, Ignatieff’s (2003) work neglects to account for differing agendas between regional 
security assemblages (Buzan and Wæver 2003) and the influence of these polities within their 
relevant spheres of influence. This is particularly evident in relation to the EU which plays an 
important role in steering development and state-building projects in the transitional states that 




(1997: 12) account for a burgeoning interest amongst international donors in development work 
and NGO activity since the late-1990s. They argue that development aid and assistance allows 
these donors to influence agendas for development work without becoming directly involved in 
interventions or state-building processes.  Conditionality is attached to development aid and this 
allows powerful donors like the EU and the United States to transpose their policy preferences 
on developing and transitional states via proxy. International development assistance 
programmes enable donor governments to assert their interests using various ‘aid frameworks’ 
that include provisions for non-core funding that can only be accessed by those development 
agencies and NGOs that align their goals with donor interests (Ibid; Browne 2006; Ellison and 
Pino 2012).   
Linking the structural politics of the international development system with his discussion of 
global liberal governance, Duffield (2007) accounts for international development assistance as 
an important technique of neo-liberal governmentality that ‘offers donor governments several 
points of engagement with state incumbents and opportunities for selective capacity building 
without necessarily legitimising those incumbents’ (Duffield 2007: 118).  In relation to the 
liberal emphasis on maintaining a balance between freedom and order, Duffield adds that 
governmentality is particularly innovative because it maximises the social distance between the 
powerful international actors that collectively advance the interests of global liberal governance 
and the recipients of this aid whose governing autonomy is marginalised as a result.  The 
following chapter builds on this argument in exploring the ways in which glocally-responsive 
police reforms reinforce neo-liberal governance and enhance liberal ordering in weak and 
structurally dependent societies like BiH.  
Chapter Three: Glocal Policing and Liberal Order 
 
Building on the previous chapter’s discussion of global liberal governance and neo-liberal 
governmentality in developing and transitional societies, this chapter explores the significance 
of policing and police reforms as ordering mechanisms for transnational governance.  Section 
3.1 discusses why police reforms serve an important order maintenance function in aligning the 
governance of security in weak and structurally dependent societies with the interests of global 
policing and global liberal governance. It also introduces Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) 
critical theory of global policing which I argue is complementary to Duffield’s (2007) work on 




policing’ as a framework for pursuing policing reforms around the world and I examine two 
influential templates for establishing glocally-responsive forms of democratic policing: 
community policing and community safety partnerships.  
Section 3.3 accounts for the political implications of internationally-driven police reform 
processes with a review of Ryan’s (2011) work which suggests that neo-liberal governmentality 
fosters political disempowerment amidst the coercive and asymmetric structures of liberal state-
building.  This is determined to be particularly apparent with respect to their role in rendering 
local institutions responsible for the governance of security responsive to supranational interests 
rather than decisions made by domestic politicians. Seeking to confront the non-democratic 
character of internationally-driven police reform processes, I introduce an alternative framework 
for establishing ‘democratically responsive policing’ in Section 3.4. Building on this 
framework, Section 3.5 concludes this chapter by discussing the prospective benefits of 
analysing the policy transfers responsible for glocally-responsive police reforms through 
Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) nodal security governance framework. I argue that analysing 
the nodal fields through which these reforms are transmitted and constructed promises to 
illuminate various opportunities that exist for relatively disempowered mediatory policy actors 
and local practitioners to influence these reforms and potentially improve the democratic 
responsiveness of their outputs in relation to local interests and institutions of governance.  
 
3.1 Glocal Policing for Glocal Order  
In this section, I elaborate on the idea that police reforms represent important ordering 
mechanisms in weak and structurally dependent societies. My discussion proceeds with a 
review of Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) critical theory of global policing and the archetypical 
actors who promote glocal policing agendas through practitioner networks and transnational 
policy communities (Marenin 2007).  I then proceed to elaborate on the significance of police 
reforms as mechanisms for securing liberal order in the aftermath of conflict with reference to 
Marenin’s (1982) early work and Hills’ (2009) discussion of ‘security sector reforms’ in post-
conflict societies.  
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 8) define global policing as ‘the capacity to use coercive and 
surveillant powers around the world in ways that pass right through national boundaries 
unaffected by them’. This suggests that global policing serves as an important ordering 




interests of global liberal governance. This ordering function involves the anticipation and 
control of local risks that pose a threat to global order (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: pp. 91-95; 
Beck 1999). To this end, global policing facilitates the consolidation of disparate power 
structures by contributing to the strategic dissemination of liberal mentalities, policies and 
practices that align national and sub-national policing structures with liberal mentalities and 
practices (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 25). 
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Table 1 The Archetypes of Global Policing23 
‘the 
technician’ 
‘…the lynchpin of contemporary knowledge-based or 
intelligence-led policing…[t]he technician...is broadly 
concerned with the efficient gathering and management of 
data…an appendage of the surveillant assemblage’ (p. 87) 
‘the 
diplomat’ 
‘…attuned to the nuances of legal, bureaucratic and political 
difference found in the multi-institutional settings in which 
policing takes place’, the ‘diplomat’ links different policing 
agents and organisations through formal structures and 
creates basis for cooperation and partnership (p. 88) 
‘the 
entrepreneur’ 
‘…an agent of institutional change….busy advancing the next 
big idea.’ A proponent of the ‘technical wizardry of scientific 
policing’ that may also exhibit elements of ‘moral 




‘…acts to repress and circumvent some dilemmas in policing 
and dramatise others’. Key to ‘[shaping] the contours of the 
global policing mission’. (p. 89-90) 
‘the legal 
ace’ 
Capitalises on the ‘double-edged quality of law’ and uses it 
creatively to  advance the interests of transnational policing 
through the creative application of ‘civil, administrative and 
regulatory law as tools of disruption’ (p. 90) 
‘the spy’ The ‘agent provocateurs’ of policing who use covert 
techniques to achieve utilitarian ends, these agents ‘further 
colour the legitimacy of an already tainted occupation’ (p. 91) 
‘the field 
operator’ 
‘…the workhorse of policing….they manage both immediate 
issues of public safety and aim to avert future ills…major 
players in multi-agency policing, neighbourhood policing and 
community policing experiments in many jurisdictions’ (p. 91) 
‘the enforcer’  ‘…maximises the assertion that the use of force is the core 




‘Glocal policing’ describes local (sub-national) and national police organisations that are 
responsive in their strategic orientation and practices to transnational issues that have 
implications beyond their national borders (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 25). Glocal policing, 
as a means for controlling local risk and promoting structural alignment, describes a form of 
indirect intervention and neo-liberal governmentality in the context of global liberal governance. 
This implies that promoting an agenda for glocally-responsive policing does not require 
powerful global actors like the European Union (EU) to outwardly exercise direct coercion in 
order to affect the governance of security in weak and structurally dependent societies. Rather, it 
allows them to influence policing mentalities and practices from a distance through liberal state-
building processes and international development aid programmes. Accordingly, policing 
reforms can be said to represent important priorities for reformers working to promote 




Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 87-92) introduce a useful typology of the roles that different 
archetypical actors play in advancing global agendas for policing (see ‘Table 1: The Archetypes 
of Global Policing’). Many of these archetypical actors also play an important role in promoting 
glocal policing agendas in weak and structurally dependent societies as Bowling and Sheptycki 
write that different actors like ‘international liaison officers’ translate the global policing 
agendas from ‘the world stage’ to ‘the local street corner’ and that they do so using adaptive and 
potentially overlapping subcultural scripts that reflect a common ‘subculture of transnational 
policing’ (Ibid: 93). At the core of this ‘subculture’ is the notion that ‘policing agents can be 
solutions to the problem of authority’ amidst growing concerns regarding the pervasiveness of 
new forms of transnational crimes in an age of globalisation and their threat to liberal peace and 
order (Ibid: 78-84). Glocally responsive policing is thus embraced by these actors as a solution 
to this ‘problem of authority’ (Ibid: 25). Specifically, international liaison officers representing 
international organisations including international policing bodies like the International 
Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol) and even international development organisations like 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) seek to foster the dissemination of global 
policing priorities by initiating and facilitating asymmetrical (global -> local) policy transfers 
that transpose the best of policing in Western liberal democracies in developing and transitional 
states (Ellison and Pino 2012: 2).  
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Glocal policing as a technique of neo-liberal governmentality raises important questions about 
the legitimacy of the security governance outcomes it generates and it is also important to 
acknowledge that internationally-imposed criminal justice reforms modelled on the best 
practices of Western liberal democracies may also generate undesirable and potentially 
criminogenic outputs (Bowling 2012). Specifically, Cohen (1988) theorises the propensity of 
one-sided policy transfers to supplant ‘traditional’ systems and practices with dysfunctional and 
unjust Western models of policing and crime control in developing, ‘Third World’ countries. In 
this respect, Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) work suggests that glocally-responsive policing 
reforms may be harmful or ‘iatrogenic’ for recipient societies. The idea that police reforms may 
be iatrogenic draws from Illich’s (1977a) critique of the inadvertent harms generated by 
treatments within the medical profession. Drawing on Illich’s (1977a; 1977b) work, Cohen 
(1988: 191) identifies three different forms of harm that can also be used to account for the 
consequences of Western criminal justice reforms introduced to the Global South.  
Clinical iatrogenesis accounts for the criminogenic effects of policies, similar to what Cohen 
(1988: 191) describes as ‘the harmful side effects of drugs, doctor-inflicted pain, unnecessary 
surgery, and the like’. In the context of criminology, Cohen likens clinical iatrogenesis to ‘the 
ironic ways in which control agencies create and stabilize deviance’ through their efforts to 
control it (Ibid: 191).  The second type of harm described by Cohen is ‘cultural iatrogenesis’ in 
which new categories of deviance are established in recipient societies to reflect Western 
interests and mentalities on crime. This is said to displace local mentalities and strategies for 
addressing disorder and ultimately, lead to cultural homogeneity and intolerance of traditional 
behaviours and values (Ibid: 192).  Building on these ‘clinical’ and ‘cultural’ harms,  Cohen 
describes ‘social iatrogenesis’ as the propensity of such reforms to  alter the expectations and 
the mentalities of recipient publics and render them insecure and overly dependent on the formal 
institutions of the state to provide them with security and justice (Ibid: 191). 
The various consequences associated with international attempts to generate glocally-responsive 
policing reforms in developing and transitional societies implies that one must move beyond a 
functionalist account of why these reforms are pursued in order to analyse their sociological 
significance. This is the position taken by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) who are critical of 
functionalist justifications of global and transnational policing and it also informs the 
ontological perspective of my research. With respect to the coercive and asymmetric structures 
underpinning police reforms pursued in developing and transitional countries like BiH, I argue 




ordering mechanisms consistent with the previous section’s discussion of neo-liberal 
governmentality. This is to suggest that the aim of glocal policing cannot be reduced to 
functionalist aspirations of improving the governance of security in ways that address the needs 
of local citizens but rather, reformers use police reforms to transpose a particular variant of 
liberal order upon the state and to secure this order through the institution of policing. The belief 
that the police are intended to perform important order  generating and maintenance functions is 
therefore crucial for understanding the importance of glocally-responsive policing reforms as 
order generating mechanisms in post-conflict, developing and transitional societies.
25
 
Marenin’s (1982) early work on policing in post-colonial Africa introduces an important 
distinction between the ‘general’ and ‘specific’ order maintenance functions of policing, a 
distinction  which remains relevant to the study of police reform and state-building in the 
context of global liberal governance. The essence of this distinction is summarised by Walker 
(1994: 25-26) who writes that policing as a form of general order maintenance involves 
‘...preserving public tranquillity...’ while policing oriented towards the maintenance of a 
specific order is concerned with ‘...protecting the interests of those in a dominant political and 
social position...’ Writing from a critical perspective, Marenin (1982: 379) provides a powerful 
characterisation of the relationship between police behaviour and state power which suggests 
that ‘the police make real, by what they do or fail to do, the intentions and interests of the state 
and of those groups that attempt to control the state.’ In elaborating on this distinction between 
general and specific order, he writes: 
‘A concrete order then has two aspects: a general-order aspect reflecting the interest of all in 
regularity- that is what the relative autonomy of the state means – and a specific-order reflecting 
the use of state power to promote specific interests – that is what the concept of “domination by 
the state” means.’ (Marenin 1982: 382) 
 
However, Marenin (1982: 383) writes that general orders are culturally diverse, that is, defined 
by states and their populations. To illustrate this argument, he writes that ‘[t]he conception of 
general order during the cultural revolution in China is far different from that held in the Soviet 
Union under Stalin or from the liberal conception of the ‘rule of law’ (Ibid: 383).  Drawing on 
the work of Engels (1959 cited by Marenin 1982), Marenin argues that the sociological 
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distinction between general and specific variants of order remains universally valid insofar as 
social organisation and subordination represent intrinsic components of any modern society.  
The advent of globalisation and global liberal governance during the 1990’s raises important 
questions about the enduring relevance of this distinction. For example, my review of work by 
Duffield (2007) and Chandler (1999; 2002) in the previous chapter suggests that in weak and 
structurally dependent states, legitimate orders are no longer defined primarily through domestic 
processes of democratic governance
26
 but rather in relation to global prescriptions for liberal 
order. This liberal hegemony may therefore be described as a ‘specific’ prescription for ‘general 
order’, one which derives its power and legitimacy from its emphasis on collective security at 
the global level. Any potential threat or disruption to the collective security of the international 
system emanating from an underdeveloped or conflict-ridden state is construed as a threat to the 
general order of all states. This creates an important justification for both military and 
humanitarian interventions as well as the long-term project of liberal state-building (see Section 
2.1). I argue therefore that the distinction between general and specific types of order 
maintenance remains relevant to our understanding of policing in the age of global liberal 
governance but that Marenin’s (1982) articulation of the state as autonomous is obsolete. 
Rather, sovereign order at the national level represents an important building block of liberal 
peace and order, one that the architects of global liberal order and global policing believe must 
be secured before it can be nurtured and ultimately afforded genuine political freedoms. 
The ‘new humanitarianism’ holds that it is a state’s responsibility to establish security necessary 
for liberal order within its borders and that failure to do so amounts to a justification for 
intervention or a call for help (Hills 2009: 2). The state is therefore rendered a functionary of 
global liberal governance through neo-liberal governmentality, its own legitimacy determined 
by its willingness and capacity to secure structural alignment and promote the modernisation of 
key governing institutions like the public police. In relation to the enduring appeal of the 
modern state as the vessel through which general order can be established in the aftermath of 
conflict, Hills (2009) observes that the ‘holistic’ concept of ‘Security Sector Reforms’ (SSR) 
has been embraced by representatives of the international community. SSR describes a 
broadened template for restoring security in the aftermath of conflict, one that emphasises the 
important relationship between democratic policing and ‘democratic governance’.  Accordingly, 
Hills defines SSR as ‘the broad range of policies programmes and projects promoting 
democratic-style police reform in post-conflict [societies]’ (Ibid: 82).  
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Ellison and Pino’s (2012) research on international police development assistance programmes 
suggests that the actors and organisations that shape agendas for SSR in developing and 
transitional societies extend beyond the archetypes described by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) 
and need not subscribe to a ‘subculture of transnational policing’. It is therefore necessary to 
consider that their involvement in policing reforms may be secondary to their interest in 
pursuing capacity development goals or a democratisation agenda and that these actors need not 
view security as an end in itself.  Together with the archetypes of global policing and prominent 
academics who play an important role in conceptualising frameworks for ‘democratic policing’ 
(e.g. Bayley 2001), international development workers as proponents of SSR populate important 
‘transnational policy communities’ (Marenin 2007: 179) that play an important role in shaping 
agendas for glocally-responsive policing in developing and transitional societies like BiH. The 
following section critiques the definitional contours of ‘democratic policing’.  
 
3.2 ‘Democratic Policing’ as Glocally-Responsive Policing 
‘Democratic policing’ has emerged as the one-size-fits-all solution for police reform in both 
mature and transitional democratic societies however limited consensus exists regarding what it 
actually means for a policing institution to be ‘democratic’. I argue that we must therefore view 
‘democratic policing’ as a ‘moral category’ rather than a political concept. This position is 
consistent with Chandler’s (1999:28) argument that ‘democracy’ represents a rhetorical device 
used by proponents of liberal state-building in BiH rather than a genuine political reality. It 
implies that democratic policing is defined by the interests of its architects rather than actual 
democratic processes of governance that represent the interests of security consumers. The lack 
of consensus regarding what it means for policing to be ‘democratic’ is evident with respect to 
an academic literature that struggles to pin-point this concept and which fails to articulate a 
universally agreed upon model for what democratic policing might look like in practice. 
Accordingly, democratic policing has emerged as an important normative device that enables 
reformers to practice neo-liberal governmentality and align domestic police institutions with the 
hegemonic interests of global liberal governance.
27
 
One of the more commonly cited definitions for ‘democratic policing’ that resonates with both 
academics and members of the transnational policy communities responsible for promoting 
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Blaustein 2013) but it is also necessary to acknowledge that Ellison and Pino (2012: 1) present a 




police reforms in transitional, post-conflict societies is that of Bayley (2001 referenced by Hills 
2009: 61) who defines democratic policing as ‘the idea that the police are a service, not a force, 
with the primary focus on the security of the individual rather than the state. Its definitive 
characteristics are the ‘responsiveness’ of the police to the need of individual citizens, and its 
‘accountability for its actions to the public it serves’.  Bayley’s emphasis on the criteria of 
responsiveness and accountability as important elements of democratic policing is consistent 
with certain articulations of liberal democratic governance more generally (Kuper 2004) but 
Chandler’s (1999) critique of the asymmetrical structures inherent to liberal state-building 
suggests that the prospect of actually establishing democratically responsive or accountable 
policing in countries like BiH is inherently problematic. The work of prominent police 
sociologists like Bittner (1978) and Manning (2010) gives us reason to further question whether 
these values are in fact practicable in advanced liberal democracies given the coercive function 
of the institution and the lack of transparency surrounding its activities.  
Drawing on these critiques, Manning (2010: 9) concludes that the rhetoric of democratic 
policing lacks an empirical basis but rather, it represents a rhetorical device that serves to 
normalise coercion and control. In transitional, post-conflict societies like BiH, Manning adds 
that the aspiration of achieving ‘democratic policing’ is particularly problematic given that these 
contexts feature ‘institutional and cultural structure[s] that [do] not possess or support 
democratic policing’ (Ibid: 9). Analysed as a ‘moral device’, democratic policing provides 
reformers with an important hegemonic framework for legitimising their prescriptions for 
liberal glocal order.  
Ellison and Pino’s (2012) work further indicates that the rhetoric of democratic policing also 
provides donors with an important framework for legitimising the conditionality they attach to 
non-core funding allocated for SSR projects in weak and structurally dependent societies. 
Recognising the politicised character of this concept and the coercive and asymmetrical power 
structures associated with the international development system, Ellison and Pino conclude that 
‘policing and police reform cannot be divorced from other forms of [international development] 
assistance’ (Ibid: 1). Accordingly, they suggest that international police development assistance 
projects must be analysed in relation to established critiques of the international development 
system popular during the 1960s.
28
 Specifically, they argue that ‘neoliberal development’ work 
is fundamentally problematic because ‘it has at its core some level of geo-strategic manipulation 
and an emphasis on donor/national interest’ (Ibid: 35-35). They also add that such initiatives are 
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unlikely to generate anticipated outcomes because they ‘[promote] a universalistic one-size fits 
all paradigm with similar development/reformist templates used in a variety of contexts that 
often differ greatly in terms of history, politics, culture and levels of social and economic 
equality (Ibid: 35-36)’.  The following sub-section examines ‘community policing’ and 
‘community safety partnerships’ as two popular templates for pursuing SSR at the local level.  
3.2.1 Community Policing 
Brogden (1999: 168) writes that community policing emerged as a North American invention 
that has since spread throughout Western Europe as a result of ‘…the hegemony of North 
American scholarship in police studies’. It has since been embraced by policy entrepreneurs and 
reformers around the world as an important template for establishing democratic policing at the 
local level.  A comparative typology of different international models of community policing 
provided by Wisler and Onwudiwe (2008) who distinguish between ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ 
models of community policing; ‘state initiated’ and ‘social’ models of community; and models 
designed to control social behaviour and those designed to control crime. As an ‘export 
commodity’ for developing and transitional societies, state-initiated models of community 
policing are the norm as international reformers primarily focus their efforts on developing the 
institutional capacities of the public police rather than traditional or informal mechanisms of 
policing and social control that may also (or have previously) contributed to communal security 
governance. Beyond this distinction, however, the policies and practices apparent from various 
models of community policing that have been introduced around the world are diverse. This 
suggests that the popularity of community policing reforms is a function of its rhetorical appeal 
as a ‘buzzword’ (Skolnick and Bayley 1988: 4) rather than the demonstrated effectiveness of a 
particular set of practices.
29
 
Given its underlying narrative which presents community policing as a strategy for improving 
collaboration between the public and the police (Manning 1984: 288) and the extent to which 
this strategy has historically appealed to domestic reformers in Anglo-American contexts at 
points when the institutional capacities and competencies of the police have been called into 
question (Alderson 1979; Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969), it is hardly surprising that this 
paradigm has gained credibility as a template for improving relations between the police and 
local populations in conflicted or underdeveloped societies. While it is clear that ‘liaison 
officers’ (Bowling and Shearing 2012) play an important role in promulgating familiar models 
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in Sarajevo Canton to their Swiss and Anglo-American origins, I discuss ‘problem-solving’ and 




of community policing around the world, these entrepreneurial actors are not the only members 
of the transnational policy communities that contribute to the global dissemination of these 
models. Rather, in the context of transitional and developing societies, international 
development workers, local policy makers and local practitioners have also served as champions 
of community policing reforms. Previously documented examples of community policing 
projects in transitional and developing societies can be found throughout the Caribbean 
(Deosaran 2002); Latin America (Frühling 2007); Northern Ireland (Topping 2008a; 2008b); 
South East Europe (Ryan 2007; Vejnovic and Lalic 2005); and Sub-Saharan Africa (Brogden 
2002; Brogden and Shearing 1992; Ruteere and Pommerello 2003). 
Brogden and Nijhar (2005: 2-3) suggest that entrepreneurial prescriptions for community 
policing appeal to international development organisations and domestic reformers because they 
are widely marketed as ‘a policing elixir that will resolve all social ills’.  In practice, however, 
the community policing practices and structures that are generated by these policy transfers 
appear to deviate from the initial prescriptions of their Western architects. This suggests that 
representatives of the international development community and local policy makers and 
practitioners play an important role in terms of adapting ‘off-the-shelf’ prescriptions for 
community policing to fit local contextual and structural circumstances.  In the following 
Chapter, I account for these transformational processes by introducing the concepts of ‘policy 
transfer’ and ‘policy translation’ however, for the discussion at hand, it suffices to note that the 
practices and mentalities that are prescribed by reformers tend to reflect an amalgamation of 
various national models that have been promoted or imposed upon this context by different 
policy entrepreneurs and adapted selectively and strategically by international development 
agencies and local actors (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 7-9).   
3.2.2 Community Safety Partnerships 
Proverbial depictions of the public police in the Anglo-American context describe this 
institution as the ‘thin blue line’ between order and disorder in the context of modern societies 
(Waddington 1998: 4)
30
 however over the past three decades, the primacy of the public police in 
the context of advanced, liberal democratic societies has been challenged by the realities of an 
increasingly pluralistic policing field. This section briefly examines this ‘preventative turn’ in 
crime control policies in the European context and the extent to which this trend has been 
replicated in the context of transitional and developing states. It is beyond the remit of this paper 
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to fully address the important question of why liberal and neo-liberal governments embrace and 
utilise crime control policies emphasising prevention however, it is useful to acknowledge that 
important factors include a combination of structural pressures, political culture and local 
contextual circumstances. This suggests that European crime control policies oriented towards 
prevention and partnership did not evolve uniformly but rather Crawford (2009: xvi) argues that 
these ‘models were heavily influenced by political ideology and reflected different assumptions 
about crime, behavioural motivations and appropriate ways of organising regulatory responses.’  
Among the five common structural factors (or perhaps more accurately trends) identified by 
Crawford (2009)
31
, there is one factor which resonates particularly well with Foucault’s (1991: 
102; see Section 2.3) concept of governmentality and the argument that the public police are 
playing an increasingly limited role in generating social order: a ‘[g]rowing acknowledgement 
of the limited capacity of formal institutions of criminal justice to adequately reduce crime and 
effect change in criminal behaviour, spurred by a recognition that the leavers of crime lie 
beyond the reach of formal institutions of control’ (Ibid: 2; see also Garland 1996). It is in 
relation to neo-liberal mentalities that various models for coordinating and governing the 
provision of plural policing became popular during the 1980s and 1990s.  Notably, Rose (2000: 
323) suggests that in the Anglo-American context, this mode of thinking was symptomatic of 
‘advanced liberal’ forms of government that involve ‘a widespread recasting of the ideal role of 
the state, and the argument that national governments should no longer aspire to be the 
guarantor and ultimate provider of security…’ but rather a ‘partner, animator and facilitator for 
a variety of agents’.  
While Crawford (2009: 8-11) acknowledges significant cross-national (and even intrastate) 
variance in terms of how community safety and crime prevention policies have manifested in 
Europe, he observes that many of the national ‘models’ with their distinctive character and 
origins have in fact become ‘hybridized’ in recent years. Drawing on the case studies included 
in his edited collection, Crawford suggests that hybridization is particularly evident in relation 
to the emergence of crime prevention policies in Southern European states like Italy (Melossi 
and Selmini 2009) and in former Soviet-bloc countries like Hungary and Slovenia where ‘the 
development of crime prevention strategies and an infrastructure to deliver them has been 
closely associated with the processes of transition’ (Crawford 2009: 13). This analysis is 
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supported by the idea that the EU plays an important role in facilitating policy transfers (Bulmer 
et al 2007), both within its borders and beyond. Promoting convergence through policy transfers 
therefore helps the EU to manage potential sources of insecurity through the practices of 
national and sub-national governments.  
In acknowledging the convergent character of recent European manifestations of crime 
prevention policies, particularly ‘community safety partnerships’ (CSP), Crawford (2009: 14) 
attributes these convergent trends
32
 and the ‘internationalisation of crime prevention’ to ‘the 
development of transnational and supranational networks’ like the European Forum for Urban 
Security (EFUS), the UN-HABITAT Safer Cities programme, and the European Crime 
Prevention Network (ECPN) among others.  These networks overlap with elements of the 
transnational policy communities that contribute to the dissemination of community policing to 
developing and transitional societies around the world and have been particularly susceptible to 
the influence of British and Dutch policy entrepreneurs, a factor which Crawford argues has 
contributed to the popularisation of situational and technological forms of crime prevention like 
CCTV (Ibid:  14).  
The rhetorical influence of the British
33
 model of crime prevention with its emphasis on ‘the 
cultivation of community involvement and the dissemination of crime prevention ideas and 
practices’ (Garland 2001: 16) is perhaps most evident in relation to the ongoing efforts of 
international organisations and development agencies to establish CSPs in the context of 
transitional and developing countries since the mid-1990s. Noting variation between CSP’s 
across England and Wales, Edwards and Hughes (original emphasis 2009: 67) describe CSPs as 
a ‘hybrid’ policy which ‘sits at the intersection of attempts by the state to deliver welfare and 
security, and policing and control in local communities’. In the context of England and Wales, 
this emphasis on ‘community’ as the territorial unit best positioned to generate improved 
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 Crawford elaborates on these convergent trends by citing the work of Jones and Newburn (2007) who 
suggest that the nature of this convergence has more to do with rhetoric than with actual policy 
content. This is an important consideration which I will return to when I examine the role that 
UNDP played in transferring the Safer Communities model to BiH.  
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 The British model I speak of refers to developments in England and Wales during the early 1990s. 
Specifically, I reference the ‘Safer Cities Programme’ initiated during the late 1980s (Crawford 
2002) and ‘Safer Communities’ which began in 1991 (Edwards and Hughes 2009). Note that this 
does not account for developments in Scotland that emerged in response to similar contextual 
circumstances as those which prompted important policy developments in England and Wales 
during the 1990s but were ultimately oriented towards social justice outcomes rather than ‘an 
unnecessarily narrow criminal justice agenda’ (Henry 2009: 87). The Scottish experience as well as 
the experiences of many other European nations have undoubtedly contributed to hybrid 
manifestations of CSPs in these transitional and developing contexts, however, it is beyond the 




security and to implement crime prevention strategies and technologies reflected the growing 
neo-liberal aversion to social welfare policies during this period. As Rose (1996: 331) argues, 
this aversion compelled policymakers to embrace ‘the community’ as ‘a new plane or surface 
upon which micro-moral relation among persons are conceptualized and administered.’ 
The Safer Cities Programme is perhaps the most prominent example of the application of CSP 
initiatives in the context of transitional and developing societies. Created in 1996 ‘at the request 
of African Mayors seeking to tackle urban crime and violence in their cities’, the Safer Cities 
Programme was developed by UN-HABITAT in cooperation with EFUS and the International 
Centre for the Prevention of Crime to improve urban safety in the developing world (UN-
HABITAT 2007: 2). The language employed by UN-HABITAT to promote this initiative 
clearly echoes important narrative elements of the preventative turn in Europe. For example, the 
UN-HABITAT brochure for the Safer Cities Project clearly states:  
‘Local authorities have a key role to play in addressing the rising public demand to reduce crime 
and violence. Success depends on partnerships between local governments and other 
stakeholders.’ (UN-HABITAT 2007: 3) 
 
Other examples of CSP initiatives in transitional and developing countries include UNDP ‘Safer 
Communities’ projects (BiH, Croatia and Kosovo) and CSP schemes initiated by development 
agencies and NGOs like the UK Department for International Development (BiH), the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (BiH and Romania) and the Saferworld Group 
(Kosovo, Bangladesh, Kenya, Nepal, Sudan and Somalia). While the specific activities and 
structures prescribed by these projects vary, their rhetorical emphasis on improving the 
provision of local security and safety through partnership and prevention remains consistent. It 
is also apparent that the pursuit of CSP initiatives in these contexts is often linked with attempts 
to implement localised forms of community policing, particularly in the case of those 
manifestations which draw their inspiration from the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model of community 
policing with its emphasis on ‘notions of local police autonomy, delegation of policing powers 
to local governments and municipalities (sometimes even private actors), and plural policing 
agencies frameworks’ (Wisler 2010: 2).  
Ryan (2011) acknowledges that plural forms of policing and security governance have become 
increasingly prevalent in the context of transitional societies and argues that these developments 
are illustrative of the broader shift of reformative emphasis away from the language of ‘police 




because it contributes to the erosion of political freedom in recipient societies by ‘institut[ing] 
mechanisms that would activate liberal sources of power and marginalize alternatives’ (Ibid: 
12). The following section elaborates on the political consequences of glocally-responsive 
policing reforms with a review of Ryan’s critique. 
 
3.3 Glocal Policing and the ‘Freedom of Security’ 
Ryan (2011: 7) argues that police reform, as an important aspect of an overarching process of 
liberal state-building and democratisation, constitutes an important form of ‘securitisation’ 
(Buzan et al. 1998)
34
, one that serves to supplant the ‘political freedom’ of the recipient society 
with what he describes as the ‘freedom of security’.  Understanding the distinction between 
‘political freedom’ and the ‘freedom of security’ is key to Ryan’s analysis of why the public 
police as an institution, and the  prospect of democratising the police represent important 
components of any liberal state-building process. Political freedom is defined by Ryan (2011: 
90) as ‘the freedom to question the validity of the status quo’. Conversely, his concept of the 
‘freedom of security’ must be understood in relation the work of influential modern political 
theorists like Hobbes and Kant which accounts for the relationship between governance and 
security.  
It is in relation to the work of Hobbes (1947) and his idea that ‘security is a unifying project’ 
that Ryan locates the utilitarian emphasis of police reform as a technology of neo-liberal 
governance. Ryan (2011) observes that Hobbes’ (1947) Leviathan posits that a symbiotic 
relationship exists between the values of freedom and security, one which suggests that 
‘security is instrumental to the perpetuation of the common good’ (quoting Ryan 2011: 22, 
original emphasis).  Hobbes equates the common good with the values of liberty and freedom 
however he suggests that these values must be ‘moulded to a common [sovereign] will’ (orig. 
emphasis Ryan 2011: 22). In this respect, Ryan notes that the Hobbesian perspective 
distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable forms of freedom. Whereas acceptable 
forms of freedom refer to rational thoughts and actions that enable society to thrive, 
unacceptable forms of freedom refer to ‘the chaotic plurality of wills one finds amongst the 
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heathen’ (Ibid: 7).  With reference to the metaphor of the police as a ‘thin blue line’, Ryan 
writes that the police represent ‘an elemental aspect of liberal modern governance’ that provides 
security necessary for sustaining acceptable variants of freedom while simultaneously 
suppressing those manifestations that threaten to compromise this social and political order’ 
(Ibid: 7). In other words, policing serves to rationalise freedom through coercive practices.  
While Hobbes’ work accounts for why coercion is necessary for securing order, Ryan (2011) 
suggests that it is Kant’s (1983) Perpetual Peace thesis that has had the greatest influence on 
neo-liberal mentalities of global liberal governance since the 1980s. Ryan (2011: 24) writes that 
it is in relation to the work of Kant and ‘selective readings’ of his ‘perpetual peace thesis’ that 
liberal internationalists of the 1980s derived their ‘philosophy of control and order’. For Kant, 
Ryan argues that freedom represents a moral ends in its own right. Whereas the Hobbesian 
perspective views freedom as a necessary component of social and political order, Ryan (2011: 
23) writes that the Kantian perspective emphasizes that ‘[h]ow we discipline ourselves in our 
minds and create our inner freedom is postulated as a framework, and a starting point, for how 
we secure our societies and our international system’.  In other words, the Kantian perspective 
argues that a liberal society must be comprised of liberal subjects who internalise its values and 
advance its cause. Drawing on Adorno’s (2007) reading of Kant, Ryan (2011: 24) notes that the 
Kantian prescription for freedom is in practice problematic because the actualisation of 
perpetual peace requires ‘coercive institutions capable of securing and liberating the individual’. 
This suggests that individuals, or in the case of global liberal governance, individual states, must 
be compelled to voluntarily embrace liberal values. However, as evident from the previous 
chapter’s discussion, some degree of coercion is necessary and justifiable for the purpose of 
instilling these liberal values through processes of neo-liberal governmentality.  
It is in relation to this caveat that Ryan (2011) argues that liberal internationalists like Doyle 
(1983) drew upon Kant’s work and articulated their theory of liberal peace in the 1980s. This 
notion of liberal peace has subsequently underpinned the logic of neo-liberal governmentality 
and it continues to provide powerful Western actors with a liberal basis for intervening in the 
sovereign affairs of non-liberal states (Ryan 2011: 24). Critiquing the paradigms of liberal peace 
and the global liberal governance, Ryan (2011: 25) references Arendt’s (2000) critique of Kant 
in arguing that ‘a key feature of modernity' involves ‘the colonization of freedom by security’.  
This suggests that neo-liberal forms of governance do not identify freedom as an ends in itself 
but rather they treat it as ‘a marginal phenomenon’ (Arendt 2000: 443 quoted in Ryan 2011: 




existential to the status quo, that it is indistinguishable from necessity…’ (Ibid: 25). This leads 
Ryan to conclude that neo-liberal governance renders the pursuit of freedom and security as 
indistinguishable phenomena.  The cumulative effect of their conflation for recipients of police 
reforms and SSR in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH is that ‘political 
freedoms’ are supplanted by a ‘freedom of security’ that is ultimately responsive to the interests 
of powerful global actors like the EU.  This is suggestive of Chandler’s (2006: 6) critique of 
liberal state-building processes which describes how ‘[t]he functional capacity of state 
institutions is privileged over their representational or policy-making autonomy and 
increasingly understood in technical or administrative terms’.  
 
3.4 A Framework for Democratically Responsive Policing 
In Section 3.2, I argued that the concept of ‘democratic policing’ as a prescription or a 
benchmark for desirable or legitimate policing in developing and transitional societies lacks 
objective meaning.  This established that there is in fact no universally agreed upon framework 
for pursuing or measuring the attainment of democratic policing but that democratic policing 
constitutes a contested, hegemonic device that is defined by entrepreneurial members of a 
thriving transnational policy community that is responsive to elements of a subculture of 
transnational policing and neo-liberal mentalities associated with global liberal governance.  
With reference to critical and cultural theories of global and transnational policing (e.g. Bowling 
and Sheptycki 2012), one can further infer that this label affords these actors a vehicle for 
normatively validating their prescriptions for glocal order and security through the domestic 
political architecture of weak and structurally dependent societies. This process has been 
characterised as an important technology of governmentality with significant implications for 
the governance of security in recipient societies.  Notably, Ryan (2011) argues that this process 
contributes to the securitisation of political freedom suggestive of what I label a ‘democratic 
policing deficit’. This is to suggest that the ‘democratic’ character of policing in weak and 
structurally dependent societies like BiH is rendered predominantly responsive to the interests 
of external actors rather than the security needs of local citizens.   
Recognising the conceptual ambiguities inherent to ‘democratic policing’ and the risks 
associated with pursuing externally-defined prescriptions for this mantra, Aitchison and 




reforms that is consistent with deliberative
35
 theories of democratic governance and the idea of 
‘democratic’ or ‘participatory policy analysis’
36
: ‘democratically responsive 
policing’.
37
According to this framework, the key determinant of whether a police service is 
democratically responsive involves the qualified question of whether its governance and 
activities are primarily responsive to the interests of its demos.
38
  It is in relation to Kuper’s 
(2007: 103-4) work on global democracy that we derive our definition for ‘responsiveness’ 
which we identify as the key determinant of democratic governance.
39
 Kuper’s work suggests 
that there are two dimensions to ‘responsiveness’: horizontal and vertical: 
‘Vertical responsiveness describes a situation in which the ‘reasonable contestations’ of citizens 
generate a ‘proper response’ from those in positions of authority. This is not a case of simple 
acquiescence to the demands of a majority, or a particularly vocal minority, and responses may 
vary from explanation through to policy change (Kuper 2007: 104).Horizontal responsiveness 
captures the checks and balances between political actors and institutions. The fact that a range 
of authorities are interdependent encourages them to build consensus and operate together 
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 Cooke (2000: 947) defines deliberative democracy ‘in its simplest terms’ as: ‘a conception of 
democratic government that secures a central place for reasoned discussion in political life’ but 
adds that   different theorists have articulated diverse and at times ‘dissimilar’ prescriptions and 
purposes for deliberative democracy (e.g.; Habermas 1994; Rawls 1997). My use of ‘deliberative 
democracy’ is consistent with Dryzek’s (2002: 17) concept of ‘discursive democracy’ which serves 
as a critique of mainstream ‘liberal constitutionalist’ theories of deliberative democracy which 
suggest that the ‘shortcomings’ of deliberative democracy can be resolved via constitutional 
amendment or legislation. By contrast, Dryzek’s concept of ‘discursive democracy’ stresses the 
notion that formal institutions of liberal democratic governance are incapable of addressing 
structural exclusion and disenfranchisement insofar as they serve the powerful.  
36
 Specifically, I refer to deLeon’s (1992: 125) argument that participation in policy making processes is a 
key determinant of their legitimacy given their ‘elite characterizations’ and the inevitable cultural 
disconnects that exist between policy actors and policy recipients.  
37
 Papadopoulos and Warin (2007: 450) note, ‘[p]articipatory and deliberative theories share a common 
target of improving legitimacy by improving the quality of public life – albeit by slightly different 
means.’ I focus my analysis on this idea of ‘participatory policy analysis’ rather than the broader 
notion of ‘participatory democracy’ in recognition of various issues associated with the latter 
concept however both concepts are oriented towards improving the legitimacy of governing 
processes. These issues are usefully summarised by deLeon (1992: 127) as those of ‘informed 
citizenry’ (i.e. do citizens have the necessary knowledge to make informed decisions?); ‘involved 
citizenry’ (i.e. apathy or disengagement with political processes); ‘technical problems’ (i.e. logistics 
of mass participation) and ‘functional problems’ (i.e. ensuring policy actors actually incorporate the 
public’s will into their decision making processes).  
38
 Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) also argue that ‘policing for democracy’ (see Section 6.2) represents a 
necessary but insufficient platform for democratically responsive policing.  
39
 With reference to the established literature on democratic policing (Jones et al 1996; Manning 2010; 
Marenin 1998) and the risks associated with majoritarian rule, particularly in the context of a post-
conflict society with enduring ethnic divisions, we identify two further qualifications for a 
democratically responsive police service that focus on 1) equity and fairness of policing and 2) the 
capacity to deliver a minimum level of service and security. Kuper’s (2007) notion of ‘horizontal 
responsiveness’ represents an important means for achieving ‘equity and fairness’ while 
international support for ‘policing for democracy’ serves as a necessary platform for democratically 





(Kuper 2007: 103). Kuper aims to sketch out a structural arrangement whereby the aspirations of 
deliberative theorists might be realised.’ (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013: see Appendix 3) 
 
Kuper’s (2007) work suggests that ‘responsiveness’ accounts for something more than 
acquiescence with a generally expressed will. In other words, responsiveness must exist as a 
deliberative process given that ‘no actor claims perfect knowledge’ meaning that ‘constellations 
of ‘knowers’ are forced to coordinate’ (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013). Thus, our framework for 
democratically responsive policing includes ‘separately conceived indicators and mechanisms 
that are oriented towards the principle of responsiveness’. We recognise that ‘responding might 
involve giving a reasoned refutation of such will and that police, and their governors may be 
called to ‘respond’ to a wide range of individuals, groups and institutions’ with different, and 
potentially conflicting expectations of the police (Ibid: see Appendix 3). We have therefore 
opted to incorporate a number of other criteria associated with ‘democratic policing’ into our 
headline concept of responsiveness. 
‘Table 2’ accounts for this broadened conceptualisation of ‘responsiveness’ within an 
established literature on democratic policing (e.g. Bayley 2006; Jones et al 1996). Most 
explicitly, Jones et al (1996: 191) list ‘responsiveness’ as their third criteria for ‘democratic 
policing’ and write that ‘the police should be responsive to some expression of the views of the 
public’ deriving this from ‘the democratic principle that government should reflect the wishes of 
the people’. Our framework identifies a number of additional dimensions of ‘responsiveness’ 
consistent with Kuper’s (2007) definition: ‘distribution of power’; ‘competition’; ‘information’; 
‘reaction’ to complaints; ‘redress’; ‘accessibility’;  ‘participation’;  ‘accountability’; and 
‘congruence’.  
With reference to the arguments of Ellison and Pino (2012) and Ryan (2011), it is clear that the 
prospect of external actors establishing democratically responsive policing in the context of 
transitional, post-conflict or post-authoritarian societies is problematic.  Chandler’s (1999) 
analysis of liberal state-building in BiH suggests that this is due to a paradox whereby the 
intrusive and coercive character of externally-driven processes of liberal state-building and 
democratisation overshadow the domestic democratic institutions and processes of governance 
that they aim to support and risk becoming the predominant stimulus for political responses. In 
the case of BiH, it is evident that powerful external influences linked with the process of EU 
alignment and the prospect of EU accession have ultimately contributed to a democratic 




complement the EU’s interest in securitising the Western Balkans have consistently taken 
precedence over issues relating to the democratic responsiveness of public security provision.  
 
 
Democratic policing deficits are problematic because democratically responsive policing, and 
indeed any form of democratically responsive governance, cannot thrive amidst governing 
structures that invest disproportionate power in the hands of unaccountable actors. These actors 
push their specific agendas and transpose their interests through inaccessible governing 
structures that constrain deliberation and thus, locally responsive governance. Under such 
conditions, the policing and the governance of security become responsive to the interest of 
external actors rather than the public interest. This conclusion is consistent with Ellison and 
Pino’s (2012: 198) argument that ‘[i]n many cases assistance with police reform is tied to the 
wider strategy interests of the donor state’ and add that ‘with few exceptions…local 
stakeholders such as civil societies groups, local governmental leaders and the citizenry are 
usually not consulted in any meaningful way or are pushed to the periphery of the process’.  
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 Jones et al (1996) provide a hierarchy of criteria for democratic policing, indicated here by 
corresponding numbers. 
Table 2: Democratic Policing and Responsiveness40 
 Jones, Newburn 




Marenin (1998: 169 ff.) 
Qualifier 1: 
Equity 
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The hegemonic function of governmentalities associated with neo-liberal globalisation can also 
be linked to Dryzek’s (2002) critique of ‘liberal constitutionalist’ forms of deliberative 
governance. Dryzek identifies the liberal constitutionalist model as the mainstay of 
contemporary liberal democratic theory but he suggests that the formal mechanisms and 
institutions of state governance do not foster meaningful deliberation insofar as they are  
inevitably constrained by the structural politics of a ‘transnational political economy’ (Ibid: 21). 
The major implication of this claim for security governance in weak and structurally dependent 
societies like BiH is that democratically responsive policing is unlikely to manifest in these 
contexts due to structural inequalities that render formal mechanisms and institutions of state 
governance responsive to the architects of global liberal governance. This alignment may occur 
directly through the work of constitutionally recognised international bodies like the OHR or the 
IPTF (Chandler 1999) or indirectly through international police development assistance projects 
(Ellison and Pino 2012). 
Based on this realisation, Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) have elsewhere argued that 
international reformers should seek to limit the scope of their involvement to cover only those 
aspects of police reform processes that aspire to the  establishment of ‘policing for democracy’.  
In other words, we advocate that prolonged interventions and long-term international police 
development assistance projects that extend beyond what is necessary to ‘address, equitably, a 
public order security gap in divided, post-conflict or ‘failed’ states and to create a secure space 
within which open, democratic processes can take place’ may counteract the emergence of a 
‘civil society’ and ‘public spheres’ of governance that foster democratically responsive policing 
(Ibid: see Appendix 3). These spheres constitute important nodes of governance or contact 
zones at which ‘policy sharing’ (deLeon 1992: 127; also Belloni 2001) might take place. They 
also present important ‘sources of democratic critique and renewal’ (deLeon 1992: 127) 




Persisting donor interest in supporting police reform projects in developing and transitional 
states and the enduring appeal of a prevailing global liberal narrative that associates 
underdevelopment with insecurity and glocal security with the rhetoric of ‘democratic poling’ 
suggest that our prescription for restraint and moderation is unlikely to resonate with members 
of this transnational policy community who derive their professional livelihoods and or 
sovereign legitimacy (Chandler 2006; see Section 2.3) from prolonged interventions. In order to 
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foster public spheres of deliberative governance conducive to democratically responsive 
policing outcomes, the following section examines the prospect of using nodal security analysis 
to illuminate opportunities that exist for relatively disempowered policy mediators to shape the 
contours of  glocally-responsive police reforms processes in weak and structurally dependent 
societies like BiH.   
 
3.5 Glocal Policing as Nodal Security Governance 
Established critiques of the relationship between global liberal governance and policing reforms 
emphasise its coercive and non-democratic character. However, this body of scholarship also 
recognises that these reforms take place within ‘poly-centric fields’ (Bowling and Sheptycki 
2012) that are populated by an array of actors and institutions that collectively facilitate the 
global dissemination and amalgamation of different templates for glocal policing including 
community policing and CSPs. In order to move beyond the fatalism of the global policing and 
police reform literatures, I draw on the work of Wood and Shearing (2006) in arguing that it is 
necessary to explore the nodal character of these fields in order to identify opportunities that 
exist for relatively disempowered actors to improve the responsiveness of policing structures 
and practices for domestic political institutions and local security needs.   
Nodal security governance refers to an ordering process whereby the negotiations it fosters 
create ‘a set of explicit or implicit normative prescriptions or rules about the way things ought 
to be’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 22). Mapping the contours and relations that occur within a 
nodal security network can therefore illuminate the politics of this field and their influence on 
the construction of order within a society. While examining the micro-politics of individual 
nodes is useful for examining the ways in which individual agents and institutional habitus can 
shape security governance, Johnston and Shearing recognise that it is also important to study the 
networked relations between different nodes (Ibid: 146-147). Examining the spaces between 
different nodes of governance provides unique insights into how their relations shape the 
decision making processes and mentalities that ultimately assign meaning and content to the 
policies and practices that are generated through processes of nodal security governance.  
Johnston and Shearing (2003) argue that neo-liberalisation and globalisation have effectively 
created plural policing landscapes around the world. They argue that this is due to the fact that 
these processes have ‘embedded’ responsibility for security in all aspects of governance and 




liberal democratic societies, they recognise that the state continues to play a limited role in 
‘steering’ the governance of security but that it does so through these nodal fields. This implies 
that the governance of security exists as a ‘negotiated’ process shaped by actors and institutions 
other than those associated with the state (Ibid: 27) and that the ‘nodal cartography’ of security 
governance is increasingly responsive to private interests. This means that the ‘governance of 
security is increasingly oriented around risk, anticipation and prevention’ instead of promoting 
political freedom conducive to ‘just and democratic outcomes’ (Ibid: 160). Accordingly, the 
plural configuration of nodal security governance has prompted concerns about the prospect of 
governing security as a ‘public good’ (Loader and Walker 2001).  
The idea that security governance is negotiated through poly-centric fields also prompts 
concerns that the policy outputs generated by these mediatory processes may contribute to 
‘power inequalities’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 160). These inequalities marginalise 
disempowered segments of the public as Wood and Shearing (2006: 98) suggest that within a 
nodal field, ‘some [actors] have done better out of nodal governance than others’. They add that 
‘the fault lines are closely associated with wealth’ meaning that the poly-centric power 
structures of this nodal field are characterised by power inequalities which affect how security is 
governed and consumed by different actors. In the transnational fields created by the confluence 
of global policing and global liberal governance, these power inequalities are evident in relation 
to the coercive and asymmetrical structures of liberal state-building and international 
development assistance programmes. 
However, while Wood and Shearing (2006: 98) acknowledge that nodal structures harbour 
power inequalities, they also suggest that nodal analysis can afford us important insights into the 
sources of these inequalities and tell us ‘how nodal relations could be transformed to improve 
governance processes and outcomes for weak actors’. They base this claim on a theoretical 
assumption that ‘nodal reality carries within it new opportunities for finding solutions to old and 
enduring problems’ and that ‘[n]odal governance provides important opportunities that we 
should identify and harness’. Referencing Braithwaite’s (2004; with Drahos 2000) work that 
describes how regulation fosters the realisation of ‘established democratic values within nodal 
or decentred governance contexts’, Wood and Shearing (2006: 99-100) argue that nodal fields 
are advantageous for weak actors because their plural configuration creates more opportunities 
for them to access and influence the governance of security than do centralised, hierarchical 
governing structures. In other words, these poly-centric power structures facilitate participation 




the policing field raises questions about the ‘public’ character of security governance in 
advanced, liberal democracies (Loader 2000), these questions are perhaps less problematic in 
weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH where state institutions are denied political 
freedom and an independent governing capacity by supranational actors like the EU. Identifying 
opportunities for locally responsive actors to mediate the ‘overlapping hierarchies of 
governance’ (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013: see Appendix 3)  that exist within these poly-
centric fields thus provides a viable starting point for rendering internationally-driven policing 
reform processes more responsive to the needs of local citizens.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
Structural analyses of the relationship between liberal state-building, security governance and 
policing reform processes typically reflect elements of Duffield’s (1999; 2007) critique of the 
relationship between development and security in the aftermath of the Cold War which suggests 
that the primary driver for development aid, humanitarian interventions, and liberal state-
building initiatives since the early 1990s is a broadened, liberal definition of security. Empirical 
critiques of policing reforms and the actors that pursue them in the context of weak and 
structurally dependent societies suggest that prescriptions for ‘democratic policing’ generally 
reflect the interests of powerful international actors who use their power to colonise policing 
and police reforms as mechanisms for generating policy alignment and structural convergence 
(Bowling 2010; Ellison and Pino 2012; Ryan 2011).
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  The evident implication of these 
critiques is that the policing practices and structures generated by foreign assistance 
programmes lack clear channels of local accountability or responsiveness. Building on this 
observed lack of local ownership and participation in policing reform projects that affect 
developing, transitional and post-conflict societies, these critiques also highlight practical 
concerns about the value of the practices and structures these prescriptions for policing reform 
generate (Pino and Wiatrowski 2006; Ellison and Pino 2012: 3). This is particularly evident in 
relation to research that documents the gap between community policing rhetoric and practices 
in developing and transitional countries around the world (Brogden 1999; Brogden and Nijhar 
2005).  
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In BiH, the question of local ownership (or lack thereof)
44
 and concerns about the outputs 
generated by policing reforms have been primarily voiced in response to initiatives by major 
multi-lateral international organisations however, since the mid-2000’s, major multi-lateral 
institutions including the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) and the OHR have 
substantially trimmed their support for low visibility aspects of the policing reform process. 
Since 2003, seemingly all of the major projects designed to establish community-based, 
glocally-responsive policing structures in BiH have been initiated by a handful of bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral development agencies.
45
 Much of this work has advocated ‘community policing’ 
and CSP models as templates for improving cooperation and service provision by the police and 
other municipal officials and improve their cooperation as well as a platform for linking BiH 
practitioners with counterparts in Western Europe through established networks like the 
European Forum for Urban Security.  
These initiatives reflect a human security narrative that presents community policing and CSPs 
as complementary elements of a ‘holistic’ localised strategy for generating meaningful 
improvements in security governance.
46
  This suggests that community-oriented policing 
provides reformers with a platform for negotiating local orders in weak and structurally 
dependent societies from a distance. This in turn allows them to align local policing norms, 
mentalities and practices with what they identify as the best practices of Western policing. 
Policy transfers account for an important vehicle for fostering these reforms and thus serve as 
useful focal points for analysing the negotiated character of glocally-responsive policing reform 
processes. In order to illuminate the power politics underpinning these initiatives and the extent 
to which different actors and institutions influence their form and content, the following chapter 
reviews the policy transfer literature and introduces the concept of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai 
and Stubbs 2007) to the criminological lexicon as a framework for accessing the mediated 
character of these reforms.  
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The issue of local ownership has also been a recurring theme in the wider literature on liberal state-
building and governance in BiH (see Belloni 2001; Caplan 2005; Pugh 2002) 
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 The important role of bilateral and multilateral development agencies in driving important aspects of 
the policing reform process in BiH since 2003 is consistent with the role of foreign policing 
assistance programmes driving such reforms in other ‘transitional’ societies (Marenin 1998). I 
elaborate on the role that specific agencies played in fostering these reforms in BiH in Chapter Six. 
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Examples of this narrative can be found in a 2007 UNDP Albania report which reviews activities in 
BiH (DeBlieck 2007).  I elaborate on this posited relationship between community policing and 




Chapter Four: Policy Translation 
 
Over the past two decades, policy convergence and policy transfer have been embraced as 
important conceptual frameworks for analysing global trends in criminal justice policy making. 
Jones and Newburn (2007) employ this concept to analyse convergence between the United 
States and the England and Wales over the past two decades while an edited collection by 
Newburn and Sparks (2004) links these concepts to the influence of political culture on criminal 
justice policy making trends in the age of globalisation.
47
 Growing literatures on comparative, 
international, supranational, and transnational aspects of criminology and criminal justice policy 
making also highlights the need to acknowledge the significance of policy convergence more 
generally. Aitchison’s (2011) work in particular suggests that this concept of policy transfer is 
relevant to the study of criminal justice transformation in the context of transitional societies. 
Within the sub-discipline of policing studies, policy convergence and policy transfer are central 
to a burgeoning literature that explores the prospect of democratising the police in developing, 
transitional and failed states. Examples include Bayley's (2006) analysis of American foreign 
assistance to police reform projects in post-conflict societies and Brogden and Nijhar's (2005) 
critique of the global export of community-based policing as a 'one-size-fits-all' template for 
democratising the police. Marenin’s (2007) discussion of a policing transnational policy 
community further suggests that human agency has played an important role in facilitating the 
dissemination of convergent prescriptions for policing over the past two-decades.  
Despite criminology’s embrace of these concepts, it has yet to incorporate the alternative 
concept of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007) into its lexicon. In this chapter I 
introduce this alternative framework by examining its conceptual origins and discussing its 
utility as a tool for analysing the role that nodal actors play in mediating externally-driven 
policing reforms in developing and transitional countries specifically.  I conclude that policy 
translation promises to enhance our understanding of criminal justice policy making processes 
by illuminating the ways in which structured-agency mediates policy transfers and shapes the 
outputs and outcomes generated by these processes.  
Section 4.1 examines the concept of ‘policy convergence’ and includes a review of work by 
Bennett (1991) and Evans (2004) who associate this phenomenon with different aspects of 
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globalisation. While Evans’ discussion of policy convergence accounts for the important role 
that both macro-level structures and agency play in prompting these policy exchanges, I 
introduce the related concept of policy transfer in order to convey the complex and 
unpredictable character of these ‘exchanges’ in practice. Policy transfer is thus the focus of 
Section 4.2 and I draw upon the policy transfer literature to describe the important role that 
actors and institutions play in not only initiating these ‘exchanges’ but also their role in actively 
mediating them as a result of their oversight and involvement.  
I recognise the that the concept of policy transfer establishes a viable framework for analysing 
how nodular relations and the micro-politics of specific nodes affect policing reform initiatives, 
however, I argue that the verb ‘transfer’ is inadequate for describing the negotiated, 
transformational character of these settings. I argue in Section 4.3 that the concept of policy 
translation is preferable to policy transfer because it encourages one to analyse these exchanges 
and from a social constructivist perspective. This approach is significant because it enables one 
to analyse the prescriptions and practices generated by different security nodes and ‘contact 
zones’ (Pratt 1991) as the sum of the collective actions and interactions which transpire within 
these settings.  Introducing the work of Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) and discussing it with 
reference to the nodal model of security governance developed by Johnston and Shearing 
(2003), I conclude that the concept of policy translation enables one to examine the political 
character of different policing nodes and their role in mediating structural pressures for glocal 
policy alignment. 
 
4.1 Globalisation and Policy Convergence 
The importance of ‘agency’ as a theoretical element of policy convergence is evident from 
Bennett’s (1991) work. Kerr (1983: 3 quoted in Bennett 1991: 215) defines ‘convergence’ as 
‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and 
performances.’ As Bennett notes, the ‘general convergence argument’ which emerged from the 
field of comparative public policy during the 1970’s and 1980’s originally focused on the 
existence of comparable public policy outcomes between ‘industrial societies’ as evidence of 
overarching processes of economic and political convergence. Bennett is critical of these 
‘general-theory building efforts’ that infer the existence of ‘convergence’ based on spatial 
comparison because he argues that they ‘obscure’ the policy processes which actually contribute 




fails to acknowledge the temporal dimension of this concept which denotes a comparable and 
concerted progression ‘over time toward some identified common point’ (Inkeles, 1981: 13-14 
quoted in Bennett, 1991: 219). 
Building on this critique, Bennett (1991) introduces the more nuanced concept of ‘policy 
convergence’ as an alternative framework for exploring the dynamics which actually produce 
comparable policy outcomes. Bennett (1991) goes on to review four drivers of policy 
convergence: ‘emulation’, ‘elite-networking and policy communities’, ‘harmonization’, and 
‘penetration’. Agency is intrinsic to all of these drivers. In other words, policy convergence 
exists not as the mere product of passive alignment determined by common structures but 
rather, it is attributable to the decisions of actors involved in the policy making process.  With 
reference to the literature on global policing and glocally-responsive police reforms, this agency 
is visible in relation to the archetypes by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) as well as other actors 
that populate the transnational policy communities described by Marenin (2007; see Section 
3.1).  
With reference to ‘emulation’, Bennett (1991: 220-221) goes on to argue that this form of policy 
convergence must not be viewed as synonymous with ‘diffusion’, a concept which generally 
assumes that comparable policy outcomes can be explained through mere imitation (see also 
Collier and Messick, 1975). Instead Bennett (1991: 221) suggests that emulation involves ‘the 
utilization of evidence about a programme or programmes from overseas and a drawing of 
lessons from that experience’ with the effect that ‘the policy of another country is employed as 
an exemplar or model which is then adapted and, one would hope, improved upon.’ Bennett’s 
description of emulation is significant because it acknowledges that the outcomes of policy 
emulation and by extension, policy transfers cannot merely be inferred from the inputs of this 
exchange. Rather, he suggests that this process and its outputs are actively shaped by policy 
makers who acknowledge that imported policies must be adapted to local contextual 
circumstances before they can be implemented. This suggests that in addition to the 
transnational agents and institutions that facilitate policing reforms as technologies of neo-
liberal governmentality, local policy makers and practitioners also play an essential role in 
facilitating policy convergence and policy adaptation. 
Bennett’s (1991) emphasis on the centrality of agency to policy convergence does not amount to 
a rejection of the significant role that macro-level structures play in shaping these processes. 
This is evident in relation to his description of ‘harmonization’ which states that ‘convergence is 




to common problems, to mitigate the unintended external consequences of domestic policy’ 
(original emphasis. Ibid: 225). In this respect, policy convergence can be analysed using 
Giddens’ (1984) theory of structuration which posits that structural factors affect the decision 
making processes of actors whose actions in turn shape these structural contexts.  With respect 
to glocal policing, it is necessary to therefore acknowledge that global liberal governance and 
global policing represent important structural drivers of policy convergence over the past two 
decades because they produce powerful pressures for actors at all levels of governance to 
actively utilise policy transfers and lesson learning in order to facilitate policy synchronisation 
and glocal ordering.   
It is also important to recognise that processes associated with globalisation account for 
important opportunity structures that foster policy convergence and lesson learning (Evans 
2004: 2). Evans accounts for these opportunity structures by presenting a list of broad ‘empirical 
statements’ that describe this conceptually broad and contested concept (Ibid: 2). This includes 
both ‘a process of external ‘hollowing-out’[of the state]…. as a consequence of the differential 
impact of processes of globalization on domestic policy formation’  and ‘[a] process of internal 
‘hollowing-out’ … in different countries as a consequence of the differential impact of 
processes of privatization, the marketization of public services, and decentralization on both the 
institutional architecture of the state and domestic policy formation’ (Ibid: 1-2). Responding to 
these structural pressures,  Evans writes that ‘[p]ublic organizations in both developed and 
developing countries do not always possess the expertise to tackle the problems they confront 
and increasingly look outside the organization to other governments or non-governmental 
organizations for the answers to problems’ (Ibid: 3). 
Referencing the work of Davies et al. (2000) and Pawson (2000), Evans (2004: 3) writes that for 
developed countries, policy convergence is generally associated with notions of ‘evidence-based 
policy-making’. This suggests that policy convergence represents ‘a rational choice for most 
developed countries’.
48
 This is indicative of the susceptibility of governance in advanced liberal 
democracies to the same neo-liberal mentalities of governance that they promote in weak and 
structurally dependent societies. However, for developing countries, Evans (2004) suggests that 
the ‘rational’ character of policy convergence may not reflect their ‘voluntary’ embrace of  
liberal order but rather, the influence of external actors over domestic policy making processes. 
Neo-liberal governmentality described in Chapter Two represents an important mechanism for 
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promoting this influence and promoting policy convergence in weak and structurally dependent 
societies. 
 
4.2 The Complexities of Policy Transfer 
As a mechanism of policy convergence and structural alignment whereby ‘knowledge about 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions in another time and/or 
place’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 344), policy transfers represent complex and mediated 
processes. Evans (2009: 244) argues that the element of intentionality serves to distinguish the 
concept of policy transfer from that of policy convergence which he suggests ‘may occur 
unintentionally...due to harmonizing macroeconomic forces or common processes’.  In this 
respect, policy transfers represent mechanisms for generating policy convergence and the two 
concepts are not synonymous. This section elaborates on the distinction between voluntary and 
coercive forms of policy transfer and discusses a number of conceptual issues that arise when 
one attempts to analyse these mechanisms of convergence.  
4.2.1 Voluntary and Coercive Policy Transfers 
Policy transfer is ‘an intentional activity involving the movement of ideas between systems of 
governance in the aspiration of forging policy change’ (Evans and Davies 1999: 251). Evans 
and Davies (1999: 366) write however that ‘...intent may be ascribed both to those who seek to 
borrow and to those who seek to impose.’ In acknowledging the wide range of interests that 
potentially drive the flow of policies from one context to another, one must consider that such 
exchanges need not be voluntary. With reference to the work of Ivanova and Evans (2004) and 
Duffield’s (2007) critique of contemporary development trends, it is evident that those 
exchanges which occur as part of an overarching process of liberal state-building are rarely (if 
ever) voluntary. Even those exchanges which occur between advanced liberal democracies  
need  not synonymous be with ‘lesson drawing’ where ‘[c]onfronted  with  a  common  
problem,  policymakers  in  cities,  regional governments  and  nations  can  learn  from  how  
their  counterparts elsewhere  respond’ (Rose, 1991: 4). Rather, processes of ‘lesson drawing’ 
and ‘emulation’ represent specific types of policy transfer that are typically driven by ‘some 
form of disaffection or problem with the status quo’ (Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996: 346).  
Consider therefore that for agents to initiate a voluntary episode of policy transfer, they must be 




Those transfer agents who are best positioned to initiate voluntary forms of policy transfer in the 
context of mature liberal democracies are domestic participants in policy-making processes.
49
 
Nutley and Webb (2000, 15) suggest that this category describes ‘government ministers, senior 
civil servants and co-opted policy advisors’ as well as less obvious sources of influence over the 
policy-making process including ‘[p]oliticans and elected officials at local government level and 
other activists’ including ‘professional associations’, ‘pressure groups’, and ‘journalists’. They 
add that ‘[p]ractitioners…who operationalize policies, have their own distinctive role in shaping 
policies as they are experienced by clients or service users’ (ibid: 15). Voluntary episodes of 
policy transfer are therefore said to exist when actors recognize a need for policy innovation and 
thus commence a search for ‘lessons’ or knowledge. Lesson learning is not, however, simply a 
matter of transposing a policy from one context on another. Rather, Dolowitz (2009: 317) draws 
on Hall’s (1993) distinction between ‘simpler’ and ‘complex’ forms of learning to suggest that 
scholarly analyses of voluntary transfers tend to account for ‘simpler forms of learning’ that 
involve ‘little more than the emulation of the ideas and rhetoric used within other political 
systems’(emphasis Dolowitz). What they neglect to account for, argues Dolowitz, is the extent 
to which the actual policy outputs generated from these processes frequently deviate from their 
anticipated designs.    
Conversely, Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 347-348) argue that an episode of policy transfer is 
coercive if the transfer agents that facilitate this exchange are compelled to do so by external 
pressures. These pressures may either be ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’.  Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 347-
348) write that direct coercion occurs ‘when one government forces another to adopt a policy’ 
but that such forms of policy transfer are in fact ‘rare’. They illustrate direct coercion by 
describing ‘the spread of Western monetary policies to Third World countries’ through 
powerful institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  Dolowitz 
and Marsh draw on Hoberg’s (1991) analysis of American influence over Canadian 
environmental regulation to suggest that indirect forms of coercive policy transfer result from 
‘the role of externalities, or functional interdependence’ which ‘push government[s] to work 
together to solve common problems’ (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996: 348-349). They add  that 
technological developments, economic pressures such as those resulting from economic 
integration, and regional or international political norms can also influence indirect forms of 
coercive transfer (Ibid: 349). Dolowitz (2009: 321-322) suggests that coercive forms of policy 
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transfer are far more common than purely voluntary forms of policy transfer. However, I argue 
that this distinction between direct and indirect forms of coercive policy transfer is perhaps 
overly simplistic and difficult to apply when studying policy transfers in the context of 
developing and transitional societies given Duffield’s (2007) argument that the paradigm of 
global liberal governance fosters neo-liberal mentalities that involve managing risk ‘from a 
distance’.   
Ivanova and Evans (2004: 96) add that policy transfers which occur between developed and 
developing societies contribute to, and are therefore constitutive of, a process of overarching 
structural transformation. Accordingly, they refer to these developing societies as ‘transitional 
societies’ because the latter term emphasizes the presence of a programme for prescriptive 
transformation which implies that the existing structures and institutions are inadequate for 
synchronisation with the emergent global prescriptions for liberal order . While Ivanova and 
Evans (2004: 96-97) acknowledge that voluntary forms of policy transfer do occur in 
transitional societies, they conclude that ultimately ‘this transformation must arise, at least 
initially, from policy transfer from exogenous sources’. The implication here is that a certain 
degree of coercion inevitably characterizes these exchanges and ‘governments in developing 
countries are often compelled…to introduce policy change in order to secure grants, loans or 
forms of inward investment’ (Evans 2004:3).   
4.2.2 Analysing Policy Transfers 
Evans and Davies (1999: 382) distinguish between 'soft' and 'hard' forms of policy transfer with 
the former category referring to ‘ideas, concepts, attitudes’ and the latter to ‘programmes and 
implementation’. However, they acknowledge that the distinction between soft and hard forms 
of policy transfer is not always clear cut and that one might equally define the ‘object’ of a 
policy transfer in terms of  the ideas that prompted the exchange or alternatively, as the specific 
policies or practices that these ideas generated. Arguing that policy transfer can involve ‘policy 
goals, structure and content; policy instruments or administrative techniques; institutions; 
ideology; ideas, attitudes and concepts; and/[or] negative lessons’,  Dolowitz and March (1996: 
349-350) further suggest that policy transfers generally involve a combination of soft and hard 
content. This complexity is evident from Jones and Newburn's (2007) analysis of the transfer of 
‘zero tolerance’ policing to the United Kingdom in the mid-1990s.  
Jones and Newburn (2007: 224-225) suggest that initially, the mantra of 'zero tolerance' was 
designed to ‘[convey] a determination to use the criminal law to ‘crack down on’ something that 




strategy made famous by former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and former Chief of the 
NYPD Bill Bratton in 1994, it is important to note that its conceptual origins actually date back 
to Ronald Reagan's 'war on drugs' in the mid-to-late 1980s (Ibid:  106).  Interestingly enough, 
the first reference to ‘zero-tolerance’ in the UK context also predates its association with 
policing as evident from a 1992 campaign against domestic violence in Edinburgh (Ibid: 2007: 
108; also MacKay, 1996). Despite its lineage, Jones and Newburn (2007) suggest that the 
concept of ‘zero tolerance’ was only applied to policing in the UK in following widespread 
media coverage that documented its apparent success in the United States. Small-scale, zero-
tolerance policing ‘experiments’ were therefore subsequently initiated throughout the UK, most 
notably by the Metropolitan Police in London and the Strathclyde Police in Glasgow.  
Ultimately, Jones and Newburn (2007: 110) go on to question the impact of this transfer and 
suggest that ‘zero tolerance’ policing had a limited impact on the provision of policing 
throughout the UK. Specifically, they describe how the ‘zero-tolerance policing’ model was 
widely opposed both in principle and practice by most police chiefs in the UK who served as an 
important source of institutional resistance to the policy (Ibid: 110). On an ideological level, 
however, Jones and Newburn argue that the mentalities underpinning the ‘zero tolerance’ 
philosophy may have actually had a more discernible impact on UK policy. This is particularly 
evident with respect to New Labour’s embrace of the ‘broken windows’ (Wilson and Kelling 
1982) hypothesis during the late 1990’s and their decision to incorporate its ideas into the 1998 
Crime and Disorder Act and the 2003 Anti-Social Behaviour Act (Jones and Newburn 2007: 
110-111).  
From this example, it is possible to identify and analyse multiple components of a policy 
transfer. Whether one decides to prioritise soft content or hard content via their analysis is thus a 
matter of subjective interpretation but it is important to recognise that there are limitations to 
each option. Focusing on policy outputs overlooks context, yet focusing primarily on the ideas 
that prompted the transfer can obfuscate the intentionality of the transfer (Evans and Davies 
1999: 370). To address this dilemma, Evans and Davies draw upon Wendt’s (1987) articulation 
of structuration theory in proposing a ‘multi-level’ framework for analysing policy transfer as a 
‘dialectical synthesis’ of structures operating from the macro-level and through agents at the 
micro-level (Evans and Davies 1999: 370). They go on to argue that the benefit of this approach 
is that it serves to ‘overcome[s] the subordination of one to another’ in recognition of the fact 
that structures and agency are interdependent and interconnected. In attempting to bridge these 




transfer networks’ play in facilitating these exchanges. They add that identifying and mapping 
these networks becomes increasingly important when analysing policy transfers that have 
occurred over the past two decades given the combined effects of internationalisation, 
transnationalisation and globalisation which have effectively introduced a new range of actors 
and institutions. 
While it is clear that policy transfers represent important mechanisms for exercising neo-liberal 
governmentality in weak and structurally dependent societies, analysing them remains 
methodologically problematic. Echoing Evans and Davies (1999), Dolowitz and Marsh (2000: 
8) draw from structuration theory to develop a framework for analysing policy transfers as both 
‘a dependent and an independent variable’. This holistic approach to studying policy transfers 
accounts for the structural circumstances that prompt the exchange (i.e. policy transfer as a 
dependent variable) as well as the impact of this process on the recipient context  (i.e. policy 
transfer as an independent variable).  Analysing policy transfers through the lens of 
structuration theory is important for understanding how these processes are shaped by the 
continuous interplay between structures and agency yet the prospect of applying this framework 
to empirical research also raises an important methodological question as to whether ‘transfer’ 
is actually an appropriate descriptor for the phenomenon being studied. 
 
4.3 Policy Transfer as Translation 
The concept of ‘translation’ is preferable for achieving a multi-level analysis of policy transfers 
because it accounts for these exchanges from a social constructivist perspective. The conceptual 
development of policy translation is directly attributable to the work of Lendvai and Stubbs 
(2006) who draw upon Latour’s (2005) 'actor-network-theory' to address what they perceive to 
be the deficiencies of the ‘mainstream policy transfer literature’.  Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) 
account for the conceptual distinction between the concepts of ‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy 
translation’ in relation to that between 'mediators' and 'intermediaries'. Latour (2005: 39) 
suggests that whereas an intermediary ‘is what transports meaning or force without 
transformation’, ‘[m]ediators transform, translate, distort and modify the meaning or the 
elements that they are supposed to carry’ with the effect that ‘[t]heir input is never a good 








Drawing on this distinction, Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 4) suggest that the concept of policy 
translation reflects an acknowledgement of the fact that ‘...a series of interesting, and sometimes 
even surprising disturbances can occur in the spaces between the 'creation', the 'transmission' 
and the 'interpretation' or 'reception' of policy meanings.’ In this respect, they are highly critical 
of what they describe as the ‘mainstream’ policy transfer literature for its tendency to account 
for this process and its outputs in relation to ‘binary oppositions’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009: 
677).   These ‘oppositions’ are described as follows: 
‘…either policy is institutionalised in another place or resisted; it either ‘fits’ or it does not fit; it is 
picked up by institutions and actors or it is blocked by veto players and/or at institutional veto 
points.’ (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2009: 677) 
 
It is worth noting however that Lendvai and Stubb’s critique of these so-called ‘binary 
oppositions’ downplays the contributions of various scholars of policy transfer and legal 
transplant whose work previously acknowledged the fact that in practice, these exchanges are 
regularly adapted to local circumstances. For example, Karstedt (2004: 23-24) writes that ‘[t]he 
concept of path dependency implies the use of loosely coupled concepts instead of ‘strong’, 
unilateral and deterministic ones’ and observes that ‘[i]n socioeconomic theories of 
modernisation the unilateral model and the idea of convergence have been substituted by the 
concept of ‘path dependent’ modernisation.’ 
Watson (1974), in articulating the related concept of ‘legal transplants’ which describes ‘the 
moving of a rule or a system of law from one country to another, or from one people to another’ 
(Ibid: 21), further acknowledges the fact that ‘a successful legal transplant…will grow in its 
new body, and become part of that body just as the rule or institution would have continued to 
develop in its parent system’ (Ibid: 27). He adds, ‘[s]ubsequent development in the host system 
should not be confused with rejection.’ Watson’s concept emphasises adaptation as an important 
aspect of this transplant process. However, it is in relation to the work of Legrand (2001) and 
his critique of the idea of ‘legal transplant’ that the ‘disturbances’ described by Lendvai and 
Stubb’s (2007: 4) become apparent. Legrand (2001: 57) dismisses the concept of legal 
transplant outright and argues that it reflects a faulty assumption that ‘law is a somewhat 
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 While Latour’s analogy is valuable for highlighting the core distinction between ‘transfer’ and 
‘translation’, Lendvai and Stubbs (2009: 676) are inconsistent in their application of these terms 
and have generally employed the label of ‘intermediaries’ when describing ‘translators’ or 




autonomous entity unencumbered by historical, epistemological, or cultural baggage.’ Rather, 
Legrand writes: 
‘There is more to ruleness than a series of inscribed words….A rule is necessarily an 
incorporative cultural form.  As an accretion of cultural elements, it is buttressed by important 
historical and ideological formations.  A rule does not have any empirical existence that can be 
significantly detached from the world of meanings that defines legal culture; the part is an 
expression and a synthesis of the whole: it resonates.’ (Legrand, 2001: 58) 
 
The same critique applies to policymaking processes. In other words, policy outputs or 
outcomes cannot exist in rhetoric only; they are a product of specific contextual circumstances. 
This is consistent with Tizot’s (2001: 305) assertion that ‘‘exact’ translations are impossible 
because of the irreducible differences between ideological contexts and historical evolution 
from one country to another, and … transfers are always imperfect and impure.’ In other words, 
the transferability of a policy from one context to another is not merely determined by resistance 
or compromise but rather, polices are transformed at multiple sites or nodes that foster 
negotiation. Within these sites and as a result of these processes, policies are afforded meaning.  
Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 15) identify the spaces within which translation occurs as 'contact 
zones'. This term is derived from the perspective of post-colonial theory that accounts for ‘the 
spatial and temporal copresence of subjects previously separated by geographic and historic 
disjunctures, and whose trajectories now intersect’ (Pratt, 1992: 6; quoted in Lendvai and 
Stubbs, 2007: 15). Pratt (1991: 1), who articulated this concept through a reflexive, 
anthropological analysis of her own experience teaching Spanish literature describes ‘contact 
zones’ as ‘social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in 
contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power, such as colonialism, slavery, or their 
aftermaths as they are lived out in many parts of the world today.’ A contact zone can thus be 
described as a shared space at which various stakeholders seek to translate their institutional 
preferences into policy prescriptions and ultimately, policy outcomes.  With reference to the 
important role that contact zones play in enabling policy translation, Lendvai and Stubbs 
(original emphasis 2007: 16) write that ‘[i]n the 'contact zone' encounters are rarely, or rarely 
only, about words and their meaning but are almost always, more or less explicitly, about 
claims-making, opportunities, strategic choices and goals, interests and resource 
maximisation...’.  This view is also supported by the work of Freeman (2009: 435) who suggests 
that these are spaces ‘... in which some kinds of association or translation are legitimated and 




Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) model of nodal governance suggests that contact zones may 
overlap with security nodes but that the two terms are not synonymous.  Whereas security nodes 
refer to concrete sites at which security is governed, contact zones may also describe the spaces 
in between these sites. As Lendvai and Stubbs (2006: 6) suggest, contact zones are actively 
constructed ‘through actor networks’ and therefore they do not represent ‘pre-existing 
categories’. By contrast, security nodes can and often do refer to pre-existing categories. 
Examples of security nodes including the public police or a private security company may be 
linked by an abstract contact zone. Concrete examples of contact zones also exist in the form of 
newly established nodes that serve to improve or facilitate policy coordination or coherence 
within a pre-existing network of governance.  
With reference to externally-generated policing reform projects being pursued in the context of 
weak and structurally dependent societies, concrete contact zones can be seen in relation to 
internationally funded
51
 development projects designed to implement community safety 
partnership schemes at the local level. In these cases, the projects simultaneously function as 
contact zones and security nodes in the sense they constitute important links between local and 
global actors and because they ultimately shape the ‘governance of governance’ (Wood and 
Shearing 2006: 113) within their respective local contexts. Analysing these interactions with 
reference to Johnston and Shearing’s (2003) nodal model of security governance thus enables 
one to develop a meso-level account of the power structure that define liberal state-building and 
policing reform projects in developing and transitional contexts.  Clarke (2005: 8) writes that 
the social constructivist perspective inherent to policy translation ‘sheds new light on [policy] 
implementation, or how policy moves from policy formation to 'front line' practice’. Analysing 
the dispositions that emerge from translational policy processes thus affords us valuable insights 
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Chapter Five: Methodology 
 
The issues associated with attempting to construct a multi-level account of a specific episode of 
policy transfer from an ‘outsider’ perspective are evident in relation to the work Ivanova and 
Evans’ (2004) who employ this concept for their case study of local government reforms in the 
Ukraine. While Ivanova and Evans (2004) provide a compelling description of the structural 
circumstances that prompted local governments in the Ukraine to band together and form a 
policy transfer network, their analysis primarily focuses on the outcomes of this network rather 
than the deliberations and interactions which shaped these outcomes. Similar issues confronted 
Aitchison (2011) who describes the difficulties that he encountered while researching policy 
transfers and policy convergence as drivers of criminal justice reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH). Aitchison writes: 
‘While international aid and assistance may have brought numerous potential agents for transfer 
into the country, the multitude of nations represented within the international community suggests 
that the process of policy learning is complicated in these circumstances...Moreover, a simple line 
cannot be drawn between the country of origin of a particular expert and the model they 
advocate, even though respondents in the field sought to suggest that this was so...Thus while a 
large international presence may facilitate the exchange of policy ideas and models, it may in turn 
create a dynamic and multi-dimensional version of lesson drawing where policy and laws are not 
transferred or transplanted from one particular source country, but in which the local is merged 
with various different models available according to perceived needs and available resources.’ 
(Aitchison, 2011: 207) 
 
The experiences of Ivanova and Evans and Aitchison illustrate that the dynamics of policy 
transfer and lesson learning are inherently difficult to represent via a post hoc analysis from the 
perspective of an outsider. In this respect, I argue that proximity enhances one’s ability to 
generate an empirical account of contact zones and security nodes. In this chapter, I elaborate on 
my research design that I use to apply the concept of ‘policy translation’ to the study of nodal 
security governance and policing reform in BiH. I also review a number of methodological 
issues that I encountered while completing my field work.  Using a case study methodology, my 
research accounts for the ‘translation’ of two glocally-oriented policing reform projects into 
policy outputs and practices in BiH and explores the ways that policy mediators including 
international actors and local practitioners affect the conceptual and programmatic contours of 




Section 5.1 introduces my research design and describes the methods that I utilised while 
conducting my case study of United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Safer 
Communities project including a discussion of how and why my research design and research 
questions evolved in relation to my incremental engagement with the field, reflections on my 
use of ethnographic methods in this organisational setting, and a discussion of the collaborative 
nature of this research.  In Section 5.2, I review the research design and methods that I utilised 
while conducting my second case study of community policing in Sarajevo Canton. Once again 
I reflect upon the nature of my access, the issue of utilising evaluative research for exploratory 
purposes, and practical issues that I encountered while completing this field work. I conclude 
this methodology chapter by accounting for the method that I used to analyse my data, 
describing the ethics of presenting my data and stating the limitations of this research.  
 
5.1 Safer Communities  
My first case study involves ethnography of the UNDP’s Safer Communities project that 
presents an institutional perspective on how mediatory nodes subsume the role of a contact zone 
and facilitate the translation of broadly defined policing reforms through interpretation, 
negotiation and practice. Through these processes, I argue that mediatory nodes play an 
important role in ascribing policing reforms conceptual and programmatic meaning and 
therefore, studying the interactions that occur within these nodal settings serves to generate a 
nuanced account of the power politics that define a limited segment within a network of 
governance.  The value of using a single case study to generate an institutional perspective on 
policy translation is that it enabled me to approach this research inductively in order to generate 
intensive and reflexive data that illustrates the transformational character of this setting. 
The data which I present in this case study was generated during a three-month ‘internship’ with 
the Safer Communities project that I completed between January and April 2011. This 
internship enabled me to research these processes from the perspectives of a member of the 
project team and it afforded me the opportunity to personally contribute to important 
institutional decision making processes and project activities. My immersion in this ‘contact 
zone’ allowed me to map the power politics of this setting while also reflecting on how my 
participation affected this translational process. The total ‘yield’ of my ethnography of the Safer 
Communities project includes over 25,000 words of personal journal entries documenting the 




Communities team and different project stakeholders, meetings between the Safer Communities 
team and senior managers at UNDP’s BiH office, and informal follow-up interviews that were 
conducted with project staff via Skype. In presenting my case study, I also reference various 
project documents and working drafts that I have retained with permission from UNDP’s 
Project Manager in order to ‘triangulate’ my observations wherever possible and to provide 
illustration for my analysis (see Appendix 2). The remainder of this section elaborates on the 
nature of my access and my approach to conducting an organisational ethnography of UNDP’s 
Safer Communities project. 
5.1.1 Access 
The issue of access is an important determinant of my ability to develop an ethnographic 
account of nodal security governance including one which focuses on a concrete contact zone 
like the Safer Communities project.  When I initially arrived at UNDP’s BiH office in January 
2011 to begin my internship, I was not entirely sure what to expect. Having already met all of 
the members of Safer Communities team back in April of the previous year, I had received 
assurances that my needs would be looked after however I was not entirely certain what my 
needs were at this point. What did I know about development work? What did I know about 
‘Safer Communities’? What did I know about community policing in BiH? All of my 
knowledge on these issues came from books or journal articles and I recognised that I lacked an 
understanding of these topics from a practitioner’s perspective.  Essentially, I entered the field 
unsure of my objectives and questioning my ability to translate my seemingly abstract, 
theoretical knowledge of policing and community safety partnerships into a workable research 
project. 
Over the next three months, my status in relation to UNDP’s Safer Communities project shifted 
through many of the categories identified by Adler and Adler (1987: 33). I went from being an 
outsider at UNDP to a peripheral member, to an active member of the Safer Communities 
team.
52
 In my capacity as an active member of the project, I authored a project brief and a policy 
brief, conducted a five-week qualitative study on community policing practices in Sarajevo, 
drafted numerous concept notes, contributed to the project’s sustainability report, and 
participated in regular, intense deliberation processes that would ultimately shape the future 
design and implementation for this project throughout the country  
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See ‘Appendix 1 Research Phases’ for an overview of my fieldwork schedule. Further note that once 
my internship concluded, I retained my peripheral membership by continuing to lend my support to 




There are numerous factors that may prevent researchers from directly immersing themselves in 
an active and relevant contact zone or security node, but doing so is important for generating a 
detailed analysis of policy translation. First there are informal restrictions on access to consider. 
On a practical level, these factors relate to the fact that the active character of these settings is 
both spatially and temporally sensitive meaning that one must be in the right place at the right 
time in order to identify translational activities and the contextual circumstances that prompt 
them. The second issue relates to formal restrictions on access. Many of the security nodes and 
concrete contact zones at which policy translation takes place often lack transparency or are 
protected by institutional gatekeepers. In order to analyse these settings, a researcher must be 
granted permission to study them. However, access is frequently limited by the fact that 
institutional gatekeepers ‘have a practical interest in seeing themselves and their colleagues 
portrayed in a favourable light’ (Atkinson and Hammersly 2007: 50-52). Allowing an outsider 
to access these spaces for the purpose of researching their political character is therefore 
potentially risky for these stakeholders given that transparency may potentially undermine their 
ability to exercise power in this setting and shape decision making processes.   
When I first arrived in April 2010 Sarajevo during the first phase of my field visit, my specific 
research design remained largely unarticulated, specifically with regards to which 
project(s)/agencies I would focus on, where I would target my case studies, and even the 
specific methods that I would employ. My primary goal for this two-week visit was to identify a 
suitable access strategy that would enable me to gain a greater sense of how international 
development agencies involved with community-based policing and community safety 
partnership (CSP) reforms in BiH were actively pursuing these projects.  Drawing heavily on 
my supervisor Dr Andy Aitchison’s experience conducting fieldwork on criminal justice 
reforms in BiH, I formed the impression that many of these issues could only be resolved after I 
developed a personal understanding of contemporary developments in the field. Limiting myself 
to qualitative methods also afforded me significant flexibility in terms of adapting my research 
questions to the realities of the field.  
During my initial two-week visit, I met with representatives of three organisations that were 
either actively involved with community-oriented policing reform in BiH or which had 
previously worked on these initiatives. These organisations included the Sarajevo-based Centre 






  My strategy for identifying these potential ‘sponsors’ or ‘gatekeepers’ relied heavily 
on a ‘snowballing’ technique consistent with a purposive sampling method described by Patton 
(2001: 106).
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  This initial series of meetings helped me to achieve a better understanding of the 
type of projects that these three agencies were actively involved with, and a sense of their past 
progress and future plans regarding the implementation of these projects. It also earned me a 




Between May and December 2010, I finalised the terms of my access with the Safer 
Community team’s Project Manager and we produced two documents which defined my 
responsibilities and obligations as a project intern. The first of these documents was a modified 
version of UNDP’s standard ‘Terms of Reference’ document that I was required to agree to as a 
condition of my internship. The second document was a ‘Memo of Understanding’ that I 
developed with my supervisors to establish a protocol for issues relating to data collection, data 
usage, research ethics, and my scheduling commitments. This ‘Memo of Understanding’ also 
included a general summary of my preliminary research questions, my proposed methods, and a 
statement asserting my ownership over personal data generated during the internship. Key to 
our agreement was a mutual commitment to collaboration and transparency. In other words, 
both parties approached this internship with the expectation that it would be mutually beneficial. 
The internship offered me formal access to research the institutional node at which Safer 
Communities was being designed and the Project Manager expected to benefit from the 
presence of an in-house ‘expert’ on community-oriented policing in the Anglo-American 




5.1.2 Organisational Ethnography with United Nations Development Programme 
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 I secured my meeting with the CSS through Dr Irma Deljkic, an Assistant Professor of Criminalistics at 
the University of Sarajevo. I arranged for my meeting with UNDP after finding the Project 
Manager’s contact details listed on a job advertisement online and the Project Manager would 
subsequently connect me to the SDC. 
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 I drew upon my extremely limited social network in BiH and through this individual, I organised a 
meeting with a project associate working at the CSS. I also secured my meeting(s) with UNDP by 
emailing the Safer Communities Project Manager whose email address was publicly listed on a job 
posting for a ‘Community-based Policing Advisor’. My encounter with the SDC (during a meeting 
with UNDP) resulted from my initial contact with UNDP. 
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 I received no financial compensation for my participation in this internship and I was only reimbursed 




I utilised ethnographic methods to account for the work of the Safer Communities team and 
their role in designing and implementing the Safer Communities project. In many ways my field 
work began as an anthropological exercise given that I entered this setting as an outsider with 
only a limited sense of what I might actually achieve through this placement.  As Neyland 
(2008: 10) observes, the need for researchers to ‘develop their method in association with the 
field being studied’ is important for all forms of ethnography. This was particularly relevant in 
this case given that the context that I was studying was both culturally and institutionally 
unfamiliar. This necessitated that I initially generate descriptive data on cultural and social 
differences and similarities that I encountered over the course of my research before I could 
adequately contextualise the power politics of this setting.  Due to the constraints associated 
with gaining access to conduct ethnography of multi-lateral development organisations 
described in the previous sub-section, it is important to recognise that there have only been a 
few other examples of researchers using ethnographic methods to account for the role that these 
agencies play in overseeing development projects in weak and structurally dependent societies. 
One such example can be found in the work of Mosse (2005) who drew upon his role on a UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) project in India during the 1990’s to develop 
an ethnographic account of the policy processes which he was involved with.  
Similarly, Harper (1998) utilised ethnographic methods to examine organisational aspects of the 
International Monetary Fund however, his research was primarily intended to support 
managerial improvements within the organisation rather than critically analyse the institution’s 
function. This distinction is important because it illustrates Hammerlsey’s (1992; also Wakeford 
2003) argument that an ‘ethnography of an organisation’ and an ‘ethnography for an 
organisation’ represent different types of research. While my research with the Safer 
Communities project was intended to function as an ethnography of an organisation (i.e. 
critical), it is also worth noting that the data I generated through my observation and 
participation in this setting also proved to be valuable to UNDP. For example, my critical 
reflections were particularly useful for helping the Project Manager and Community Policing 
Advisor to conceptualise various roles for the project and to recognise the implications of 
aligning the project with what we perceived to be the European Union’s (EU) interests in BiH.
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In this respect, my research suggests that an ethnography of and an ethnography for an 
organisation can actually be complementary.  
                                                     
56




As one of four individuals who together comprised the Safer Communities team
57
, I was 
directly involved with important decision making processes involving the project’s design and 
conceptualisation. Participating in these tasks, I accounted for how the interplay between 
individual, institutional and structural factors shaped important decisions and deliberation 
processes. While my eventual status as an ‘active member’ may have been limited compared to 
the level of membership attained by my colleagues
58
, this membership role did allow me to 
utilise my own subjective reflexivity as data source as well as a means of validating my 
observations (Neyland 2008: 14; see also Davies 1999). In this respect, I argue that the active 
and ongoing reflection which is present throughout my field notes constitutes a unique and 
important element of my empirical data because it allows me to convey an experiential account 
of how policy translation occurred through narrative which presents important insights into the 
power politics of this contact zone.  
5.1.3 Ethnographic Interviewing 
Another qualitative method that I used to complement my participant-observation involved the 
use of informal or ethnographic interviewing. I utilised ethnographic interviews as part of my 
ongoing, daily interactions with my colleagues and I would also use this technique as part of my 
research with community-based police officers in Sarajevo Canton. Ethnographic interviews are 
distinct from formal interviews in that they represent a distinct kind of ‘speech act’, one which 
Spradley (1979: 331) loosely equates with ‘a friendly conversation’. In other words, he suggests 
that in an ethnographic interview, the informant is aware of the fact the conversation is 
‘supposed to go somewhere’, but that this individual ‘only has a hazy idea about this purpose’ 
(Ibid: 331). However, over course of this conversation, Spradley adds that ‘the ethnographer 
gradually takes more control of the talking, directing it in those channels that lead to 
discovering the cultural knowledge of the informant’ (Ibid: 335). An ethnographic interview 
therefore requires the researcher to subtly educate or prompt the informant with regards to the 
type of cultural data which is being sought. This is achieved through the use of subtle cues and 
mutual feedback which, over time, enables the researcher to manage this series of interactions in 
a manner which builds trust and therefore generates honest and insightful data. 
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I introduce these individuals in sub-section 7.2.2. 
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Drawing on the work of Adler and Adler (1987: 50), I characterise my role with the Safer Communities 
project as a form of ‘active membership’ while my ‘colleagues’ at UNDP enjoyed ‘full 
membership’ in this field.  At various points during this internship, it was clear that my degree of 




The data that I generated from ethnographic interviews was valuable because it provided me 
with candid insights into key structural relationships and institutional culture at UNDP. Serber 
(2001: 71) observes that accessing this type of data can be particularly difficult in institutional 
settings ‘because a structural requirement of such institutions is to conceal the actual 
organisational processes that generate industry orientation’. Ultimately, my ability to account 
for the role that different individuals, institutions and structural factors played in shaping the 
conceptualisation and design of Safer Communities was a product of my ability to establish a 
strong degree of trust with my Safer Communities colleagues. I believe that this trust was based 
on their awareness of my ethical protocols and the fact that they considered my involvement to 
be of benefit to the Safer Communities project.
 
The fact that I was able to generate such a strong 
degree of trust between myself and my colleagues did create problems of ‘over-rapport’ (Miller 
2001: 170) because I was regularly presented with sensitive or potentially disruptive pieces of 
information regarding the project and the work of UNDP more generally.  In cases where the 
information was of a personal nature and did not relate directly to the Safer Communities 
project or the work of UNDP, I excluded it from my field notes. I also omitted any specific 
information and private opinions that I accessed through personal communications or interviews 
with individuals who did not wish to be identified in my research.
59
   
I also acknowledge that my personal proximity to the Safer Communities team and UNDP 
restricts my ability to present an ‘objective’ representation of the events and processes that I 
document in this contact zone and I make concerted effort to reflexively account for the ways in 
which my relationship with the Safer Communities team and UNDP has influenced my field 
work and analysis of the setting. In the interest of full-disclosure, it is also important to state that 
I continued to maintain regular contact with members of the Safer Communities team until the 
project started winding down in March 2012. This afforded me frequent regular updates about 
the project’s future plans and access to subsequent project documents. In exchange for these 
updates, I provided my former colleagues with feedback on various project documents relating 
to the project including a final project report (unpublished). In the interest of upholding my 
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One such conversation took place with the senior representative for a major international organisation 
working in BiH. This individual presented me with two options at the start of the conversation.  The 
first was that s/he would speak to me about her/his role candidly but that I would not be allowed to 
take notes or to reconstruct this conversation. The second option involved them providing me with 
the official institutional response to my questions, a prospect which they suggested would be of 
limited value to my research. This choice amounted to a ‘catch-22’ but I ultimately decided to go 
with the former option on the basis that this individuals authentic perspective would still be useful 
for validating my own observations and conclusions about police reform in BiH. Accordingly, no 
explicit reference to this conversation (or similar communications) is included in this thesis or in 




commitment to transparency and to protecting the interests of my research subjects and the 
work of UNDP, I also provided these three individuals with an advanced copy of an article that 
I submitted to Policing and Society (see Blaustein 2013). This afforded them the opportunity to 
raise any concerns or issues that they had regarding my analysis and presentation of my findings 
before it underwent peer-review. As of November 2012, I continue to have periodic contact with 
certain members of the team on a personal level.  
 
5.2 Community Policing in Sarajevo Canton 
My second case study explores the role that police practitioners play in dramatically translating 
strategic prescriptions for community policing into culturally and contextually relevant 
practices.  I use interactive ethnographic methods including observation and ethnographic 
interviewing
60
  to examine how community police officers in Sarajevo actively interpret and 
implement a specific strategic prescription for community policing that was introduced by the 
SDC in 2007. My research design for this project featured a multi-site, single case study. In 
other words, it examined the work of two community policing specialist teams operating in 
different sectors sharing a common institutional structure and urban context. This multi-site 
design allowed me to combine observation, ethnographic interviews and semi-structured 
interviews in order to document the significant variation in terms of how a specific community 
policing strategy was being implemented in a shared context, Sarajevo. By limiting my multi-
site ethnography to only two sites, I was able to develop a fairly detailed account of how each of 
the two teams worked to implement and adapt the SDC’s prescriptions through practice.  
My field work involved observing two teams of community policing specialists working in 
different municipalities in Sarajevo over a period of four weeks. Following this period of 
observation, I also conducted semi-structured personal interviews with station commanders at 
both of these stations in order to account for a managerial perspective on how this project was 
being implemented as well as semi-structured group interviews with three additional community 
policing specialist teams that were also working to implement this project in Sarajevo. The final 
source of primary data on the implementation of this project was the Canton’s community 
policing coordinator (RPZ Coordinator) who served as both my institutional gatekeeper and an 
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My presence and affiliation with UNDP during this project meant that I was in fact a ‘participant’ in 
this research in the sense that these factors would ultimately shape the quality and type of data that I 
was presented with. However, during this research I would never achieve or indeed aspire to ‘full 
membership’ status given the professional/institutional and linguistic barriers that would inevitably 




important source of candid data because he was keen to discuss the various difficulties that the 
Sarajevo Canton Police had experienced while implementing the ‘Swiss-model’ of community 
policing in Sarajevo.   
5.2.1 Access 
Prior to starting the internship with the Safer Communities project, I had previously identified 
micro-level community policing reform initiatives as the primary focus of my research (with 
community safety partnership initiatives serving as a secondary focus), however, due to various 
time constraints and pressures related to my work with UNDP, I decided to relegate my interest 
in community policing to secondary status. Ultimately, this decision proved to be beneficial 
because it allowed me to become more involved with various deliberation processes relating to 
‘Safer Communities’. This in turn enhanced my level of informal access to this setting thereby 
allowing me to research this topic from the perspective of an active member. By actively 
contributing to the project rather than merely documenting it, I was also able to develop an 
important source of institutional support that ultimately provided me with formal access to 
conduct research on RPZ officers in Sarajevo via UNDP’s contacts in the Canton’s Ministry of 
the Interior (MUP KS). Without the institutional support of UNDP, I believe that my prospects 
for achieving this level of formal access and support from the MUP KS would have been 
extremely limited. According to the Safer Communities project’s Community Policing Advisor, 
this was partly due to the fact that the police in Sarajevo had grown tired of dealing with 
researchers in recent years given that they rarely received any meaningful benefits from their 
cooperation (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 16 February 2011).
61
 
In recognising the important role that UNDP played in acting as my institutional sponsor, it is 
important to note that I approached this study with two separate (albeit complementary)  
research agendas. My ‘official’ agenda reflected UNDP’s interest in developing a better 
understanding of the SDC’s progress with implementing its community policing project within 
Sarajevo Canton to this point. This objective was linked to the fact that the SDC’s budget for 
community policing related activities in BiH was scheduled to expire at the end of 2011. This 
promised to create a future policy vacuum and questions about which agency would provide 
ongoing support for micro-level community policing reforms in BiH, a void that UNDP was 
interested in addressing with the Safer Communities template. My ‘official’ or primary 
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Based on my ethnographic observation of community policing in Sarajevo Canton, I provided the RPZ 
coordinator with written feedback and recommendations for improving consistency between the 
different RPZ units. My findings would also influence my recommendations in the UNDP policy 




objective as a representative of UNDP undertaking this research therefore involved conducting a 
brief  qualitative evaluation of community policing operations in Sarajevo Canton that would 
enable me to assess whether the Swiss-model of community policing had been successfully 
implemented, whether it was having  its intended effect, and if not, why not? My project 
manager with the Safer Communities project also suggested that by addressing these questions, 
I would also be able to generate some empirical support for a policy brief that I was 
simultaneously developing regarding the prospect of introducing the Safer Communities 
template in Sarajevo. In recognition of UNDP’s stake in the evaluative aspect of this research 
and the extent to which this would ultimately shape my analysis of the field, I use ethnographic 
reflexivity in the following sub-section to account for how my institutional affiliation with 
UNDP may have shaped or skewed my own study of this field.  
5.2.2 Reconciling Multiple Research Agendas 
My personal agenda as an academic researcher was linked with my broader interest in 
examining the transformation of micro-level community-oriented policing reforms in BiH. 
Drawing on my theoretical understanding of issues relating to path dependency and the concept 
of ‘legal transplants’ (see Section 4.3) and my awareness of  how various implementation 
problems had affected the work of the Safer Communities project, I approached this study with 
a tentative hypothesis that community-oriented policing reforms are not only susceptible to 
transformation at the design stage, but that local actors and practitioners also play an important 
role in actively shaping their policy outputs and outcomes via their attempts to implement these  
policies. A combination of time constraints and logistical issues meant that I would not be able 
to study these implementation issues in relation to the Safer Communities project, however, the 
nature of my access with the MUP KS and the police meant that I would have an opportunity to 
study policy translation as it affected the implementation of the SDC’s strategic prescriptions 
for community policing in Sarajevo.
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In order to simultaneously address these research objectives, I completed approximately fifty-
hours of participant observation with two community policing specialist teams operating in 
different municipalities in Sarajevo Canton. I selected participant observation as my primary 
method because I knew that it would provide me with first-hand account of what these officers 
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The fact that my research examines two different initiatives and organisations serves as a limitation in 
the sense that I cannot claim to provide a comprehensive empirical account of policy transformation 
based on a single case study. However, both cases are complementary in the sense that they address 
sequential stages in the policy transfer process and deal with glocal policies designed to improve 




actually do. Such insights were essential for establishing what constitutes community policing 
in this particular context and I also anticipated that ethnographic observation would also provide 
me with an opportunity to spend a significant amount of time with individual police officers.  
This proximity allowed me to access to their personal reflections and experiences and it 
ultimately provided me with an enhanced sense of how these individuals respond to a 
combination of institutional and structural pressures while attempting to implement this 
strategy. Another benefit of this method was that it enabled me to observe certain interactions 
inherent to community police work that cannot be accessed through non-participatory methods 
like interviews.
63
   
I identified Sarajevo Canton as a suitable location for researching community policing in BiH 
for a number of reasons. The first and most obvious reason involved practical considerations 
like time and cost commitments required for conducting this research in another municipality.
64
 
Another consideration related to the prospect of gaining formal access to conduct this research, 
particularly given the limited timeframe of my internship. In discussing my options with the 
Safer Communities Project Manager, it was determined that I would be more likely to achieve 
good cooperation from the Sarajevo Canton Police because the project’s Community Policing 
Advisor had already established a number of relevant contacts within the department and would 
also be well-positioned to assist during my research should I encounter any resistance or 
problems.
65
 A final aspect of this location that appealed to my research involved the 
decentralised structure of community policing in Sarajevo Canton
66
, a feature which afforded 
me the opportunity to conduct comparative research within a single case study. In other words, 
the fact that community policing specialist teams operated in different sectors/municipalities 
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This was evident in a report developed by a consultant who was hired by UNDP to research community 
policing activities in Sarajevo in 2010. This individual issued ‘field diaries’ for the officers to 
complete during their shift in order to provide an indication of how they spent their time.  The 
officers complied with the directive and coded their activities in the diaries however, this data failed 
to convey the significance of their actions or the context in which they took place. 
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 Initially, my plan involved researching community  policing in Zenica given that this municipality also 
served as one of the Safer Communities pilot sites and therefore, I believed that it could provide me 
with an opportunity to assess the Safer Communities  hypothesis that ‘Citizen Security Forums’ 
(CSF) serve to enhance a community policing strategy. Once I arrived in Sarajevo, however, the 
Project Manager suggested that the prospect of commuting to Zenica from Sarajevo would be 
problematic and that it would potentially go against my Terms of Reference agreement for my 
internship. This created a dilemma for me given that my access was largely predicated on my 
institutional affiliation with UNDP however this affiliation was also creating restrictions for how I 
would be able to proceed with my research of community policing implementation.   
65 
It was also evident that the Safer Communities Project Manager was keen to use my research to explore 
the possibility of promoting the Safer Communities in Sarajevo given that this city represented an 
important strategic and symbolic location which could potentially benefit the Safer Communities 
project’s goal of long term expansion.  
66




and were directly accountable to their station commander’s rather than the Cantonal RPZ 
Coordinator provided me with an opportunity to articulate multiple, highly localised holistic and 
multi-level accounts of the implementation of this project and to control for common structural 
and contextual factors in my analysis. 
My four weeks of ethnographic observation focused on the activities of two community policing 
specialist teams.  Both teams were established at the same time in 2007 as part of a micro-level 
community policing project that was initiated by the SDC. By 2011, however, the consensus 
was that one of these teams (RPZ1) was the most advanced community policing unit in BiH 
while the second team (RPZ2) had been less successful in implementing the Swiss-model within 
its respective municipality (personal communication, Sarajevo, 4 March 2011). During the final 
week of this study (Week 5), I also conducted a series of six semi-structured follow-up group 
interviews with three additional specialist units (RPZ3, RPZ4, and RPZ5), two station 
commanders (responsible for RPZ1 and RPZ2), and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator. 
No interpreter was required for my participant-observation with RPZ1 as three of the four 
community policing specialists spoke English and assisted me with interpretation in the field.  
The fact that I depended on these officers for interpretation amounted to a significant limitation 
for this research given that it restricted my ability to independently access and reproduce certain 
interactions. This issue was most problematic when it came to comprehending the content and 
nuances of dialogue and interactions that took place in Bosnian. In this respect, the language 
barrier provided my research subjects with a powerful means for controlling my access to the 
field.  In order to study these interactions, I was forced to rely on mediated accounts of various 
events or meetings that were provided by my hosts. This limited my capacity to objectively 
evaluate their work but it was useful for developing trust with the officers and accessing their 
subjective understandings of community policing and the ways that they associated these 
narratives with different activities.   
5.2.3 Participant Observation with an Interpreter 
As my participant-observation with RPZ1 progressed, it was also clear that the language barrier 
and the privacy that it afforded these officers actually helped me to establish a positive rapport 
with these individuals. For one thing, it made my physical presence amongst the officers less 
threatening because I struggled to grasp all but the most basic conversations in Bosnian. This 
allowed the officers to ignore me while conducting private conversations in my presence.  It 
also meant that my unannounced and unanticipated presence at various meetings and events 




served as a filter for any personal or sensitive information that could potentially create issues for 
other participants in this setting. In this respect, I argue that my dependency empowered my 
research subjects while simultaneously sensitising them to my personal limitations as a non-
native researcher attempting to access their world. In providing me with interpretations, these 
officers functioned not only as my research subjects, but as key informants who facilitated my 
comprehension and reproduction of the field within my notes. As these narrative accounts 
regularly touched upon important structural and institutional issues that affected their work as 
RPZ specialists, these insights represented a key component of my ethnography. 
I was less successful in accessing these narrative elements in my ethnography of RPZ2 because 
I was required to employ my own interpreter as none of the team’s three officers possessed 
more than a basic level of proficiency in English.  The interpreter who assisted me in this 
capacity was Adnan Fazlić, a graduate student of Criminalistics at the University of Sarajevo 
who also served as my interpreter for three of the follow-up interviews that I conducted during 
the final week of this project.
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 As a native Bosnian speaker with an academic background and 
local knowledge of the police, Adnan’s presence during the course of my field work with RPZ2 
improved my comprehension of the various events and interactions which took place in our 
presence. This was particularly valuable because over the course of our field work with RPZ2, it 




Adnan’s involvement in my research with RPZ2 did create some limitations however. Most 
important was the fact that his ability to understand private conversations and to actively 
interpret the various events and activities meant that I did not establish the same degree of trust 
with these officers as I had with their colleagues from RPZ1.This made the officers of RPZ2 
less willing to present us with what Adnan and I believed to be a ‘truthful’ representation of 
their roles as community policing officers. Given that this unit was generally regarded to be 
weaker than RPZ1, we also suspected that they were using my research to present their work in 
the best possible light given the risk that any problems or shortcomings might be perceived as a 
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Adnan served as my interpreter for my interviews with RPZ3, RPZ4 and C2 (Station Commander for 
RPZ2). Another intern from UNDP acted as my interpreter for my interview with RPZ5 while a 
police officer acted as my interpreter for my interview with C1 (Station Commander for RPZ1). I 
did not require an interpreter during my initial meeting or final interview with the RPZ Coordinator.  
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 For example, during the first day of our field work with RPZ2, we went on ‘patrol’ with one of the RPZ 
officers who took us on a guided tour of her assigned neighbourhood and proceeded to introduce us 
to various ‘partners’ in the community. Adnan observed however that these interactions appeared to 
be ‘artificial’ in the sense that none of these encounters appeared to hold any substantive value for 




failure of individuals rather than the model itself, the institutional context, or structural factors. 
Despite these limitations, the data which I managed to generate from observation of RPZ1 and 
RPZ2 provided me with unique insights into important questions about rhetorical character of 
community policing in Sarajevo and a sense of the various constraints to ‘successful’ 
implementation which I discuss in Chapters Nine and Ten. 
 
5.3. Data Collection, Analysis and Presentation 
Appendix 1 summarises my research schedule and lists all of the interviews and personal 
communications that are referenced in my case studies. All of the data that I generated while 
completing my field work in BiH was initially hand written in a field journal and subsequently 
composited into a single Word document containing typed transcripts of all of my journal 
entries and interviews. The process of transcribing these written field notes into a typed 
document provided me with the opportunity to conduct a preliminary analysis of my data 
following my second visit to BiH (prior to my follow up visit in summer 2011). No qualitative 
data analysis software (CAQDAS) was used during this preliminary analysis or any subsequent 
analyses.
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 Rather, the process of actually transcribing this substantial collection of notes in 
chronological order provided me with the opportunity to actively reflect on the experience and 
identify key themes of each case study that conveyed the active and transformational character 
of these nodal settings. Examples of themes identified through my analysis of my notes on the 
Safer Communities project included UNDP’s results-based management culture, UNDP in 
BiH’s relationship with the EU, and the conflicted nature of UNDP’s capacity development 
ethos. My thematic analysis of my second case study focused on themes such as the operational 
effectiveness of community policing, managerial influence over implementation and the role of 
discretion in shaping practice. Reflecting on these themes during subsequent readings of my 
field notes allowed me to categorise my data and expand upon these themes as translational 
processes.  In addition to my personal field notes and interview data, I also retain electronic 
copies of various project documents relating to the Safer Communities project. This includes 
project reports and drafts of the different assignments that I worked on during my internship as 
well as project documents from previous community policing projects in BiH. A list of all of the 
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Given that my interviews were not recorded but rather recorded in notes and in many cases conducted 
through a translator, it is questionable whether using CAQDAS would have been appropriate for 




unpublished project documents and working drafts that are referenced in this thesis can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
 In presenting qualitative data to support these case studies, I have taken various measures to 
obscure the identities of research participants while simultaneously preserving relevant 
information relating to their role and background in order to situate their actions and mentalities.  
For my case study of the Safer Communities project, I identify my colleagues by their role in 
the Safer Communities team (i.e. ‘Project Manager’ and ‘Community Policing Advisor’) and I 
am careful to avoid identifying individuals when referencing potentially controversial or 
disruptive incidents (i.e. ‘One of the members of the Safer Communities team explained…’).  
Similar measures are used to obscure the identities of the individual officers that I conducted 
participant observation with from RPZ1 and RPZ2 as well as the other officers that I 
interviewed during this five-week evaluation. Perhaps the sole exception was the Sarajevo 
Canton Police’s RPZ Coordinator whose public profile and concerted efforts to publicise his 
leadership role make anonymity problematic in this case. 
 
5.4 Methodological Limitations 
Case study research is useful for illustrating the complexities of policy translation however the 
generalisability of my findings is inevitably limited by the unique contextual and historical 
characteristics of BiH.  In other words, the translational processes and stimuli that I document 
through my ethnographic case studies represent products of their specific structural and 
institutional circumstances and they do not provide a reliable basis for modelling or predicting 
the form, the outputs, or the outcomes of future ‘episodes’ of policy translation.  
It is also important to acknowledge that this research primarily focuses on manifestations of the 
glocally-responsive policing involving what Brodeur (1983) labels ‘low policing’ rather than 
those manifestations associated with the synchronisation of national technical and/or legal 
infrastructures for ‘high policing’.  While high policing is most commonly associated with the 
work of ‘global cops’ within the global policing literature, focusing on glocally-oriented 
policing projects is useful for exploring the idea of neo-liberal governmentality in relation to the 
structural politics of the international development system. In the following chapter, I provide 





Chapter Six: Reforming the Police in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 
Since 1996, police reforms have served as a major focus of the international community in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and they have been initiated at the macro-, meso- and micro-
level.
70
 This chapter provides a brief, thematic review of the police reform process in BiH to 
illustrate its coercive and asymmetrical character. This is important for contextualising my case 
studies presented in Chapters Seven, Eight, Nine and Ten. I review the police reform process in 
BiH chronologically, initially accounting for macro-level initiatives designed to ‘democratise’ 
the police throughout BiH and subsequently in relation to local community policing projects. 
This review draws on a substantial body of secondary literature that documents and analyses 
various aspects of policing and police reform in BiH and I supplement this literature with 
primary data generated from interviews and personal observation.  
Section 6.1 of this chapter describes policing in BiH prior to the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. This section also briefly accounts for the transformation of this institution during 
the Bosnian War and the extent to which its reputation and general order maintenance capacities 
were tainted by the conflict. Section 6.2 describes macro-level police reform initiatives in BiH, 
particularly the work of the United Nations International Police Task Force’s (IPTF) between 
1996 and 2004 which I argue played an important role in establishing ‘policing for democracy’ 
in BiH (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013). Section 6.3 reviews a subsequent shift of focus for 
macro-level policing reformers in BiH that I attribute to the European Union’s (EU)role in 
overseeing the state-building process since 2003.  
Section 6.4 reviews the history of community policing in BiH beginning with two community 
policing initiatives that were implemented by international actors starting in the late 1990s. I 
acknowledge the limited interest of major international organisations like the European Union 
Police Mission (EUPM) in pursuing localised community policing reforms and thus focus my 
discussion on the role of the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the 
Swiss Agency for Development and Communication (SDC) in piloting their respective national 
models for community policing in select municipalities. I also account for the role that these 
agencies played in subsequently drawing from their pilot projects to shape BiH’s national 
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 Macro-level reforms deal with policing structures, meso-level reforms target the police organisation 
and micro-level reforms involve training for individual police officers. It is often the case that the 




Strategy for Community-based Policing in 2007 (see Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of 
Security 2007).  It is against this backdrop that the two community-oriented policing projects 
that I examine with my case studies were initiated.  
 
6.1. Policing Before ‘Dayton’ 
Policing in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) remains poorly documented in 
the English language policing literature
71
 however it is clear that institution exhibited elements 
of what Broduer (1983) describes as ‘high’ and ‘low policing’. High policing was evident from 
the centralised, state policing body known as the ‘Resor Državne Bezbednosti’ (RDB). The 
RDB was responsible for intelligence and counter-intelligence activities and was comprised of a 
paramilitary force of approximately fifteen-thousand officers who ‘...could be deployed in times 
of political unrest or disorder when the local police were expected to side with the populace 
against federal authorities’ (Soper, 2007). This suggests that the RDB primarily performed a 
specific order maintenance function within the SFRY by working to insulate the Yugoslav 
government and its political ideology from political dissidence.  By contrast, low policing in the 
SFRY was decentralised and administered by each of Yugoslavia’s six individual republics 




The fact that each individual republic had a certain degree of control over local ‘milicija’ 
(public police) meant that local policing varied throughout the SFRY.  While descriptive 
accounts of low policing within these constituent republics is scarce, anecdotal evidence does 
suggest that its provision was generally viewed more favourably by the Yugoslav public than its 
state-level counterpart. This was at least the case in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
where Bringa (1995: 74) suggests that the local milicija derived a certain degree of legitimacy 
from its capacity to act as a de facto arbitrator of inter-ethnic disputes. The milicijia may have 
therefore performed an important order maintenance function in the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina but this is not to suggest that the institution was highly regarded by the public it 
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 I searched English-language scholarly databases and asked fellow researchers from BiH to search local 
academic libraries for any Serbo-Croat resources on policing in the former-Yugoslavia. The only 
Serbo-Croat reference that I have located on policing in the former Yugoslavia (pre-1991) was an 
NCJRS Abstract for Anzic, (1992). The abstract indicates that the article describes the repressive 
function of high policing in Yugoslavia but I have unable to access the full text.   
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 Prior to liberalisation, public policing was overseen by the Federal Secretariat of the Interior. The six 
constituent republics of the SFRY included the Socialist Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 




served. Nor is it clear that members of the public were overly keen to engage with their local 
police officers. I encountered anecdotal evidence of the public’s aversion to police contact 
during one of my interviews with a senior police officer in Sarajevo. The officer suggested that 
even today, older generations in BiH continue to mistrust the police because they associate 
sector-based policing with neighbourhood policing styles of the Yugoslav era (personal 
communication, ‘Station Supervisor’, 04 April 2011).  A 2003 project proposal for DFID’s 
community-oriented policing project also supports this analysis and suggests that 
neighbourhood policing in the SFRY was  characterised by ‘a lack of trust between police and 
communities’ (Atos KPMG 2003: 2). 
If policing in the SFRY could not be described as ‘democratic’
73
, its role during the Bosnian 
War was clearly ‘anti-democratic’ (Aitchison and Blaustein 2013). Bieber (2010) describes how 
the collapse of SFRY during the early 1990s prompted the local police to redefine their function 
for the duration of the conflict while Aitchison (2007: 327-328) observes that between 1992 and 
1995, local police officers actively participated in various human rights abuses including acts 
associated with ethnic cleansing, forced population transfers, mass detention, and mass murder. 
The role of the public police during the war and its complicity with human rights abuses 
inevitably tarnished the reputation of this institution as a legitimate provider of public security 
and further diminished its operational capacities for maintaining general order. It was in relation 
to the perceived non-democratic character of policing in the SFRY and its anti-democratic 
character during the Bosnian War that international reformers identified police reform as an 
important state-building priority in BiH beginning in the late 1990s.  
 
6.2 Towards ‘Policing for Democracy’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
The international community’s mandate for supporting police reforms in BiH is apparent from 
Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace Agreement which established the IPTF to assist the ‘Parties’ 
with overseeing the implementation of police reforms that would establish a ‘a safe and secure 
environment for all persons in their respective jurisdictions, by maintaining civilian law 
enforcement agencies operating in accordance with internationally recognized standards and 
with respect for internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (Office of 
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 This is not to suggest that an objective benchmark or threshold exists for measuring the ‘democratic’ 
character of this institution, rather that it was not intended to be ‘democratic’ and nor does the 
limited anecdotal evidence suggest that it was viewed as democratic by citizens of the SFRY or 





the High Representative 1995: Annex 11). Underpinning the international community’s interest 
in reforming the police was the notion that a ‘democratic’ model of policing was necessary for 
re-establishing general order throughout BiH and for ultimately establishing and sustaining 
liberal democratic governing institutions prescribed by the Dayton Peace Agreement. 
Elsewhere, Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) argue that between 1996 and 2003, the IPTF’s 
primary contribution to the police reform process in BiH involved fostering a model of public 
policing that was necessary for democratic governance: ‘policing for democracy’. Drawing from 
the international community’s role in supporting police reforms in BiH, we define ‘policing for 
democracy’ as ‘…policing which does not damage, but rather actively supports, the 
development of the core elements of a democracy and of democratic consolidation’. This 
definition emphasises the need for the institution of policing to demonstrate restraint with 
respect to their use of coercive force as well as their positive obligation to use their coercive 
powers to protect key democratic processes and institutions including fair and free elections 
(Ibid: see Appendix 3).  
During the IPTF’s first year (January - December 1996), its most immediate priority involved 
addressing the public order security gap that existed in the aftermath of the war. During this 
initial period, Aitchison (2011: 82) writes that the IPTF’s prescribed role emphasised 
‘monitoring and facilitating law enforcement activities, offering advice and training to police 
forces, advising government bodies, assessing threats and evaluating capabilities, accompanying 
and assisting police, and reporting human rights violations to the authorities…’. In other words, 
the IPTF lacked a formal policing mandate
74
 and was tasked with overseeing various police 
reform initiatives that were designed by the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMBiH) to improve the institutional capacities of BiH’s ‘decentralised and dysfunctional’ 
police forces (ICG 2002: 1; also Wisler 2005: 140).
75
  
In December 1996, Aitchison (2011: 82) notes the IPTF’s mandate was formally extended by 
UN Resolution 1088 (also Wisler 2005: 147).  As noted in the 2002 International Conflict 
Group (ICG) report Policing the Police in Bosnia, the renewal of the IPTF’s mandate included a 
call for a greater focus on ‘the protection of citizens’ rights [through] the articulation of specific, 
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As Wisler (2005 :145) notes, the UN CIVPOL mission (which included the IPTF) ‘was unarmed and 
not entrusted with law enforcement capacities’. 
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A 2002 report from the ICG suggests that the state and governmental structures that were prescribed for 
BiH by the Dayton Agreement would actually create major challenges for the IPTF and subsequent 
agencies involved with police reform initiatives because it effectively established 14 different 





observable standards’ (International Conflict Group 2002: 7; quoting Dziedzic and Bair 1996: 
20, 28). Aitchison (2011) argues that around this time, the IPTF also became involved with a 
‘lustration’ process designed to transform the police into a trusted institution through via the 
implementation of a three-tiered accreditation process.
76
 The first stage of this process required 
individual police officers to register with a national database. The second stage required every 
officer being screened ‘by means of a self-completed questionnaire’ (Ibid: 83).  During the third 
stage, police officers were required to pass a personal background check to ensure that they had 
not been involved with human rights abuses or war crimes (Wisler 2005: 148). Finally, before 
these officers could be certified and issued a UNMBiH identification card, there were required 
to complete mandatory training courses that covered human rights issues and training on more 
programmatic aspects of ‘democratic policing’. 
In terms of its overall impact and legacy, the IPTF mission played an important role in re-
establishing the general order maintenance capacity of the public police in BiH (ICG 2002: 1). 
This suggests that the IPTF supported the establishment ‘policing for a democracy’ in BiH but it 
was less successful in supporting the police as a democratically responsive institution. 
Specifically, the IPTF
77
 struggled to address the issue of police interference from nationalist 
politicians in the Republika Srpska (RS) while the fragmented political structures in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) also limited its capacity to implement reforms 
uniformly throughout its ten cantons. The IPTF’s attempts to ‘socially engineer’ the police in 
BiH (Collantes Celador 2005: 373) further highlights the non-democratic character of security 
governance in BiH. The powers afforded to the IPTF via Annex 11 of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement and UN Resolution 1088 effectively rendered it an important architect of structural 
alignment in BiH, its work primarily accountable and responsive to the international interests 
like the UNMBiH and the Office of the High Representative (OHR) which viewed the police as 
an important ‘transmission mechanism’
78
 that served to impart liberal democratic values 
throughout the wider social and political architecture of the newly established BiH state (Ibid: 
373). The rhetoric of ‘democratic policing’ was attached to this transformative agenda (e.g. 
United Nations Security Council 1107) yet the governance of the police reform process 
remained inaccessible to democratically-elected BiH politicians who lacked the authority or 
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 This accreditation process was initially introduced to FBiH in 1998 and only subsequently implemented 
in RS in 1999 due to ongoing resistance from nationalist political elites.  
77 
IPTF was not the only organisation/agency involved with police reform during this period however it 
was the most influential. Other contributors ranging from the U.S. Department of Justice’s 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are listed in ICG (2002: 7). 
78 




influence to positively shape these prescriptions. Instead, their designated role involved acting 
as intermediaries in legitimating and implementing the international community’s prescriptions 
for state-building through domestic governing institutions and structures (Chandler 1999).  
 
6.3 Europeanization and Policing Reforms 
On 1 January 2003 the EUPM replaced the IPTF as the primary agency tasked with overseeing 
the police reform process in BiH. The convergence between international and EU interests in 
BiH was effectively cemented in 2003 when the OHR took on the role of the European Union 
Special Representative in BiH thus intrinsically linking the processes of democratisation and 
Europeanization in this context. As the coordinating agency tasked with overseeing BiH’s 
democratic transition as well as its fulfilment of its various prescribed EU pre-accession criteria, 
the OHR played a significant role in subsequently shaping the agenda of the EUPM.
79
  
Wisler (original emphasis 2005: 153) argues that this transition ‘opened the door to a new era of 
realpolitik in Bosnia by the EU…’, one that would signify a reformative shift from peace-
building towards a specific, European brand of liberal state-building that called for BiH’s 
gradual integration into the structures and institutions of the EU (see also Centre for European 
Perspective 2008: 7).  The EU’s interest in overseeing the police reform process in BiH was 
linked with its Common Security and Defence Policy. Notably, Osland (2004: 544-545) argues 
that police reform was viewed as a means of combatting the risks associated with state failure 
on the EU’s periphery, specifically organised crime, terrorism and narcotics trafficking. 
Furthermore, Juncos (2007: 46) argues that BiH would serve as an important ‘security 
laboratory’ for the EU which had recently emerged as one of two powerful ‘regional security 
actors’ in this region (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 343).
80
 Through its prospective role in 
overseeing the state-building process in BiH and its specific oversight of the police reform 
process, Osland (2004: 545) argues that the EU sought to generate important credibility for its 
European Security Strategy (Solana 2003) that was adopted in December 2003 and which 
subsequently served as an important test of the EU’s capabilities as a legitimate, regional 
security actor.   
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 The European Commission also served as an important source of influence over the EUPM’s agenda as 
it was responsible for overseeing BiH’s pre-accession negotiations. 
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Drawing on the experience of its predecessor, the initial aims of the EUPM emphasised 
‘improv[ing] [police] governance on the middle and higher levels’ and ‘de-politicis[ing] the 
police’ (Osland 2004: 553). During its initial three-year mandate
81
, the EUPM worked closely 
with the OHR in attempting to address the issue of political interference through a plan which 
called for extensive restructuring of the police throughout BiH. In response to conclusions 
published in a 2003 European Commission Feasibility Study that advocated the need for 
European reformers to restructure the police in BiH, (see European Commission 2003; also 
Muehlmann 2008: 4-5),  High Representative Paddy Ashdown and the OHR established the 
Police Restructuring Commission (PRC)  in 2004 as a vehicle ‘for proposing a single structure 
of policing for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the overall political oversight of a ministry or 
ministries in the state-level Council of Ministers’ (Police Restructuring Commission 2004). The 
impetus behind this proposal also stemmed from the realisation that the established policing 
structures that the EUPM had ‘inherited’ from the IPTF were highly fragmented, dysfunctional, 
and susceptible to corruption. In other words, they were determined to represent a significant 
vulnerability to the prospect of establishing ‘rule of law’ in BiH. Accordingly, existing policing 
structures in BiH were identified as a major impediment to BiH’s progress in its pre-accession 
negotiations with the European Commission (EC) and the prospect of it signing a Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement (Muehlmann 2008: 3).  
The EUPM’s main contribution with respect to the PRC’s proposal for a single policing 
structure in BiH involved designing the ‘second level of policing’ structures in BiH. This new 
design called for establishing new police regions that transcended the inter-entity boundary line 
between FBiH and RS. This proposal was received as a ‘contentious’ issue by Bosnian Serb 
members of the PRC who viewed it as a threat to RS’s autonomy. Their concern was that 
creating these new inter-entity regions could ultimately lead to the discontinuation of the RS 
ministry of the interior which had previously been responsible for coordinating policing in RS 
(Muehlmann 2008: 7).  Ultimately, this resistance from RS politicians undermined the OHR’s 
attempt to restructure the police in BiH.   
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 The EUPM’s mandate was initially prescribed to last for only three-years (January 2003 – December 
2005). Osland (2004: 552-553) suggests the EUPM’s initial plan was to carry out its work over 
three stages. The planning stage was expected to overlap with the work of the IPTF and was 
intended to ensure a smooth transition between the two agencies. The second stage involved a 
implementing various projects in order to ‘transform the BiH police into a professional, political 
and ethnically neutral institution for judicial enforcement’. Finally, the third stage emphasised 






While the EUPM’s involvement with the PRC served as an important highlight of its first 
mandate, Collantes Celador (2009: 240) notes that another issue which confronted the EUPM 
involved the prospect of introducing ‘European standards practices’ for policing to BiH. In fact, 
Collantes Celador suggests that the EUPM’s preoccupation with restructuring ‘led to the 
interruption or slowing down of programmes/projects under EUPM’s first mandate’ with the 
effect that its mission would subsequently be extended for another two years (January 2006 – 
December 2007).
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 The EUPM’s difficulties in supporting programmatic reforms during its first 
mandate can be partially attributed to continued resistance and political interference from 
domestic politicians. However, Collantes Celador adds that the OHR’s focus on restructuring 
also contributed to a reduction in ‘political energy and resources available for crime-fighting’ 
and other programmatic and technical initiatives like community policing (Ibid: 240). These 
obstacles, combined with what Juncos (2007: 46) describes as the EU’s relative inexperience ‘in 
the field of civilian crisis management’ and operational issues such as the EUPM’s scattered 
presence throughout BiH raise important questions about the purpose and capabilities of the 
Mission. These concerns prompted the EUPM to redefine its mandate to focus exclusively on 
high profile issues like building the capacity of the BiH police to combat organised crime and 
political corruption as these issues were determined to represent significant impediments to the 
country’s prospective accession to the European Union (‘European Union Police Mission’, 
2011).  Subsequently, reforms focusing on low policing structures and practices were left to 
international development agencies, specifically DFID and the SDC which played an important 
role in shaping the national Strategy for Community-based Policing in 2007 (henceforth 
Strategy; ref. Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2007). 
 
6.4 Towards Community Policing and Community Safety 
Partnerships 
In Chapter Three, I discussed how community policing has been embraced by policy 
entrepreneurs and reformers as an important prescription for democratic policing in the context 
of transitional post-conflict societies. As an export commodity (Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 4), 
community policing provides reformers with an important ‘buzzword’ (Skolnick and Bayley 
1988: 4) and a ‘plastic concept’ (Eck and Rosenbaum 1994: 3) used to describe an array of 
activities relating to low policing. While various models of community policing exist, the 
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Peelite narrative inherent to community policing presents it as the antithesis of ‘military-style 
policing with a central bureaucracy obedient to directive legislation which minimizes discretion’ 
(Brogden and Nijhar 2005: 2). In the context of weak and structurally dependent societies like 
BiH, community policing usually exists as an amalgamation of different national models that 
have been promoted or imposed upon this context by different policy entrepreneurs, 
international development agencies and domestic reformers who collectively constitute an 
important transnational policy community (Ibid: 7-9).   This section presents a detailed account 
of the various initiatives that contributed to this amalgamation process by introducing different 
community policing models to BiH.  
6.4.1 Macro-level Initiatives 
The rhetoric of community policing was first introduced to BiH in the late 1990’s by the IPTF 
and it has since served as a recurring focus of international reformers. The IPTF’s role in 
initially introducing the rhetoric of community policing to BiH is documented in a 2003 report 
by the DFID which also describes the involvement of the United States Department of Justice 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) (Atos KPMG, 
2003: 2). This report also accounts for an important early conceptual link between community 
policing and democratic policing in suggesting that ICITAP’s aim in the late-1990’s was ‘to 
create a community-oriented police force that abided by democratic standards and observed and 
protected human rights’ (Ibid:  2). A subsequent report published by the US Institute of Peace 
also accounts for the collaborative relationship between ICITATP and the IPTF in describing 
how ‘… [ICITAP] trained and equipped local police directly or provided curriculum and 
equipment to the IPTF, which trained the Bosnians’ (Perito, 2007: 8).While these documents 
indicate that the rhetoric of community policing has been present in BiH since the early phases 
of the police reform process, the lack of documentation relating to these early initiatives 
indicates that their programmatic impact on subsequent community policing mentalities and 
practices was limited.   
Between 2000 and 2002, however, more concrete attempts by the IPTF to promote community 
policing in BiH become apparent. For example, in 2000, the IPTF implemented a mandatory 
training course for all police officers that provided them with a basic understanding of the 
community policing philosophy (United Nations Secretary General 2000: 3). This initiative 
complemented the three-stage lustration process discussed in Section 6.2. It is difficult to assess 
the impact that this educational initiative had on subsequent community policing practices in 




but one indicator of the IPTF’s success in at least disseminating the rhetoric of community 
policing is the fact that by July 2001, ‘[t]he community policing programme [had] been 
completed in 60 per cent of the Federation and 88 per cent of Republika Sprska’ (United 
Nations Secretary General 2001: 2).  The actual novelty of community policing from the 
perspective of local police officers in BiH is less clear however. For example, the 2003 Atos 
KPMG report commissioned by DFID notes that many of the rhetorical elements that were 
emphasised in the IPTF’s training programme including its emphasis on the need for police to 
maintain a presence within the communities they served and the importance of information 
sharing were recognised by BiH police officers as important components of the Yugoslav model 
of ‘sector policing’ (Atos KPMG, 2003: 2). This indicates that the IPTF’s training may not have 
actually introduced ideas like problem-solving and information sharing to BiH in a 
programmatic sense but rather,  it provided these officers with a fresh vocabulary for familiar 
concepts and practices.   
Macro-level support for community policing reforms began to dwindle between 2003 and 2005 
under the direction of the EUPM and Wisler and Traljic (2010: 23) observe that the EUPM had 
‘retreated from local policing issues in 2007-2008’. A project associate working for the SDC’s 
community policing project accounts for the EUPM’s decision to withdraw its direct support for 
community policing reforms in suggesting that the EUPM viewed them as time consuming, 
resource intensive and difficult to implement uniformly given the absence of a universal legal 
framework to compel interior ministries throughout BiH to adopt the reforms (personal 
communication, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011). This analysis is supported by 
Collantes Celador’s (2007: 6) analysis of the EUPM as lacking ‘...adequate resources and 
personnel...’ to simultaneously focus on macro-level restructuring and local improvements in 
the delivery of policing.   
6.4.2 Community Policing as International Development Assistance  
By the end of 2003, police officers throughout BiH were aware of the rhetoric of community 
policing but the training that they had received from the IPTF or through the police academies 
in Banja Luka and Sarajevo included limited or no emphasis on the practical skills necessary for 
actually doing community police work (personal communication, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 
June 2011). Nor did this curriculum encourage police managers to incorporate this ‘policing 
style’ into their ‘every-day operations’ (par. Atos KPMG 2003: 2).  Hoping to advance the 
programmatic development of community policing and community safety partnership schemes 




projects that would effectively introduced two different community policing and community 
safety partnership models to select municipalities in BiH beginning in 2003. The ‘lessons 
learned’ from these projects served as a platform for the agencies’ future collaboration in 
establishing and supporting the national Strategy.   
DFID oversaw the larger of the two initiatives in terms of both scale and budget and established 
community policing and community safety partnership pilot projects in Žepče and Prijedor. This 
initiative formed part of the agency’s Safety, Security and Access to Justice Programme 
(SSAJP) financed by the UK Government’s Conflict Prevention Pool (Atos KPMG 2003: 3). 
The logic of pursuing community-oriented policing reforms as part of DFID’s broader interest 
in conflict prevention and stability in the Western Balkans suggests that the agency subscribed 
to the ‘human  security’ narrative discussed in Section 2.1. The holistic emphasis on conflict 
transformation through development  is evident from DFID’s 2003 technical proposal which 
stated that ‘…the goal of the project is that public bodies implement justice strategies that 
reduce local tension, conflict and prevent crime and disorder’(Atos KPMG 2003: 3). According 
to the cluster manager for the SSAJP project, Prijedor and Žepče were specifically selected as 
the pilot sites for local community policing projects because they were identified as likely future 
hotspots for future ethnic conflict (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). This suggests that DFID 
embraced community policing as a potential mechanism for managing local conflict through the 
police as local security institution.   
In translating the community policing philosophy into strategic programmes that could be 
implemented within these municipalities, DFID also aimed to generate greater levels of trust 
and cooperation between uniformed police officers and members of the public in order to 
improve the police’s ability to address any tensions and to manage the risk of escalation (Atos 
KPMG 2003: 4). The emphasis on community policing reform was further complemented by a 
second component of the project that involved establishing community safety partnership 
schemes at both sites to improve cooperation between the police and public agencies which had 
previously struggled with communication and had failed to address public security and safety 
issues in a collaborative manner (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011; also Atos KPMG 2003: 4).  
The two pilot projects were designed and implemented by a team of UK-based consultants 
employed by Atos KPMG through its contract with DfiD. The team was led by a ‘Project 
Manager’ who had previously worked as an Assistant Chief Constable in Scotland and had 
subsequently served as an advisor for police reform projects in Namibia and Jamaica. It also 




Albania, India, Kosovo, and Serbia and Montenegro. All of these individuals possessed 
previous experience working with community policing and community safety partnership  
(CSP) schemes in a UK context. At each pilot site, one associate was responsible for 
community-based policing initiatives while their counterpart was responsible for community 
safety initiatives. In addition to the project’s international consultants, the team also employed 
‘local consultants’ ‘on a needs basis’ due to the lack of ‘local expertise’ that the ‘core team’ 
possessed (Atos KPMG 2003: 15). This indicates that during its pilot phase, DFID’s community 
policing project was primarily shaped by members of a transnational policy community 
involved with what Brogden and Nijhar (2005) describe as the global export of community 
policing. 
The specific model for community that DFID introduced at these two pilot sites was based on 
an amalgamation of the best community-oriented policing practices from the UK and 
developing and transitional countries around the world.  According to the Cluster Coordinator
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the Atos KPMG team advocated a two-component model for establishing community-oriented 
policing which could be readily adapted to local circumstances and structures (interview, S. 
Traljic, 26 July 2011). Component 1 focused on institutionalising the idea that every police 
officer should perform their duties in a manner that reflected the philosophy of community 
policing (Ibid).  It also involved establishing ‘strategic boards’, comprised of local officials and 
senior police officers, to: ‘review progress as community-based policing is introduced’; ‘advise 
on the strategic direction and endorse key decisions’; and ‘establish mechanisms to monitor and 
evaluate the introduction of community-based policing’ within these municipalities (Department 
for International Development 2005: 8). Component 2 focused on developing and managing 
‘strategic partnerships’ at these sites to:  ‘strengthen the capacity of the police to solve 
community problems’; ‘secure joint commitment across government to the new model…’; and 
‘assist the police in developing and implementing local policing plans…’ (Ibid: 10). 
In 2004, the SDC initiated its own pilot project for community policing in Zenica (FBiH) and 
subsequently throughout the entire Zenica-Doboj Canton (DeBlieck 2007: 23). Smaller than its 
UK-based counterpart, the SDC project team consisted of two full-time project associates from 
BiH and a Project Manager primarily based in Switzerland. The SDC worked to implement its 
own brand of community policing locally throughout BiH but it did not reject nor oppose 
DFID’s meso-level approach to institutionalising community policing. In fact, the SDC project 
associate whom I interviewed stated that the SDC recognised the importance of ensuring that 
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every police officer conducted their work in a manner that was consistent with the philosophy of 
community policing but questioned whether meaningful outputs could be generated and 
sustained through organisational acceptance alone.  These concerns prompted the SDC to 
advocate strategic prescriptions for developing local, community policing specialist teams that 
would take a proactive role in implementing a problem-oriented approach to policing grounded 
in the ‘Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment’ (SARA) methodology  (personal 
communication, ‘SDC Associate’, 22 June 2011).    
Between 2004 and 2006, the SDC trained community policing specialists in Zenica-Doboj 
Canton and also provided managerial training ‘in areas such as field work, management, 
communication and public relations’ (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2007: 17).  
The SDC also established a citizen security forum in Zenica and provided financial assistance 
for crime prevention campaigns, police station refurbishments and the implementation of a 
public perception survey designed to identify local community safety issues (Ibid). During an 
interview with one of the SDC’s project associates, I was informed that the SDC had a number 
of reasons for pursuing community policing reforms in BiH. On an idealistic level, this 
individual suggested that the Swiss wanted to make a meaningful contribution to the post-war 
reconstruction and state-building process in BiH. However, on a pragmatic level, it was 
suggested that the project and the SDC’s work with community policing reforms in Romania 
reflected the organisation’s belief that investing in security sector reforms in proximate 
countries undergoing transition could contribute to a reduction in Switzerland’s refugee 
population and by extension, levels of petty crime throughout Switzerland (personal 
communication, ‘SDC Associate’, 22 June 2011). While this individual’s analysis must be 
treated as a personal opinion and thus highly speculative, their discussion of the instrumental 
motives underpinning the SDC’s support for community policing projects is suggestive of a 
holistic belief in the relationship between under-development and insecurity in transitional 
societies. Similar motives are also accounted for by Hvidemose and Mellon (2009: 3) who 
suggest that the primary objective of ‘Phase 10’ which refers to the SDC’s regional programme 
for police reform was to ‘…help law enforcement improve its ability to fight transnational 
crime, and [to] promote community policing as a means of conflict prevention’ (see also Uster 
2007: 4).
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 The third rationale which was presented by the project associate from the SDC was that Switzerland ‘is 
only a small country with an interest in showing the world that they know something’ (par. personal 
communication, ‘SDC Associate’, 22 June 2011).  This rationale perhaps explains why the SDC 




In attempting to pilot their respective community policing pilot projects, both DFID and the 
SDC encountered significant institutional resistance from station commanders and senior police 
officers who proved hostile to their proposals or failed to follow through on their assurances of 
support. One explanation for this institutional resistance was the lack of a formal framework 
(either legal or policy-based) to function as a mandate for managerial cooperation (personal 
communication, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011). Another obstacle described by the 
former Cluster Coordinator for DFID’s SSAJ initiative was that police managers underestimated 
the strategic utility of community policing and failed to appreciate its value. Rather, he 
suggested that they viewed it as ‘child policing’ or ‘helping old ladies’ (interview, S. Traljic, 26 
July 2011).  
6.4.3 A National ‘Strategy for Community-based Policing in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’ 
Despite the indeterminate success of their pilot projects, DFID and the SDC drew upon the 
lessons learnt from their pilot projects and the obstacles they encountered in supporting the 
federal Ministry of Security in developing the national Strategy which was approved by the BiH 
Council of Ministers in 2008 (Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2007). The 
‘Foreword’ to the Strategy states that it was developed by a working group that included 
representatives from key state, entity and cantonal ministries as well as representatives of 
different policing agencies and the EUPM yet the  majority of its content was authored by DFID 
(interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). DFID played the greatest role in steering the 
implementation of the national Strategy between 2008 and 2010 because of its budgetary 
resources that enabled it to fund a Secretariat position for the National Implementation Team 
responsible for disseminating the Strategy’s prescriptions throughout BiH, facilitating 
implementation, and monitoring progress (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). By funding this 
post, DFID was able to subsequently limit its direct oversight of localised community policing 
projects and instead focus its resources towards specific activities linked with the third Strategic 
Objective of the Strategy that emphasised establishing ‘Community Safety Boards and 
prevention campaigns’ to support the implementation of this Strategy in new locales  (Wisler 
and Traljic 2010: 21).  This Secretariat position allowed DFID to continue to shape the 
implementation of the Strategy from a distance in a manner illustrative of neo-liberal 
governmentality via a glocal contact zone.  
                                                                                                                                                           
2007 national Strategy for Community-based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina formally adopted 
DFID’s approach however as an explanation for why the SDC initially decided to invest in this 




Lacking the budget or influence to shape the national Strategy and shape police reforms from a 
distance, the SDC instead aligned the second stage of its micro-level community policing 
project with the Strategy’s specific ‘objective’ of this framework.  In authoring the template for 
the ‘Strategy’, DFID intentionally left certain areas of the framework ‘broad’ in order to 
accommodate the Swiss-model where it was contextually relevant as it was anticipated that this 
would encourage the SDC to support its implementation (interview, S. Traljic, 26 July 2011). 
Accordingly, the SDC subsequently focused its attention on supporting police-oriented activities 
rather than those which focused on mobilising community resources or generating support from 
local public officials (interview, S. Mihajlović, 28 April 2010; Schorer 2007).  
Between 2007 and 2011, the SDC supported the national Strategy by: implementing opinion 
polls designed to identify local priorities for community police work; coordinating prevention 
campaigns that would assist RPZ officers in addressing these issues; providing RPZ officers 
with training that reflected the ‘best practices’ of community policing in Switzerland; providing 
managers with training on community policing; contributing to the National Implementation 
Team’s development of an Operational Handbook on Police-Community Co-Operation 
(Council of Ministers 2010)
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 ; and lobbying for adjustments in performance management 
systems in order to account for the flexible nature of community policing. Seeking to facilitate 
greater trust between the police and the public, the SDC also provided officers with training in 
concepts like ‘transactional analysis’ and ‘security marketing’ aimed at generating greater 
public awareness of community policing (Schorer 2007; Wisler and Traljic 2010). Finally, the 
SDC also subsidised the refurbishment of public reception areas at police stations throughout 
the country including Banja Luka and Novi Grad in Sarajevo in order to improve the 
institution’s public image (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).  
By supporting the objectives identified by the national Strategy, the SDC also continued to 
promote its specialist model of community policing and in 2007, the SDC introduced this model 
to two municipalities in Sarajevo Canton and throughout RS (Petrovic 2007; see Section 9.2). In 
July 2010, the SDC commissioned an external review of its community policing project in BiH 
that was conducted by Dominique Wisler, a Swiss community-based policing expert with 
significant previous consulting experience and Sead Traljic who formerly served as the Cluster 
Coordinator for the SSAJP project until 2010. The language and conclusions of this unpublished 
evaluation indicate that the SDC was relatively successful in generating outputs that were 
consistent with the objectives that it defined for itself back in 2007. However, the report also 
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recognized that the SDC’s working methodology was output-oriented meaning that the SDC 
neglected to define or measure its ‘successes’ in relation to the actual impact of these reforms.
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In the following chapter, I note that this is common practice for international development 
agencies that adhere to a ‘results-based-management’ philosophy. It is also symptomatic of the 
limited ability of development agencies to anticipate the outcomes of the projects on the basis of 
project inputs or even the tangible outputs they generate. 
In their report, Wisler and Traljic (2010: 13) also concluded that the SDC made significant 
progress in developing self-sufficient training regimes for RPZ specialists at the police 
academies in Sarajevo and Banja Luka. The evaluators stated that this progress was promising 
in terms of promoting sustainability for the project’s outputs and that ‘neighborhood policing is 
capable of reproducing itself as far as training is concerned without further technical assistance’ 
(Ibid: 13). This report also describes numerous successful applications of the specialist model in 
order to provide an indication of its potential to generate favorable outcomes. Many of these 
examples are drawn from the work of a RPZ team operating in Sarajevo Canton since 2007 
which the evaluators suggest have ‘clearly invested a great deal of intellectual effort into 
understanding the concepts involved and translating this into practice’ (Ibid. 5).   
Perhaps the most important conclusion of Wisler and Traljic’s (2010: 7) evaluation however 
was that the SDC project required a one-year extension (through 2011) so that the SDC could 
use its political influence to promote the legal institutionalisation of community policing and the 
RPZ role within entity and cantonal ministries throughout the country. They write, ‘considering 
the nature of the administration in BiH, the adoption of the aforementioned bylaw is a 
requirement for ensuring that CP stabilizes completely: currently, its implementation depends 
heavily on the police management good will’ (Ibid: 7). Ultimately, the evaluators concluded that 
the lack of a legal framework to support community policing served as a major impediment to 
the successful implementation of Strategy.
87
  Recognising the challenge of pursuing such legal 
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Compared to the 2007 review which was conducted by Uster (2007), Wisler and Traljic’s (2010) 
evaluation of the second stage of the SDC’s community policing project provides valuable insights 
into the working methodology of this organisation’s approach to implementing police-oriented 
activities in BiH. The analysis presented in this 2010 review is also noticeably more detailed than in 
Uster’s evaluation and it includes critical reflections on the value and impact of specific aspects of 
the SDC’s work.  
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This sentiment that the National Implementation Team had been unsuccessful in implementing the 
Strategy’s recommendations was shared by representatives of UNDP’s Safer Communities project 
during our initial meeting in April 2010.  These individuals suggested that the difficulties generated 
by this lack of a legal framework were further compounded by the National Implementation Team’s 
lack of budgetary and human resources which served to restrict its presence on the ground (personal 
communication, ‘Safer Communities Team’, 26 April 2010). Further information regarding the 




reforms at the state or entity-level in FBiH, Wisler and Traljic specifically advocated that the 
SDC pursue an ‘early-riser’ approach to promoting legal institutionalisation that would focus on 
compelling ‘cantons/entities that present the best conditions for an early adoption’ to make 
necessary changes to their book of rules as a model for others to subsequently follow (Ibid: 7). 
On the basis of these recommendations, the SDC was granted a one-year extension by the Swiss 
Government and its community policing project lasted until January 2012. 
 
6.5 Discussion 
The established literature on policing reforms in BiH combines post-hoc  assessments of macro-
level police reform initiatives (Hansen 2008; International Conflict Group 2002, 2005; 
Muehlmann 2008; Wisler 2005); critiques of the goals and objectives that have been pursued by 
international actors such as the UNMBiH (Vejnovic and Lalic 2005) and the EUPM  ( 
Collantes-Celador 2007, 2009; Maras 2009; Merlingen and Ostrauskaite 2005); analyses of the 
circumstances that drive policing reform initiatives in  this context (Collantes-Celador 2005; 
Venneri 2010); and localised empirical evaluations of specific policing reform initiatives 
(Deljkić and Lučić-Ćatić 2011). This body of research contributes to a rich, descriptive account 
of the police reform process in BiH and highlights the important role that international actors 
play in shaping the rhetoric and content of policing in BiH. It further speaks to the hierarchical 
and non-democratic power structures underpinning their work and the neo-liberal character of 
different techniques utilised to promote glocal policing agencies in BiH. Building on this 
review, I present my case studies of community-oriented policing reforms in BiH to illuminate 
their translated character and the mediatory potential of different actors and institutions involved 










Chapter Seven: Introducing Safer Communities 
 
Policies associated with community safety partnerships including ‘Safer Communities’ and 
‘Safer Cities’ initiatives have proliferated globally over the past two decades (see Sub-section 
3.2.2). An increasingly prominent feature of plural policing and crime control strategies in 
advanced ‘Western’ societies, the touted successes of this model and its purported contribution 
to generating more accessible and responsive models for local security governance have 
rendered these policies attractive templates for reformers involved with policing issues in 
developing, transitional and post-conflict societies (Crawford 2009). Its global dissemination 
through transnational policy communities populated by policy entrepreneurs, international 
development agencies and NGOs since the mid-1990s suggests that significant cross-national 
(and even internal) variation exists with regards to the conceptual and programmatic features of 
these ‘partnerships’ (Ibid).   
In the previous chapter, it was noted that community safety partnerships were introduced to 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) between 2003 and 2006 by the UK's Department for 
International Development (DFID) and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC). 
Both of these agencies initially established citizen security forums (CSF) to complement their 
community policing projects. The logic underpinning these decisions was that community 
policing would serve to improve the public’s willingness to engage with the police and that 
local security forums would generate greater cooperation between the police and their 
counterparts from other local public service providers thereby improving the capacity of these 
officers to address community problems through partnership (Atos KPMG 2003: 3-4).
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Drawing from this narrative and the work of its predecessors, the United Nations Development 
Programme in BiH launched its own community safety partnership project in 2009. 
In this chapter, I introduce my ethnographic case study of the Safer Communities project in BiH 
by profiling the project’s institutional sponsor, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and by reviewing its origins as an off-shoot of UNDP’s Small Arms Control and 
Reduction Project (SACBiH). Section 7.1 contextualises the habitus of the international 
development worker at UNDP by examining the conflicted role of this organisation and its 
increased dependency on non-core funding for pursuing its capacity development ethos. Section 
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7.2 reviews the institutional origins of the Safer Communities project leading up to the start of 
my placement in January 2011. This includes a discussion of the project’s implementation 
which began in 2010 and an analysis of its working methodology used to pilot the project which 
reflected UNDP’s capacity development ethos. 
In Section 7.3, I discuss the implications of the international development workers habitus by 
challenging Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) claim that glocally-responsive policing is 
primarily responsive to a harmful ‘subculture of transnational policing’. I also discuss the 
project’s status as a contact zone that linked local community safety forums to the United 
Nations development system and international donors and I argue that the project’s unique 
positioning and limited resources enabled the Safer Communities team to design project 
activities that addressed local needs. These factors also afforded domestic stakeholders 
opportunities to participate in important decision making processes that shaped the local 
governance of security within their respective municipalities.  
 
7.1 The United Nations Development Programme: Capacity 
Development through Non-core Funding 
Profiling an institution provides insight into the historical, cultural, and structural factors that 
shape the habitus of its members.  In this section, I sketch the ideational and operational 
contours of the UNDP, an international multi-lateral development agency encompassing a 
global network of regional and country offices, in order to account for an important institutional 
conflict that exists between UNDP’s capacity development mandate and its financial 
dependency on external, non-core funding. My discussion  draws primarily from Browne’s 
(2011) institutional analysis of UNDP and Murphy’s (2006) official history of UNDP and 
suggests that this institution lacks a clear and distinctive purpose within the UN development 
system and that this question of purpose serves as an important source of ontological insecurity 
for both the organisation and its staff.
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 Confronted by this insecurity, this review suggests that 
UNDP employees actively seek to align their work with the Programme’s capacity development 
mandate but that their ability to do so is often restricted by the increasingly limited availability 
of core funding for capacity development projects initiated in UNDP country offices. 
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system makes Browne (2011) and Murphy’s (2006) insider accounts important resources.  Both 
accounts depict UNDP as an innovative yet troubled organisation, characterisations that are 
generally consistent with the data which I generated during my own participant observation of 




Limitations on UNDP core funding thus generate strong institutional pressures for UNDP staff 
to actively seek out non-core investment from international donors with the effect that their 
capacity development focus is frequently undermined. 
Originally born out of a merger between two major international development funds (the 
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and the ‘Special Fund’) in January 1966, UNDP 
was initially created to function as a central coordinating network that would oversee the 
allocation of a unified technical assistance fund and ‘preinvestment’ services for all 
development-related work being carried out within the UN development system (Murphy 2006: 
5). Over the next five decades, however, UNDP’s role as a technical assistance fund was greatly 
diminished as other UN agencies that depended on this technical assistance fund sought to re-
assert their organisational autonomy in this complex and competitive institutional environment 
by actively seeking out sources of non-core funding that would bolster their institutional 
resources and enable them to expand their global operations.  With UNDP’s levels of core 
funding inherently volatile and levels of non-core donor funding rising, UNDP began its 
transformation into a fully-fledged development agency during the 1990’s (Browne 2011: 5).  
By securing this additional non-core funding, UNDP was able to run its own projects and 
programmes through a network of regional and country offices that employ roughly 7,000 staff. 
The significance of UNDP’s institutional transformation since the publication of the first 
Human Development Report
 
(ul Haq 1990) is evident from Browne’s observation that as of 
2011, non-core funding accounts for ‘no less than 80 percent’ of the organisation’s annual 
budget (Ibid: 5). This suggests that UNDP now simultaneously functions as both a central hub 
for core fund disbursement within the UN development system and a fully functional multi-
lateral development agency that competes with other UN agencies (as well as non-UN agencies) 
for non-core funding (Ibid: 5). 
In its capacity as a development agency, UNDP’s formal mandate emphasises the objective of 
‘capacity development’, a concept that can be traced back to the publication of the first Human 
Development Report (ul Haq 1990). This innovative and ‘subversive’ report was authored by 
Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq and introduced under the leadership of William Draper 
who Murphy (2006: 242) credits with embracing a greater advocacy role for UNDP, particularly 
in relation to issues involving gender equality and poverty reduction.  Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the outbreak of a number of localised conflicts during the 1990s, UNDP 
also embraced ‘governance’ and ‘crisis prevention and recovery’ as additional focal points 




its role as a preeminent international development organisation (Murphy 2006), its propensity to 
adopt vague and ill-defined mandates like ‘capacity development’ has also served as an 
important source of ontological insecurity for this institution and its staff. Browne (2011: 90) 
argues that UNDP’s insecurity reflects the organisations concerns about its relevance and 
managerial efficiency as well as its awareness of the fact that it was not originally designed to 
function as an autonomous international development agency. He writes: 
‘All of the entities of the UN development system were established to answer specific 
development needs… UNDP, on the other hand, was not so much an organization as an 
amalgam of two funding facilities, the “need” for which was based on the concern at the time to 
facilitate the transfer of technical skills from North to South.’ (Browne 2011: 90) 
 
Since the 1990s, however, Browne (2011: 91) argues that UNDP has struggled to reconcile its 
prescribed role as the central coordinator and disburser for the UN development network with 
its invented function as an autonomous development agency. He writes: 
‘UNDP’s search for a role has not been without ambiguity, the signs of which were visible in the 
early days. The real strength of the field network is to keep the organization’s ear to the ground, 
identifying the specific development priorities of each country. But while these highly 
differentiated needs are fed upwards, the organization has developed a set of centrally 
determined development priorities which it attempts to propagate downwards. One recent 
observer has characterized this tension as UNDP’s “riding two horses simultaneously.’ (Browne 
2011: 91) 
 
These conflicting roles create important questions regarding what it is that UNDP actually does; 
what makes the agency unique amongst an increasingly populous field of bi-lateral and multi-
lateral competitors with similar capacities and donor appeal; and perhaps most importantly, how 
can the organisation actually translate abstract objectives like ‘capacity development’ into 
tangible outcomes? UNDP’s attempt to address the latter question is evident from its advocacy 
of ‘results-based management’ at its regional and country offices. A 2006 report by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank states that 
‘[r]esults-based management asks managers to regularly think through the extent to which their 
implementation activities and outputs have a reasonable probability of attaining the outcomes 
desired, and to make continuous adjustments as needed to ensure that outcomes are achieved’ 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and World Bank 2006: 9).
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A 2007 internal Evaluation of Results-Based Management at UNDP (United Nations 
Development Programme 2007) observes that UNDP was ‘among the earliest UN organizations 
to introduce results-based management’ (RBM) back in 1999 as a strategy for ‘learning from 
empirical evidence based on past experience and using that information to manage’ (United 
Nations Development Programme 2007: i, 5).  However, the Evaluation concludes that by 2007, 
UNDP had made limited progress towards successfully implementing RBM because UNDP 
embodies an institutional culture that is characterised by ‘a lack of clear lines of accountability’ 
with the effect that staff at its country offices face competing pressures to simultaneously 
manage capacity development projects for outputs and outcomes (Ibid: x). These pressures can 
be accounted for in relation to the significant influx of non-core funding over the past two 
decades.  
While UNDP as a development agency continues to advocate capacity development as its 
primary ethos, Browne (2011: 119) argues that the re-orientation of UNDP from a network 
coordinator into a multi-faceted international development agency has fostered an opportunistic 
managerial culture at its regional and country offices. He explains, ‘[w]herever it has become 
clear that donors are willing to fund a particular incentive or program, a suitable proposal is sure 
to follow’ (Ibid: 119). While limited core funding continues to be disbursed to these offices to 
cover administrative costs, fund certain core programmes designed to address centrally defined 
priorities, and provide seed funding to encourage local staff to initiate projects that may 
potentially attract future non-core donor investment, UNDP‘s core budget is insufficient. This 
means that the majority of development projects that are implemented by UNDP staff around 
the world are funded by external, non-core investment provided by national and international 
donors including the United States and the European Union (EU). 
Faced with the need to finance their operations via external channels, Browne (2011: 119) 
suggests that projects implemented through UNDP’s regional and country offices are 
increasingly being defined in relation to what are perceived to be the interests of donors rather 
than the needs of recipients. Browne (2011: 119) further argues that ‘[t]here is little doubt that 
all these donor-driven initiatives have provided benefits to developing countries’ but 
acknowledges that the influx of non-core investment has created significant ‘operational 
distortions’ that affect the way in which UNDP actually operates. This means that project 
managers based at UNDP’s regional and country offices must frequently demonstrate the 
prospective benefits of any project they propose  to donors in order to attract non-core funding. 
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When and if this funding is secured, they must then continuously work to assure these donors 
that their investment is being put to good use in a manner consistent with the guidelines agreed 
upon in the ‘project document’.  
Monitoring and evaluation activities thus serve important elements of RBM at UNDP. Given 
that outcomes can only be measured via post-hoc evaluation, continuous monitoring and 
evaluation procedures requires project managers to invent predictive ‘indicators’ in order to 
demonstrate that the project is on-schedule, on-budget and generating pre-defined outputs. The 
demands of continuous monitoring and evaluation combined with the threat that donors may 
potentially withdraw funding if certain benchmarks or targets are not met has rendered UNDP’s 
managerial culture highly opportunistic and the parallel accountability structures which result 
from UNDP’s dependency on non-core funding are said to compel UNDP’s staff to align their 
projects and activities with what they identify as the interests of donors (Browne 2011: 107). 
Doing so is important for not only sustaining individual projects but for securing UNDP’s 
relevance within the international development system. These pressures highlight the extent to 
which the work of international development agencies is affected by neo-liberal 
governmentalities described in Chapter Two and the ontological insecurities that they generate 
represent an important, recurring theme of my ethnographic case study of the Safer 
Communities project. 
 
7.2 Background: The Safer Communities Project 
The goal of improving cooperation between the police and other municipal service providers 
with a role to play in community safety and local security governance served as the working 
narrative for the Safer Communities project during its pilot phase which officially commenced 
in early 2009. The project’s initial aims included supporting five previously established CSFs in 
Bratunac, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Višegrad and Zenica (see ‘Map 1 Bosnia and Herzegovina’) 
and drawing from these experiences to develop a strategic framework that would subsequently 
allow the Safer Communities team to support the project’s expansion throughout BiH with 
financial support (i.e. non-core funding) from European donors (interview, ‘Project Manager’, 
26 April 2010; also United Nations Development Programme  2010).With reference to Johnston 
and Shearing’s (2003; see Section 3.5) work on nodal security governance, it is evident that 
UNDP aspired to develop a parallel architecture for governing security in BiH, one that was 




various stakeholders including the police, municipal officials, and other municipal-level public 
service providers (United Nations Development Programme 2009a). During the pilot phase, 
each CSF constituted an important security node within this emergent security assemblage. 
UNDP in BiH also served as an important security node and contact zone in its capacity as a 
‘non-governmental organisation’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003: 147) and institutional sponsor 
for the Safer Communities project. Specifically, it provided the project with seed funding that 
allowed the Safer Communities team to provide financial and technical support to these forums. 
To contextualise the work of the Safer Communities team, this section revisits the origins of the 
project through an analysis of its project document and a review of its working methodology 
during its pilot phase prior to the start of my internship in January 2011. 
7.2.1 The Project Document 
The Safer Communities project was established as a component of the Small Arms Control and 
Reduction project in BiH (SACBiH) in early 2009. Section 1.4 of the SACBiH Project 
Document states: 
‘The safer community project will demonstrate how community members with commitment and 
ideas can work together to develop innovative approaches to crime prevention and reduction of 
supply and demand for SALW....The Small Arms Control Programme will support the 
implementation of the principles and characteristics of community-based policing to allow the 
police and the community to work tighter in new ways to solve problems of crime, disorder and 
safety issues to improve the quality of life… for everyone in that community.’ (UNDP 2009a: 15) 
 
The link between Safer Communities and SACBiH was grounded in the belief that community 
policing and community safety partnerships could be used to support small and light weapons 
(SALW) related activities such as amnesty programmes and further contribute to an overall 
reduction in the levels of illegal SALW ownership in BiH by improving the overall level of 
security for citizens within their communities. Essentially, the Project Document forecasts that 
the SACBiH team’s support for community policing and CSPs would encourage greater 
cooperation between the police and other municipal officials and contribute to improvements in 
the governance and provision of local security that would ultimately reduce the incentives for 
private citizens to own illegal weapons. The Project Document also states that Safer 
Communities would ‘help communities develop and implement community-based solutions to 
problems that contribute to crime and SALW widespread presence’ by ‘[b]uilding partnerships 
with women’s organizations to encourage them to engage in the ‘armed violence against 
women’ issue and implement activities to try to understand and decrease men’s motivation for 




During the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project (2009-2012), the SACBiH project’s 
focus on SALW control and the posited link between community policing and community 
safety partnerships and a long term reduction in personal SALW ownership played an extremely 
limited role in terms of actually defining the range of project activities that were supported by 
the Safer Communities team. For example, during my three-month placement with UNDP, the 
Safer Communities team never actually approached any of its five pilot CSFs about the prospect 
of mobilising its members or local community police officers for activities designed to 
contribute to a reduction in SALW ownership. Nor did the Safer Communities team designate 
SALW collection as a strategic priority for these CSFs while working with them to develop 
operational plans. Rather, the majority of the project activities that the Safer Communities 
project reflected a broader objective listed in Section 1.4 of the Project Document: 
‘…to reduce crime, increase public safety and enhance public education and awareness about 
the causes of crime through community tailored set of activities that entail direct support to the 
municipalities.’ (United Nations Development Programme 2009a: 15) 
 
On a rhetorical level, it was also evident that the Safer Communities team’s Project Manager 
only referred to the link between SALW and Safer Communities when discussing the project 
with specific audiences. For example, not once did the issue of SALW arise at any of the four 
meetings that I attended between representatives from Safer Communities and local CSF 
representatives. Nor was it discussed at meetings between UNDP and other international 
agencies involved with policing reforms in BiH including the OSCE or the SDC (field notes, 16 
January 2011 – 26 March 2011). However, this seemingly tenuous link was referenced on one 
occasion during a SACBiH project board meeting attended by key project stakeholders and 
donors including representatives from the European Commission (EC) and BiH’s Ministry of 
Security. At this meeting, the Project Manager spent the majority of his presentation reviewing 
the SACBiH team’s progress relating to munitions destruction and made only a passing 
reference to the Safer Communities component in suggesting that it was ‘linked with weapons 
collection activities’ (field notes, 04 February 2011).  This example illustrates that the Safer 
Communities team consciously adapted the way that it presented the project to different 
audiences and the team’s motives adapting the rhetoric of the Safer Communities when 
addressing different audiences were directly related to the funding pressures described in the 
previous section. This example illustrates how audience segmentation (Goffman 1956) was used 
by members of the Safer Communities team to secure managerial autonomy and I elaborate on 





The SACBiH project’s initial budgetary resources included 7.8 million USD including 4.2 
million USD in non-core funding from the EC, 2.8 million USD in non-core funding from 
bilateral donors mainly from Europe, and 695,000 USD in core funding from the UN Bureau for 
Crisis Prevention and Recovery budget (United Nations Development Programme 2009a: 1). 
None of the non-core funding for SACBiH was initially allocated for the Safer Communities 
project. Rather, the SACBiH team waited to initiate the Safer Communities component until 
December 2009 due to delays in receiving core funds from the UN Bureau for Crisis Prevention 
and Recovery (personal communication, 16 February 2012).
91  Because the Safer Communities 
project was initially funded through UNDP seed funding rather than SACBiH’s non-core 
budget, there was no need for the Project Manager to justify their financial expenditure or report 
on the progress of the Safer Communities component to the EC. Rather, the Project Manager’s 
description of the Safer Communities project during this presentation to the EC can be 
explained in relation to the need for the SACBiH team to justify its decision to deploy its 
limited human resources to pursue activities that appeared to be unrelated to the munitions 
destruction and SALW reduction targets established within the Project Document. Facing 
significant pressures from European donors to hit these performance targets amidst significant 
delays, the Project Manager risked alienating these donors and being forced to return their 
allocated investment if it was thought that the SACBiH was unfocused or misallocating its 
resources. This dynamic produced an evident disconnect between the ‘official’ justification for 
the Safer Communities component and the actual work of the Safer Communities team between 
2010 and 2012.   
7.2.2 The Team 
Having secured its seed funding by the end of 2009, the SACBiH team recruited a ‘Community-
based Policing Officer’ (henceforth ‘Community Policing Advisor’) in February 2010.  The 
Community Policing Advisor acted as the team’s resident expert and coordinator for all 
operational aspects of the Safer Communities project. This individual reported directly to the 
SACBiH Project Manager who continued to oversee the work of the Safer Communities team 
until late 2011.  The Community Policing Advisor previously worked as a police officer in 
Republika Srpska (RS) for nearly ten-years but retired in the mid-2000’s to serve on UN police 
missions in other transitional, post-conflict societies around the world. As the newest permanent 
member of the SACBiH team, the Community Policing Advisor had limited previous 
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experience working for international organisations involved with policy making and 
development work but had previously dealt with major multi-lateral institutions including the 
United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the European Union Police Mission 
(EUPM) as a senior police officer in RS.  These experiences influenced the Community 
Policing Advisor’s negative view of the international community’s ‘top-down’ approach to 
introducing their reforms to BiH and instilled in them an awareness of the risk that this 
approach often generates significant resistance from local policy makers and practitioners. 
Accordingly, the Community Policing Advisor readily identified with UNDP’s capacity 
development ethos and employed it as the guiding principle for building relationships and 
supporting project activities during the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project (personal 
communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 26 April 2010). 
The SACBiH Project Manager also played an important role in shaping the Safer Communities 
project during its pilot phase. A lawyer by training, the Project Manager joined UNDP in BiH in 
2009 having previously worked as legal counsel for another major multi-lateral organisation 
involved with security sector reforms in BiH. The Project Manager’s managerial style 
emphasised tangibles and the need for the SACBiH project to deliver measurable results. This 
reflected the individual’s responsiveness to the managerial pressures of UNDP’s ‘results-based 
management’ system described in the previous section. Due to the demanding nature of the 
Project Manager’s role in supervising the SACBiH project, this individual was forced to limit 
their involvement with the day-to-day operations of the Safer Communities project. The final 
member of the Safer Communities team was a Project Associate who was primarily responsible 
for overseeing administrative tasks for both SACBiH and Safer Communities. This individual 
contributed to discussions and brainstorming sessions relating to the design of the Safer 
Communities project but played only a limited role in terms of contributing to the projects 
operations.  
As BiH citizens and residents, the Project Manager, the Community Policing Advisor and the 
Project Associate were all classified as ‘local staff’. This meant that they were employed on 
temporary contracts that were linked to the continuation of the SACBiH project. It also meant 
that they enjoyed limited horizontal and vertical career mobility within the UN development 
system and were paid significantly less than the international staff that populated the upper 
echelons of management at UNDP BiH office. Compared to international staff, members of the 
Safer Communities project also lacked significant influence within the UN development system 




difficulties that these individuals encountered while attempting to access information about 
funding (discussed in the following chapter) also indicates that these individuals enjoyed 
relatively limited social capital within this institutional setting. The Project Manager represented 
a partial exception given their previous experience working for another major international 
organisation in BiH and their personal contacts amongst influential domestic political elites 
(field notes). 
7.2.3 Planning Safer Communities 
Between April and June 2010, the Community Policing Advisor, the Project Manager and the 
head of UNDP in BiH’s Safety and Justice Sector conducted a series of meetings and interviews 
with local and international stakeholders involved with different aspects of community policing 
reforms in BiH. This included over fifty meetings with various individuals including 
representatives from all levels of government; international organisation and local NGOs; the 
National Implementation Team for Community-Based Policing (NIT); local police officers; and 
representatives of other municipal-level public service providers. Based on these meetings, the 
Community Policing Advisor and the Project Manager created a Baseline Assessment report 
(United Nations Development Programme 2010; see Appendix 2) that was subsequently 
published by UNDP in June 2010. This report concluded that the implementation of the national 
Strategy (2007: 6) had experienced numerous obstacles and that poor cooperation between the 
police and municipal officials remained problematic in many urban communities that were 
working to implement its recommendations.  
The Baseline Assessment report also summarises the working ‘methodology’ that the Safer 
Communities team used to select its five pilot sites (Ibid: 8). It describes how a number of 
possible candidates were initially eliminated due to their inadequate size based on the team’s 
belief that those municipalities which were too small were not suited to community-based 
policing. This elimination process was followed by a process of ‘positive selection’ whereby 
municipalities with desirable characteristics were effectively shortlisted for consideration. At 
our first meeting in April 2010, the Project Manager and the Community Policing Advisor 
confirmed that the most significant factor for determining whether a municipality was suitable 
for pilot status involved the question of whether key local stakeholders including current and 
prospective CSF members were motivated to implement changes. Essentially, the Safer 
Communities team was only keen to invest its limited time and resources into supporting CSFs 
in receptive communities that were unlikely to generate resistance.  For this reason, Stolac 




Safer Communities was eliminated from consideration after numerous unsuccessful attempts by 
the Safer Communities team to schedule a meeting with municipal officials to discuss the 




From the selection process described in the Baseline Assessment report it is clear that the Safer 
Communities team was keen to emphasise the values of partnership and cooperation as the core 
symbolic elements of its working methodology. These narrative elements were perhaps 
unsurprising given that they were consistent with what the Project Manager and a Project 
Associate identified to be the institutional mandate of UNDP: local capacity building (field 
notes, 21-22 February 2011).
93
 For the Safer Communities team, this ethos motivated them to 
distinguish the project’s reformative approach from what were perceived to be the top-down and 
coercive approaches utilised by other agencies involved with policing reform initiatives in the 
country.  For example, the Project Manager stated that the Safer Communities project was not 
about forcing a specific model or structure upon these local actors but rather, the project’s core 
budget would allow it to provide technical and financial assistance to pilot CSFs and to 
subsidise project activities designed to address the local security needs of these communities. It 
was anticipated that this investment and the project’s formal ties with UNDP would also support 
increased collaboration between the police, local government officials, and other key public 
service providers who would be compelled to participate in these CSFs as a means of accessing 
the projects discretionary budget (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 26 April 2010).  
Essentially, the goal of the Safer Communities team during the project’s pilot phase was to 
demonstrate the value of the CSP model through an ‘early riser’ approach that might serve to 
generate future interest from other municipalities in BiH. 
Having selected its five pilot sites in mid-2010, the Safer Communities team hired consultant to 
conduct an independent assessment of the NIT’s progress with the national Strategy and to 
develop a strategic framework for operationalizing the Safer Communities model in BiH. The 
successful bid was tendered by a small  UK-based consultancy firm called XIX Services which 
at the time consisted of a retired Chief Inspector from Merseyside, England and a local research 
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Aitchison (2007: 332) has previously described how majoritarian politics in Stolac created 
significant obstacles for the IPTF during in the late 1990’s.   
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assistant from BiH  who was completing their graduate studies  in RS. The chief consultant 
possessed extensive experience overseeing operational and training aspects of community-
oriented policing projects in Merseyside and had previously served as an international police 
adviser and consultant for DFID projects in Sierra Leone and South Sudan (personal 
communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 14 February 2012). Like the Atos KPMG 
consultants hired by DFID to design and implement its community policing project in BiH 
between 2003 and 2005, this individual represented a member of the transnational policy 
community responsible for the global dissemination of community policing described by 
Brogden and Nijhar (2005). 
Between 28 September and 14 November 2010, XIX Services conducted a series of 78 
interviews with different community policing stakeholders throughout BiH. This included 
police officers, local partners and community representatives in order to assess the NIT's 
progress against the 14 key performance indicators published in the national Strategy and to 
identify important ‘issues that have affected the implementation of the strategy and the delivery 
of the strategic objectives’ in BiH (Gill 2010a: 2).
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  The findings of this research were 
published in a Community Policing Strategy Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) Evaluation Report 
(henceforth Evaluation, referenced as Gill 2010a) which concluded that ‘the CBP concept is 
embedded in police divisions throughout BiH’ but police officers, including the SDC trained 
RPZ specialists, working to implement these reforms regularly encountered problems due to a 
lack of support from ‘service delivery partners at the municipal and cantonal level’ (Gill 2010a: 
21-22). The Evaluation thus concluded that this lack of cooperation indicated that ‘there is a 
need to migrate the CBP strategy into a CSP strategy with CBP forming a single workstream of 
this strategy’ (Ibid: 21-22). 
XIX Services drew from this apparent ‘need’ to inform the development of its Community 
Safety Partnership Development Strategic Framework Document (henceforth Strategic 
Framework, referenced as Gill 2010b)
95
 which translated these ‘obstacles’ into strategic 
prescriptions for operationalising the Safer Communities model in BiH. The Strategic 
Framework recommended that the Safer Communities team should proceed with developing a 
functional, multi-level system for governing community safety partnerships in BiH. It also 
reaffirmed the team’s decision to establish CSFs at the municipal level and also called for the 
creation of a ‘Steering Group’ at the national level that could oversee the expansion of this 
project throughout the country and serve as a hub of coordination linking these CSFs  once the 
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Safer Communities project expired (Gill 2010b: 11-12). During the pilot phase of the Safer 
Communities project, the programmatic recommendations provided by XIX Services played 
only a limited role in influencing the design of the Safer Communities project. However, these 
reports did provide the project with an important source of external validation because it 
supported the team’s initial belief that community safety partnerships represented the only 
logical means of improving the local governance of security across BiH.    
7.2.4 Piloting Safer Communities 
Through its financial support for the Safer Communities project, UNDP in BiH aspired to 
develop a parallel architecture for nodal security governance in BiH, one that could enhance 
existing state structures and institutions by improving the links between different agencies and 
security actors and rendering their governance more accessible and responsive to the needs and 
interests of local security consumers (United Nations Development Programme 2009a). The 
goal of improving cooperation between the police and other municipal service providers with a 
role to play in community safety and local security governance reflected the capacity 
development ethos of UNDP and served as a working narrative for the Safer Communities 
project during its pilot phase. The remainder of this section examines the micro-politics of the 
Safer Communities project as an emergent contact zone within this nodal assemblage by 
reviewing the team’s methodology for selecting  and identifying relevant project activities to be 
implemented through local CSFs. This analysis concludes that the Safer Communities team’s 
methodology was consistent with UNDP’s ‘local capacity development’ mandate with the 
implication that important domestic stakeholders, specifically local political elites who were 
involved with these CSFs, were encouraged to take ownership over their respective  nodes and 
to use them to govern security in a locally responsive manner.  
In order to support project activities designed to address the needs of local communities in BiH, 
the Safer Communities project had to first identify these needs. In order to access this 
information, the team hired a local, BiH-based ‘marketing media and social research agency’ to 
conduct a country-wide telephone survey to measure public perceptions of community security 
which conducted in November 2010 (henceforth Public Opinion Poll 2010).  However, the 
survey’s limited sample size and impersonal sampling methods raised concerns amongst the 
Safer Communities team regarding the reliability of this data.  For example, the final report 
states that only fifty households were surveyed at each of the five pilot sites and asked about 
their views ‘regarding the security situation in their areas of residence, their attitudes regarding 




their experiences, aspirations and trends with regard to security’ (Public Opinion Poll 2010: 3). 
It was therefore clear that the sampling and data collection methods used in this telephone 
survey failed to account for the perceptions of certain groups in BiH at greater risk of 
victimisation or economic hardship (i.e. Roma or ‘returnees’).   
While the Safer Communities team was well aware of these methodological limitations, the 
findings published in the Public Opinion Poll were also determined to be problematic because 
they did not support the team’s belief that there was a need for further improvements in the local 
governance of security. Most notably, the survey found that ‘the highest percentage of citizens 
felt mostly safe in their municipality of residence’ (orig. emphasis, Public Opinion Poll 2010: 6) 
while ‘the highest percentage of respondents (12.7%) who opted… [to identify a security issue 
as being most significant in their community]…considered stray dogs as the biggest problem’ 
(Ibid: 6).  This was accounted for in relation to the finding that 89.7% of the sample ‘stated that 
they had not been the victim of criminal activity or any other form of socially unacceptable 
behaviour during the past two years’. In other words, the survey suggested that the BiH public 
did not feel particularly insecure when it came to the issue of criminal behaviour within their 
communities because frequency of incidents appeared to be relatively low (Ibid: 6). Another 
finding that was potentially problematic for the Safer Communities team was that ‘amongst the 
general population [only] 45.5% would like to introduce certain changes into the security 
management of their municipalities’ (Ibid: 6). This called into question UNDP’s popular 
mandate to support reforms designed to improve the local governance of security in relation to 
its capacity development ethos because it suggested that local demand was limited. This 
concern was particularly problematic with reference to the five pilot sites given that 91% of the 
residents sampled from four of the five sites (Bratunac, Prijedor, Sanski Most and Zenica)
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expressed that they felt ‘very safe’ or ‘mostly safe’ within their municipality of residence (Ibid: 
9).  
The Public Opinion Poll raised important questions about what the Safer Communities project 
could actually hope to achieve by introducing its CSP model to BiH however, any doubts 
regarding the necessity of this project or the legitimacy of UNDP’s capacity development 
mandate were neutralised by members of the Safer Communities team who constructed an 
alternative explanation to account for these findings. Specifically, members of the team 
suggested that the BiH public had limited expectations of security provision, particularly 
compared to public expectations of security in Western Europe. According to the team’s 
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Community Policing Advisor, these limited expectations were problematic because it meant that 
the police in BiH and other municipal institutions lacked an impetus to collaborate with each 
other to deliver security. The Community Policing Advisor added that public apathy threatened 
to create a vicious cycle whereby the public might become increasingly disinvested from the 
governance of security within their local communities with the effect that providers and 
institutions responsible for governing security might become even more lethargic (personal 
communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011). Thus, rather than deterring 
the team from pursuing the project, these findings were creatively and selectively interpreted to 
justify the team’s decision to proceed with the project as planned.  
While the Safer Communities team used neutralisation techniques to support their decision to 
proceed with implementing the project, the BiH public’s limited expectations of local security 
provision also created a significant managerial problem for the project because it meant that it 
would be inherently difficult to demonstrate the value of the project’s outputs with a RBM 
framework. This was due to the fact that many of the local issues prioritised by BiH citizens in 
the Public Opinion Poll (2010) did not involve security threats that could be readily measured 
using established indicators such as crime statistics.  Thus, while investing in project activities 
designed to address the country’s stray dog population promised to improve the public’s sense 
of security in many communities, the return on this investment could not be readily 
communicated to potential donors. Similarly, investing in crime prevention technologies 
including CCTV designed to address signal crimes and support a ‘Broken Windows’ policing 
strategy would also fail to translate into measurable short-term gains that appealed to the 
interests of non-core donors.  
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the question of how the team could implement and manage 
this project for ‘results’, the Community Policing Advisor presented the findings of the Public 
Opinion Survey (2010) to representatives from each the five CSFs and following a series of 
consultations, the Safer Communities team identified a range of tailored project activities that 
addressed local security issues defined by each of the municipalities. During its pilot phase, the 
Safer Communities used its seed funding to support the construction of stray dog shelters in 
Sanski Most, Višegrad and Zenica. In Bratunac and Prijedor, it invested in projects designed to 
improve road safety. CCTV technology was introduced to all of the municipalities and the 
Community Policing Advisor worked with local officials to ensure that the application of this 
technology was consistent with a charter for the ‘democratic use’ of this technology published 




Advisor’, 13 December 2011; see European Forum for Urban Security 2010).  The Safer 
Communities team also paid for the construction of a designated youth centre in Bratunac after 
members of its CSF suggested that it might help to prevent antisocial behaviour among youths. 
In Višegrad, the Safer Communities team purchased a lifeboat in response to a number of 
accidental drowning in the Drina River and in Zenica, it worked with the local CSF to develop a 
curriculum for addressing gender based violence through a training seminar (field notes, 16 
January - 26 March 2012). 
 
7.3 Discussion 
The significance of international development workers as policy mediators is linked with the 
idea that the habitus of these actors is not primarily responsive to police subcultures. In other 
words, the international development worker operates as an ancillary of global policing by 
fostering neo-liberal globalisation through police reforms in developing and transitional 
societies. It is not, however, one of the principal archetypes of global policing.  This suggests 
that the international development worker’s habitus is not primarily structured by the coercive 
and Manichean mentalities associated with what Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) 
 
describe as a 
‘subculture of transnational policing’ (see Section 3.1).
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 Rather, this habitus draws from a 
conflicted capacity development ethos that is first and foremost responsive to the institutional 
politics of the international development system.
98
  To this effect, the habitus of the 
international development worker is at once idealistic and opportunistic. It renders the 
international development worker both principled and savvy; an actor whose transient interest in 
policing and police reform projects is predicated on the circumstantial demand for such projects 
and the availability of funding to support such activities.  
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 Chan (1996: 109) has previously incorporated Bourdieu’s concept of ‘habitus’ into her analysis of 
police culture and argues that it is particularly valuable for simultaneously analysing the 
‘interpretive and creative aspects, as well as the legal and political context of police work’. Drawing 
on Sackmann’s (1991) framework for applying Bourdieu’s concept of habitus to the study of 
organisational cultures, Chan’s work (1996: 110) introduces a nuanced account of police culture 
which theorises it as the product of ‘interaction between the socio-political context of police work 
and various dimensions of police organisational knowledge’. 
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 This is not to suggest, however, that police subculture does not affect the habitus of individuals who 
assume this ‘international development worker’ role. Rather, I argue that the capacity development 
ethos is prioritised by individuals who are compelled to respond to institutional and structural 
factors associated with the UN development system. This is evident in relation to the work of the 
Community Policing Advisor who continued to identify with police subculture for the duration of 
their involvement with the project yet would only consciously draw upon this and incorporate into 




The international development worker’s ephemeral interest in police and security sector reform 
projects is key to understanding their translational function because it influences their approach 
to policing reforms and security governance as a means to an end which need not be primarily 
grounded in problematic aspirations for more or better forms of security (Bowling and 
Sheptycki 2012: 98-100; Zedner 2003). Rather, the conflicted capacity development ethos that 
shapes the habitus of international development workers compels these individuals to engage 
with policing reforms and the governance of security as vehicles for achieving broader 
outcomes linked with development, local ownership, democratisation and liberalisation. While 
Duffield’s (1999; 2007) work suggests that development objectives cannot be divorced from the 
concept of security, the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project evidences that the 
international development worker can use their agency to promote security as an ‘axiomatic’ 
phenomenon (Loader and Walker 2003: 16) rather than purposively or necessarily contributing 
to processes of securitisation (Buzan et al 1998).  
Admittedly, the prospect of incorporating capacity development ‘outcomes’ into a ‘results-
based management’ framework like the one which is utilised at UNDP and other international 
development organisations is challenging. Nevertheless, my ethnographic case study of the 
Safer Communities project suggests that the concept of capacity development continues to 
enjoy significant purchase with the international development worker who views it as an 
important part of their professional identity (Murphy 2006) and their role as an agent of glocal 
policy making. Accordingly, the Manichean worldview that Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) 
associate with a subculture of transnational policing is not a characteristic element of this 
habitus and it does not intuitively resonate with the international development worker’s interest 
in capacity building.  
In its pilot phase, the flexible and indeterminate character of the project also represented an 
important asset to the Safer Communities team, one that allowed its members to invest the 
project’s limited resources in project activities that would help to improve the governing 
capacities of local political elites and practitioners throughout BiH. To this effect, the Project 
Manager suggested that the Safer Communities project represented a ‘perfect metaphor for the 
work of UNDP’ because ‘it can be used to do anything but it is difficult to define’ (personal 
communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 February 2011).
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 It is evident that during the pilot 
phase, each CSF constituted an important security node. UNDP also served as an important 
security node in this emerging network and afforded the project seed funding that allowed the 
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Safer Communities project team to provide financial and technical support to these forums. 
With this seed funding, it was also evident that Safer Communities emerged as an important 
contact zone in this emerging network as well as a security node given the project’s role in 
initially coordinating (or governing) the work of local CSFs. This implies that certain security 
nodes take on characteristics of a contact zone in cases where their designated function and 
nodal positioning compels them to participate in the ‘governance of governance’, that is 
‘governing the range of nodes and nodal assemblages that now function to produce security 
goods across local, national and international levels’ (Wood and Shearing 2006: 115).  
The Safer Communities team’s decision to support this range of low profile project activities 
illustrates UNDP’s significant influence over this contact zone.  This investment afforded to the 
Safer Communities team the chance to exercise a significant degree of autonomy in terms of 
how it chose to conceptualise the project and define its projected outputs so that they could 
address local issue without fear of under-delivering. In this respect, the designated ‘results’ for 
the pilot phase of Safer Communities remained largely intangible and intentionally ill-defined. 
UNDP’s economic resources in the form of seed funding also ensured that Safer Communities 
would be designed, managed and implemented by UNDP employees.  
While the Safer Communities team’s role in governing the governance of security is suggestive 
of what deLeon (1992: 125) labels the ‘elite characterization’ of policy actors,  their ‘elite’ 
positioning did not amount to a cultural ‘disconnect between policy actors and local users’ 
because the Safer Communities team continued to implement its project activities in a manner 
reflective of UNDP’s capacity development ethos which advocated ‘policy sharing’ as a means 
of identifying local needs. Specific examples of the Safer Communities team’s use of policy 
sharing included identifying project activities based on consultations with CSF members during 
the pilot phase of the project. This included maintaining regular channels of communication 
with local political elites involved with the forums, and employing local BiH citizens to manage 
and implement the project as members of the Safer Communities team. Local staff at UNDP 
represented a particularly important mechanism for operational reflexivity and their presence in 
this contact zone also fostered policy sharing by ensuring that their collective habitus was also 
responsive to their personal interests as BiH citizens in achieving meaningful and sustainable 
improvements in the local governance of security.   
The Safer Communities project also functioned as an important link between local CSFs and 
other security nodes operating in this network. For example, representatives from the Sarajevo-




Europe (OSCE) and the London-based Saferworld group were invited to attend a string of 
meetings between the Safer Communities team and local CSFs in February 2011. During these 
meetings, these different organisations presented CSF members with educational resources 
covering issues like community engagement and dealing with hate crimes (field notes, 8-10 
February 2011). The majority of the interactions
100
 that took place during these meetings were 
consistent with UNDP’s capacity development ethos in that there was no expectation from these 
different organisations that CSF members would utilise their resources or enter into 
collaboration unless it was in the interest of their local communities. In this respect, the Safer 
Communities project and its individual members played empowered local CSFs by allowing 
them to govern security within their communities in relation to local preferences.  However, the 
following chapter suggests that the habitus of the international development worker is mutable 
(Wacquant 2009: 137), shaped by historical experiences and contemporary circumstances and 
structured by cultural, social and political processes that contribute to the objectification of 
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One example of an interaction that I observed which does not fit this analysis was between a 
representative from the OSCE and members of the CSF in Prijedor. The OSCE representative 
attended the meeting to inform the police officers attending about new procedures that were being 
introduced throughout the RS for reporting hate crimes. The OSCE representative stated that these 
officers would need to familiarise themselves with these new procedures and that the police in RS 
would need to take responsibility for maintaining a database of all hate crime incidents as this was a 
condition of OSCE assistance. This is indicative of the susceptibility of this nodal assemblage to 
externally-responsive forms of governance and I explore this issue in the following chapter (field 




Chapter Eight: Safer Communities as a Contact Zone 
 
In this chapter, I reflect upon my three-month internship with the Safer Communities project to 
examine the negotiated character of this contact zone and the ways that policy translation 
impacted a policing reform project in a weak and structurally dependent society. Section 8.1 
examines the Safer Communities project’s unique positioning as a concrete contact zone that 
linked local citizen security forums (CSF) to international donors and I analyse the ways in 
which nodal relations and structural pressures for policy alignment influenced the work of the 
Safer Communities team and momentarily compelled it to align the project with what were 
perceived to be the interests of the European Commission (EC) in the region. This realignment 
is argued to be problematic in a procedural sense because it appeared to undermine the capacity 
of domestic policy makers to exercise political freedoms and impart their policy preferences 
through the governance of the Safer Communities project as a contact zone. I conclude this 
section by presenting a redemption narrative for the project which suggests that opportunities do 
exist for seemingly disempowered individuals working for locally-based international 
multilateral development agencies to use policy translation in order to mitigate these intense 
structural pressures to align policing reform initiatives with the interests of supranational 
stakeholders.  
Whereas Section 8.1 concludes with a cautiously optimistic assessment of the prospects for 
maintaining a habitual emphasis on capacity development amidst limited sources of funding and 
structural pressures for policy alignment, Section 8.2 presents a bleaker account of the ways in 
which institutional and individual motives influence the habitus of international development 
workers in relation to the issue of sustainability. An account of the difficulties faced by 
members of the Safer Communities team attempting to develop a sustainability report for the 
project suggests that the official aim of generating self-sustainable CSFs became conflated with 
the team’s concerns about the need to sustain the project itself in order to provide long term 
support for these nodes, United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) interest in 
sustaining its oversight and proximity to this nodal assemblage, and individual motives 
involving job security. At times, these ulterior motives conflicted with the capacity development 
ethos of the project and thus raise important questions about the democratic responsiveness of 
the Safer Communities project as a node of transnational governance in Bosnia and 




In Section 8.3, I conclude this chapter by analysing this case study with reference to the glocal 
policing literature. My discussion of this case study recognises that the habitus of the 
international development worker is susceptible to structural interference that risked aligning 
the work of the Safer Communities team with the interests of powerful supranational actors. 
However, I also argue that the Safer Communities team’s continued use of reflexivity and 
creative problem solving provided it with means of mitigating these structural pressures and a 
platform for supporting a deliberative and locally responsive model of nodal security 
governance in BiH. 
 
8.1 Translating Safer Communities 
While the ambiguity surrounding the conceptual and programmatic contours of Safer 
Communities was advantageous insofar as it allowed the project team to focus on capacity 
development, it was also apparent that the lack of clarity regarding what the Safer Communities 
was meant to achieve in BiH was problematic and it was thought that capacity development 
outcomes would not appeal to prospective donors thought to be interested in tangible outputs 
(personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 January 2011). As a project dealing with 
security sector reform in the Western Balkans, it was also believed that the EC represented the 
only remaining source of potential investment as most alternative sources of bilateral assistance 
had dried up by this point. Confronted with a need to attract a new source of revenue to sustain 
the Safer Communities project beyond 2011, a significant portion of my time in this contact 
zone was spent working with colleagues to negotiate and translate the conceptual and 
programmatic contours of Safer Communities into language that we believed would appeal to 
the EC.  
Articulating a new identity for the project proved to be challenging because none of the team 
members (including myself) possessed a concrete understanding of how to attract non-core 
investment from donors. There was also confusion about what kind of policing reform projects 
the EC would be keen to invest in.  As noted in the previous chapter, the three permanent 
members of the Safer Communities team were BiH citizens who lacked first-hand experience 
and knowledge of the higher echelons of the UN development system and the international 
community’s network of governance in BiH.
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 As junior staff in the UNDP BiH country office, 
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 As a non-BiH citizen, I would have been considered ‘international staff’ had I been salaried during this 




the team’s Community Policing Advisor and Project Associate lacked the social capital 
necessary for directly acquiring this information from senior UNDP managers with a better 
understanding of the UN development system. While the Project Manager could periodically 
access these individuals, they were frequently preoccupied with addressing various obstacles 
that had arisen with the Small Arms Control and Reduction Project (SACBiH)  meaning that the 
Community Policing Advisor, the Project Associate, and I were left to explore these questions 
through regular brainstorming sessions that generated various concept notes
102
 and prescriptions 
for aligning the project with European priorities. Reviewing these attempts to translate Safer 
Communities into language that would appeal to the EC as a prospective investor serves to 
illustrate an important and structurally coercive dimension to the relationship between liberal 
state-building, nodal security governance and policing reforms in BiH that is described in 
Chapter Three. 
8.1.1 Renegotiating Safer Communities 
Admittedly, this translational process proceeded on the basis of imperfect information about 
what the EC might be interested in funding. Such information was supplied by the Project 
Manager who suggested that we would need to identify a ‘selling point’ for Safer Communities 
that would readily answer the question of what these forums actually do (personal 
communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 January 2011). The Project Manager added that Safer 
Communities projects in other transitional countries were linked with specific, topical issues 
designed to attract investment.  In Kenya, for example, a ‘Safer Cities’ project had been 
implemented by UN-HABITAT which focused on the issue of developing safer housing. In 
Croatia, UNDP Safer Communities project stipulated that 20% of the project’s budget must be 
spent on gender related activities. By citing these previous examples, the Project Manager 
effectively suggested that the Safer Communities project in BiH would only appeal to donors if 
it was marketed as a strategy for achieving a clearly defined goal as opposed to marketing it as a 
template for improving security governance locally (Ibid.). 
Similar ideas were expressed by the team’s Community Policing Advisor who believed that ‘the 
European Commission and other donors are only interested in seeing progress in the short term, 
                                                                                                                                                           
governance in BiH and more importantly, I lacked the social capital necessary for acquiring this 
knowledge without introductions provided by the Project Manager. 
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Concept notes were used by the Safer Communities team as a means of articulating a vision for the 
project and for clarifying its aims and objectives for external audiences including prospective 
donors. Reflecting on these documents provides insight into how the team’s habituated view of the 
project changed during this period. My participation in this process therefore necessitates an auto-




demonstrated through tangible outputs’. They added however that this would be problematic for 
the Safer Communities project because ‘CSFs are ultimately successful when they are operating 
and being utilised to deal with local issues without an overreliance on external support and 
resources’ (par. personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011).  In 
other words, the team’s Community Policing Advisor believed that aligning the project with 
donor interests risked compromising its value as a mechanism for local capacity development. 
Despite these concerns, the team’s Project Manager remained adamant that the EC would not 
view capacity development or the creation of new structures or nodes as ‘results’ in their own 
right. Rather, the Project Manager suggested that European-based donors would only invest in 
projects with tangible outputs; projects that could be measured and evaluated (personal 
communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 January 2011). These mentalities structured our search 
for a 'greater selling point’ and prompted us to demonstrate that the Safer Communities model 
could be aligned with the EC’s agenda for BiH’s accession to the European Union.   
 Safer Communities as ‘Social Capital’ 
One of the first concept notes that we developed,
103
at the request of the Project Manager, 
indicated that CSFs might provide a useful platform for combatting rising levels of social 
exclusion in BiH, an issue which was previously identified as being significant by a 2009 
UNDP Human Development Report for BiH titled The Ties That Bind (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2009b).  This report suggests that ‘the use of štela – personal and 
family connections – is widespread’ in BiH with the effect that different populations enjoy 
differential access to important networks of governance. The report adds that those 
populations
104
 which lack these connections are ‘network poor’ meaning that they ‘have lower 
levels of social capital and higher levels of material deprivation’. This implies that they are 
ultimately disempowered within and beyond their respective communities and prone to social 
exclusion (Ibid: 22).   
Building on the theorised relationship between differential access to networks and social 
exclusion, I developed the following introduction to a draft for a concept note titled ‘Safer 
Communities Project 2012-2015: Security Governance as Social Capital’ in February 2011: 
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I took the lead in developing this report and feedback was later provided by the Project Manager and 
Community Policing Advisor.  
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The report also states that ‘[g]roups most likely to suffer from social isolation include [internally 
displaced persons], minority returnees, the elderly, women in rural areas and people with lower 




‘The Safer Communities Project aims to reinvigorate meso-level social bonds in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina through the establishment of Citizen Security Forums (CSF) that serve to enhance 
the accountability and transparency of the process by which local security governance is 
provided.  As it currently stands, the key structures and institutions that are tasked with governing 
security in Bosnia and Herzegovina are largely exclusive in that opportunities for citizen 
participation are limited and the availability and functionality of formal communicational channels 
designed to encourage information sharing remain underutilized and ultimately inadequate.’ 




Later in this concept note, I also emphasise the ‘tangible’ security risks associated with social 
exclusion in order to amplify the significance of this project for prospective donors.  
Taking the lead in developing this concept note attuned me to the significant degree of influence 
and discretion that relatively disempowered international development workers are afforded 
over the prospective conceptual and programmatic contours of police reform projects.  
However, it also made me aware of the fact that reformulating the project’s narrative to appeal 
to prospective donors was indicative of a process of neo-liberal governmentality that is said to 
generate local alignment at a distance (see Section 2.4). It also constituted a creative process 
rather than an empirical exercise as the concept note neglected to account for what the Safer 
Communities model might realistically achieve and it instead reflected what we as policy 
translators believed that the project would need to achieve (or be shown to achieve) in order to 
attract donor investment. For example, I drew from the Public Opinion Poll (2010) and 
summary data from the XIX reports to provide empirical support for this posited link between 
social exclusion and insecurity. The draft of this concept note which I eventually submitted to 
the Project Manager in February 2011 thus stated:   
‘This notable gap between security 'providers' and citizens is inherently problematic in that it 
serves to continuously erode the latter's trust and confidence in the former. Furthermore, this lack 
of information sharing serves to negate the capacity of 'providers' at all levels of government in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from effectively addressing key safety and security issues of relevance 
to citizens. This contributes to a vicious cycle resulting in two significant outcomes that represent 
fundamental threats to the long term sustainability of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an 
independently governed state. The first 'outcome' is that citizen expectations decrease, 
particularly in relation to the provision of public safety and security. Related is the second 
'outcome' whereby that the impetus for 'providers' to provide such services is thus reduced 
accordingly.... 
….Not only does this cycle serve to deprive these citizens and communities of these socio-
economic benefits but perhaps most problematic of all, it contributes to the normalization of this 
social deprivation in the eyes of these 'consumers'…. 
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….In linking this dynamic to the “broken windows” theory, the mutually-dependent relationship 
between democratically responsive structures for local security governance and social capital is 
clear. Broken windows theory suggests that ineffective security governance within a community is 
likely to prove conducive to petty crime and anti-social behaviour. Over time the overt occurrence 
of this behaviour combined with its social and physical effects will ultimately be normalized in the 
minds of the public thereby cementing the further degradation of social capital in these 
communities.’ (‘Safer Communities 2012-2015…’ February 2011)106 
 
I concluded this concept note by presenting the Safer Communities project as an ideal platform 
for improving the responsiveness of police and municipal authorities to public concerns:  
‘Citizen Security Forums (CSF) address this need for greater social cohesion at the community 
level by creating 'linkages for developing sustainable changes in the living conditions and well-
being of communities.' When introduced to divided communities, these CSFs are also well 
positioned to have a significant impact on policies aimed at addressing the social and economic 
integration of individuals at risk of marginalisation…107 
 Specifically, the SCP is designed to have a significant impact on two forms of social capital: 





The concept note was initially well received by the Project Manager and the Community 
Policing Advisor who later incorporated some of these ideas into a final project report.  
However, the ideas also evoked concerns from the Project Manager who questioned whether the 
abstract elements of this narrative could actually be translated into a set of empirical indicators 
used to manage the project and measure results (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 14 
February 2011). In other words, the Project Manager was unconvinced that this vision would 
appeal to European-based donors who were thought to base their decision to invest in the 
project on the tangible benefits that it would generate. On the basis of the Project Manager’s 
concerns, this early attempt to translate the Safer Communities concept into language that lined 
a thematic, capacity development issue with the EC’s security interests in the Western Balkans 
was dismissed.  
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See Appendix 2. The possibility of linking this framework to the issue of refugees and returnees was 
also briefly discussed, albeit promptly dismissed once the Project Manager was informed by a 
senior UNDP manager based at the BiH country office that this was no longer an appealing issue 
for European donors (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 14 March 2011).  
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Quoting United Nations Development Programme (2009b: 20).  
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 The Ties That Bind report describes ‘bridging social capital’ as ‘horizontal relationships – connecting 
people from different backgrounds’ and ‘linking social capital’ as ‘vertical relationships – 
connecting people with dissimilar social standing and spanning power differentials’ (United 





 Safer Communities as Crime Reduction 
Subsequent attempts by the Safer Communities team to construct an attractive narrative for the 
project illustrate an important shift of power within this contact zone. The prospect of reducing 
crime through the work of the CSFs provided the Safer Communities team with a logical 
starting point but it was problematic in practice. Developing indicators to convey the tangible 
benefits of CSFs was difficult because it meant that the Safer Communities team would need to 
identify available statistics that could be used to demonstrate that these forums were having a 
positive impact in reducing levels of crime and public insecurity within their respective 
municipalities. This meant that the team would need to predefine the anticipated benefits of 
applying the Safer Communities model in municipalities throughout BiH for local CSFs, a 
prospect which went against the team’s capacity development ethos because it restricted 
opportunities for future CSFs to define their own performance indicators in relation to local 
contextual circumstances.  Instead, the Project Manager felt that it was necessary to develop a 
single set of indicators that could be applied uniformly throughout BiH in order to convey the 
significance of this project on a national level to prospective donors who would not be 
interested in local outcomes such as a reduction in stray dog populations (personal 
communication, ‘Project Manager’, 02 February 2011).   
On a pragmatic level, conveying the benefits of this project was also problematic given that the 
Public Opinion Poll (2010) indicated that initial levels of crime and public insecurity were 
relatively low. While the Safer Communities team attributed these findings to the public’s lack 
of expectations of security governance within their respective communities, it was also 
anticipated that the prospect of using these forums to boost public expectations might initially 
contribute to a statistical increase in reported crimes and possibly a greater sense of ontological 
insecurity. This speculation reflected our belief that functional CSFs would need to generate 
greater awareness of the public security issues that affected their respective communities before 
they could convince the public of their value as nodes for resolving these issues through 
collaboration. The team also anticipated that generating this awareness would lead people to 
become more proactive in reporting incidents to different agencies serving on these CSFs, 
particularly the police (field notes, 02 February 2011).  
The prospect that functional CSFs might potentially contribute to increasing levels of reported 
crime in the short term was recognised as being problematic because the prescribed extension 
for the Safer Communities project was only three years. This meant that within this three-year 




predefined performance targets or risk termination and repayment at the discretion of the EC.  
While the team was optimistic that CSFs would eventually generate meaningful improvements 
in the governance of security in BiH, the team was not confident that these improvements could 
be readily expressed as statistical reductions in local levels of crime or insecurity. This concern 
was particularly evident in relation to the Project Manager’s suggestion that crime prevention 
would need to serve as a primary function of these CSFs but that measuring prevention through 
indicators is extremely problematic given issues with causation (i.e. whether a statistical 
decrease in certain indicators can actually be attributed to the CSFs) and the methodological 
problem of measuring non-events (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 02 February 
2011).  
Methodologically, demonstrating the project’s success to donors was problematic because of the 
lack of credible baseline data available for comparison. Official statistics on crime and public 
insecurity in BiH appeared to offer the only available data source for longitudinal comparison 
but we anticipated that auditors from the EC would inevitably question their reliability. The 
option of hiring a local research consultancy firm to develop a new statistical methodology for 
continuously evaluating the project was also dismissed given the team’s concerns about the 
questionable sampling and data collection methods used by the research consultancy firm 
responsible for conducting the Public Opinion Poll (personal communication, ‘Community 
Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011).   
 Safer Communities as Europeanization 
The issue of developing a single set of indicators to convey the impact of Safer Communities to 
prospective donors proved a stress-inducing prospect for the entire Safer Communities team and 
prompted the Project Manager to seek out the advice of a senior manager at UNDP BiH office 
to help us determine what kind of indicators might appeal to the EC. During a meeting between 
the Project Manager and this senior manager that I attended in March 2011, the Project Manager 
explained how we were struggling to develop a set of indicators because of the ‘broad and 
flexible nature of this project’. The senior manager explained that part of the problem was that 
‘we were missing the bigger picture’. In other words, they suggested that supranational donors 
increasingly recognised the need for a project to be managed flexibly and so there is no 
expectation that a funding proposal will contain finite indicators. Rather, they suggested that the 
EC would support the project if it was seen as facilitating BiH’s progress towards EU accession 




Based on this feedback, we readily dismissed the possibility of marketing Safer Communities as 
a strategy for reducing crime and improving the governance of security in local communities 
and momentarily examined the possibility of aligning the project’s narrative directly with what 
we perceived to be the EU’s primary agenda in the region. In other words, we looked to 
determine how the Safer Communities project might be used to support BiH’s progress towards 
EU accession. To this end we reviewed two key accession documents, the Copenhagen Criteria 
(European Union 1993: 13) which lists three key benchmarks ‘that a candidate country must 
have achieved’ before it can become a member of the EU and BiH’s Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement (2008) which outlines the specific obligations that the country must 
fulfil before it can be considered a candidate for EU membership.
109
   From this review, we 
determined that the Safer Communities model could be linked with the Copenhagen Criteria’s 
emphasis on the need for ‘stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights, and respect for minorities’ (European Union 1993: 13) and Article 78 of BiH’s 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (2008) which prioritised ‘[r]einforcement of 
[i]nstitutions and [r]ule of [l]aw’ by ‘…developing adequate structures for the police, customs 
and other law enforcement bodies’ and ‘fighting corruption and organised crime’ (Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement 2008: 47-48).   
The narrative that emerged from this deliberation process emphasised the prospect of 
establishing the Safer Communities model as a local extension of a vertically-integrated security 
model whereby CSFs might serve as an important source of local intelligence for state-level 
police organisations like the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) with its focus on 
combatting organised crime and terrorism and also for the BiH Border Police.
110
  The appeal of 
this proposal was linked to BiH’s fragmented policing landscape which contributed to 
coordination issues between different entity and cantonal police forces but the prospect of 
actually translating this narrative into functional practices was problematic for two reasons. The 
first problem was that we readily discounted the possibility of generating valuable intelligence 
on high profile criminal activities through local community policing practices and CSPs.
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Second, we determined that the nodular structures established by the Safer Communities project 
during the pilot phase lacked the hierarchical structure necessary for channelling relevant 
information upwards to relevant state-level agencies. The possibility of facilitating such 
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 As of March 2012, BiH remains a potential candidate country for EU accession as it has not ratified its 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement which it signed in June 2008.  
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The State Border Police was renamed the BiH Border Police in July 2007.  
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This scepticism was supported by Tilley’s (2003: 3) doubts about the value of using ‘problem-oriented 




exchanges through the creation of cantonal and entity level steering boards was momentarily 
explored but ultimately discounted by the Project Manager based on concerns that establishing 
another level of nodal governance would create ‘too much bureaucracy’ and merely add to an 
already crowded system of underperforming institutions (personal communication, ‘Project 
Manager’, 25 March 2011). Another concern was that establishing a new hierarchical structure 
for the Safer Communities model would effectively contradict the initial focus of the project 
which involved the needs of local recipients (personal communication, ‘Project Associate’, 24 
March 2011). While Europeanization ultimately failed to provide us with a viable selling point, 
our exploration of this possibility did prompt an important dialogue amongst the members of the 
Safer Communities team that led us to conclude that the conceptual and programmatic contours 
of this project must continue to be oriented towards improving local security governance rather 
than increasing security. 
8.1.2 Policy Translation and Social Exclusion 
By March 2011, it had become apparent that our concerted efforts to rebrand Safer 
Communities amounted to a significant distraction from the development and implementation of 
project activities which had fallen behind schedule. For example, following a meeting of the 
Safer Communities team that dealt with the issue of indicators, the team’s Community Policing 
Advisor announced that ‘we already lost the game’ with reference to the fact that the substantial 
time that was spent negotiating the conceptual aspects of the project and speculating about the 
interests of potential donors had consequences for the Community Policing Advisor’s ability to 
successfully manage existing relationships with CSF partners and negated the prospect of 
expanding the project during the pilot phase in relation to its existing budgetary resources 
(personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 24 March 2011). This observation 
denotes a significant shift in the power politics of Safer Communities project as a contact zone, 
one which served to prioritise the perceived interests of the EU.  It further illustrates how the 
hierarchical structures associated with liberal state-building, Europeanization and donor-driven 
development allow powerful supranational actors to steer security governance from a distance 
(e.g. Duffield 2007, Ryan 2011). The significant economic resources of the EC as a potential 
investor allowed it to play an influential albeit indirect role in temporarily shaping the 
conceptual and programmatic contours of the project through a series of deliberations and 
negotiations that were conducted by the Safer Communities team. 
With reference to UNDP’s capacity development ethos and the prospect of the Safer 




of policing in BiH, this structural dynamic was problematic because it effectively restricted 
democratically-elected domestic policy makers from participating in important decision making 
processes that would potentially determine the future prescriptions for implementing the model 
throughout the country.  This restriction was significant because it signalled that the preferences 
of CSF members including local political elites, police practitioners and members of the general 
public would ultimately fail to have a significant impact on the governance of security 
governance (Wood and Shearing 2006) through this nodal structure. It also conflicted with 
UNDP’s goal of eventually generating local ownership for the Safer Communities project and 
the Safer Communities team neglected to include these local stakeholders in this translational 
process. 
This exclusion can be explained in relation to the limited economic resources of domestic policy 
makers and governing institutions as this effectively precluded their ability to act as potential 
investors for the project. These local policy makers were also physically excluded from this 
translational process and unaware of the fact that it was even taking place. This is evident from 
the fact that at no point during this three-month period did the Safer Communities team invite 
any Bosnian political elites to participate in this deliberation process.
112
 The inaccessibility of 
this contact zone is further illustrated by the fact that its deliberative boundaries overlapped with 
the physical boundaries of the Safer Communities office which was located in UNDP’s BiH 
headquarters and featured a secure entry system and a strict visitor protocol that would have 
physically prevented any individual without an invitation from UNDP to access this nodal 
setting. Emphasising the exclusion of these individuals is not to suggest that the Safer 
Communities team consciously or intentionally restricted these individuals from participating in 
this deliberative sphere.  Rather, it was simply the team’s assumption that CSF members and 
other government officials had little interest in participating in this translational process and that 
they would have nothing to contribute to it.  
An alternative explanation for why international development agencies have struggled to 
implement their capacity development ethos in BiH is evident from the work of  Maglajlić and 
Rašidagić’s (2007: 156) who observe that ‘Bosnian social-sector professionals [find] themselves 
both unable to communicate with international aid agencies and incapable of adopting the style 
of work these agencies brought with them’.  Accordingly, Maglajlić and Rašidagić suggest that 
it is the ‘local staff’ of international organisations like UNDP who must take on the role of 
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policy translators given their unique positioning in relevant contact zones that link international 
organisations like UNDP to local settings.  
8.1.3 Salvaging Safer Communities 
While pressures for the Safer Communities team to align this project with the interests of 
prospective donors present a fatalistic assessment of the underlying structures of nodal security 
governance in BiH, recent developments since March 2011 indicate that the team has identified 
an alternative solution to this funding dilemma that promises to reaffirm its link to UNDP and 
allow it to ‘govern the governance of security’ (Wood and Shearing 2006) in relation to its 
capacity development mandate. This solution can be explained by UNDP’s proximity to the 
Safer Communities project as an active contact zone and its habitual emphasis on managerial 
creativity as a means of achieving capacity development objectives amidst these financial 
pressures (Murphy 2006: 348). Creative problem solving in this instance was made possible by 
the fact that the UN development system continues to offer limited pockets of core funding that 
allows projects like Safer Communities that are not particularly resource intensive to remain 
independent of non-core investment if they can be linked with designated funding areas 
(Browne 2011: 119).    
In March 2011 the Safer Communities team concluded that in order for the project to have a 
meaningful impact on the local governance of security in BiH and for the CSFs to be rendered 
locally accountable and sustainable the conceptual and programmatic prescriptions of this 
project would need to remain flexible. In other words, the ‘governance of governance’ (Wood 
and Shearing 2006) must remain responsive to the diverse needs and expectations of the CSF 
partners rather than rigid interpretations of the subjective interests of prospective supranational 
benefactors. Accordingly, the team determined that establishing and supporting the 
development of new municipal level CSFs throughout BiH must necessarily serve as the 
project’s primary focus and projected output (field notes, 25 March 2011).  
This realisation seemingly negated the possibility of attracting investment from the EC and 
following a series of meetings between the Safer Communities Project Manager and a senior 
UNDP manager based in the BiH country office who possessed significant contacts and 
experience and knowledge of the UN development system, the Safer Communities team 
developed a creative proposal to pursue the expansion of the Safer Communities project as a 
component of the UN’s Armed Conflict and Violence Prevention Programme (AVPP) (personal 
communications, 12 April 2011 and 14 July 2011). This would enable the team to access core 




alongside other UN development agencies like UN Population Fund (UNFPA) to develop a 
range of project activities that could be marketed to the CSFs. The idea was that CSFs would 
still be afforded the opportunity to choose which project activities they wished to pursue while 
the Safer Communities team could provide technical and administrative support for these 
forums and draw upon its position in the network to connect these forums directly to appropriate 
donors (personal communications, 13 December 2011 and 16 February 2012).  
The benefit of this proposed solution (with reference to UNDP’s capacity development 
mandate) was that it promised to reduce the pressures for the Safer Communities team to 
manage the project on the basis of anticipated ‘results’. Instead it enabled the Safer 
Communities team to develop a flexible list of objectives relating to the project and to include 
this list in the project’s ‘Concept Note’ (Safer Communities 2012-2015…’, February 2011’)
113
 
that was eventually submitted as part of the team’s bid for UNDP Crisis Prevention and 




8.2 Sustainability and Translation 
Along with functionality and local responsiveness, sustainability also represented an important 
priority for the Safer Communities team.  It also served as a major source of confusion as it was 
not entirely clear what the Safer Communities team was actually meant to sustain. The official 
answer indicated the CSFs, meaning that the team would need to develop strategic 
recommendations to enable CSF members and prospective local stakeholders to continue to 
operate these forums once the Safer Communities project had expired. However, members of 
the Safer Communities team also recognised that the Safer Communities project played an 
important role as a central coordinating node for these CSFs and questioned whether they would 
continue to operate without its ongoing financial and technical support. Institutional motives 
also factored into this discussion. Notably, the team’s concerted search for a source of non-core 
funding meant that UNDP was also keen to sustain its presence within this contact zone. 
Finally, individual motives also factored into this question of sustainability as some members of 
the Safer Communities team knew that they would only retain their jobs with UNDP if they 
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This is a reference to a later version of the document that I provided feedback on in December 2011, 
once my internship had finished. In exchange for this feedback, I requested permission to use this 
document for my research but provided assurances to the team’s Community Policing Advisor that 





found a way to prolong the project. Reflecting on the Safer Communities team’s efforts to 
develop a sustainability report for the project between January and April 2011 provides useful 
illustration of these competing pressures, their influence on the habitus of the Safer 
Communities team and the extent to which policy translation is responsive to competing 
interests within a contact zone. 
8.2.1 Sustaining Safer Communities… 
Sustainability initially emerged as an important issue in  January 2011
115
 because the Safer 
Communities team had been invited by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(SDC) to contribute to the development of a new ‘Book of Rules’
116
 for community policing 
that was being developed for the Ministry of the Interior in Republika Srpska (RS).
117
  As noted 
in Chapter Six, the SDC’s community policing project was granted a one-year extension by the 
Swiss Government in 2011 following recommendations from the project’s external review team 
(see Wisler and Traljic 2010) and so its primary objective during this period was to work to 
facilitate the adoption of relevant by-laws within entity and canton-level ministries that would 
formally recognise community policing as a specialist function and provide specialist units with 
a guaranteed budget line. The SDC brought this proposal to the attention of the Safer 
Communities project because it recognised CSFs
118
 to be important mechanisms for sustaining 
the outputs that it generated through its community policing project and because the SDC 
believed that these forums were necessary for generating holistic solutions to a range of 
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The Project Manager issued this assignment to the Safer Communities team via email on 6 January 
2011 (personal email, ‘Project Manager’, 6 January 2011). 
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A ‘Book of Rules’ is a set of by-laws which describe the specific roles and responsibilities for different 
types of police officers. It is maintained by the different Ministries of the Interior at the entity-level 
in RS and at the canton level in FBIH and any changes must be proposed and approved by their 
relevant assemblies. Asked about the significance of the Book of Rules, the Safer Communities 
team’s Community Policing Advisor responded that ‘a vacancy must be defined in it in order for it 
to be budgeted and filled’ (personal correspondence, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 02 April 
2012b).  
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 I only became aware of the fact that our work on the sustainability report was linked to the SDC’s plan 
in late March 2011 at a meeting with the Safer Communities Project Manager regarding a draft that 
I was developing with the Community Policing Advisor. After expressing my concerns about the 
lack of clarity regarding what the Project Manager expected us to produce for this document, the 
Project Manager informed me that the impetus for us to produce a sustainability report at a fairly 
early stage in the project was linked to the SDC’s imminent plans to introduce a revised strategy for 
community policing to the Ministry of the Interior in RS before its project expired at the end of 
2011 (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 26 March 2011). A follow up correspondence 
sent by the Safer Communities project’s Community Policing Advisor suggests that the SDC’s 
plans never materialised. Nonetheless, the recommendations that we developed during this two 
month period were included in the ‘Concept Note’ that the Safer Communities team submitted with 
its funding proposal the following year (personal correspondence, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 
02 April 2012).  
118 




problems identified by specialist officers utilising their ‘Scanning Analysis Response 
Assessment’ (SARA) methodology.  Without these CSFs, the SDC anticipated that its problem-
oriented prescriptions for community policing would fail to materialise and the entire concept 
would lose credibility in the eyes of practitioners and the public alike.  The prospect of 
sustaining a problem-oriented strategy for community policing in BiH (see Section 9.2) was 
therefore linked with the need to sustain local CSFs (Wisler and Traljic 2010: 10-11).  
For the Safer Communities team, sustaining these CSFs was important because it was linked 
with UNDP’s capacity development ethos.  In other words, if these forums were to cease their 
operations once UNDP withdrew its support, the project would fail to generate locally 
sustainable outputs that could independently contribute to improvements in the governance of 
security in BiH. The sustainability of these CSFs was therefore identified as an important 
measure of the project’s success by the team’s Community Policing Advisor and Project 
Associate who drafted multiple ‘sustainability reports’ designed to address this issue and 
ultimately supply the SDC with concrete recommendations to be included in the forthcoming 
proposal (personal field notes, 02 February 2011).  
The first step towards developing these recommendations involved identifying various threats to 
the sustainability of these forums. This was achieved through a series of in-house deliberations 
that occurred between the other members of the Safer Communities team and I, as well as a 
series of meetings with the pilot CSFs that I attended with the team’s Community Policing 
Advisor in early February 2011.
119
 The Community Policing Advisor took the lead with this 
project and was influential in shaping our collective understanding of how this project could 
succeed in the long term. According to the team’s Community Policing Advisor, the primary 
threat to the sustainability of these forums involved the question of how we could keep CSF 
participants motivated once UNDP withdrew its support for the Safer Communities project. The 
Community Policing Advisor attributed the initial wave of interest in this project to the fact that 
participating in these nodes afforded different municipal actors with direct access to 
discretionary UNDP funds but expressed concerns that without this financial incentive, 
individuals would lack a tangible incentive to participate in this scheme (personal 
communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011). 
The Project Manager, Community Policing Advisor and local CSF members were also 
conflicted over the question of whether CSF members should be personally compensated for 
their CSF roles. For example, the Project Manager was concerned that unless the Safer 
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Communities team used its influence to compel local municipal assemblies to establish 
permanent salaried positions for CSF members, individuals would lack an incentive to 
effectively administer these forums. However, the team’s Community Policing Advisor was 
adamant that participation in CSFs must be voluntary because otherwise they would attract 
individuals that lacked an intrinsic motivation to develop holistic solution for local problems but 
were instead keen to draw a salary (personal field notes, 22 February 2011). During our meeting 
with the CSF in Bratunac, a senior municipal official and ‘permanent’ member of the 
municipality’s CSF expressed similar concerns about the risks of compensating CSF members 
for their participation. He suggested that this would spawn jealousy amongst members of the 
public who would ask, 'why is he being paid to serve on the committee and not me' (par. 
personal communication, ‘Senior Municipal Official’, Bratunac, 08 February 2011). This 
individual’s assessment suggests that compensating CSF members for the participation in these 
nodes might undermine their legitimacy in the eyes of the public because doing so would 
amount to paying municipal employees a second salary to perform their existing jobs.  
During this series of meetings with the pilot CSFs, the need to institutionalise these forums was 
also addressed. For example, a senior member of the forum in Prijedor suggested that one of the 
difficulties that this CSF faced was a lack of support from the city’s Mayor. This individual 
added that the CSF in Prijedor was not formally recognised by the city’s municipal assembly 
with the effect that it lacked a mandate to generate compliance from its membership which 
generally underperformed and frequently failed to attend regularly scheduled meetings (personal 
communication, ‘Senior CSF Member, Prijedor’ 10 February 2011).  These sentiments were 
viewed as being particularly problematic by the Community Policing Advisor who was 
convinced that if the well-established forum in Prijedor failed, the model would fail elsewhere 
(personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 31 January 2011).   
Following a series of deliberations, it was determined that institutionalisation would be crucial 
for the sustainability of local CSFs. This meant that the Safer Communities team would 
subsequently work to provide support for the five pilot CSFs in order for them to achieve 
recognition from their municipal assemblies through a ‘Terms of Reference’ document that 
would also provide them with a small annual budget line. This budget line was determined to be 
particularly important for the sustainability of CSF operations because it would afford these 
nodes with a renewable stream of discretionary funding that could be spent on collaborative 
safety projects (field notes, 25 March 2011).  While fiscal constraints meant that the municipal 




Community Policing Advisor suggested that its very existence would serve to legitimise these 
nodes and that in the long term, perhaps compel different member agencies to embrace a 
partnership-based approach and use their own institutional budgets to support collaboration 
through CSFs (field notes, 22 February 2011).  
While institutionalisation represented a seemingly viable option for sustaining these CSFs, the 
Safer Communities team’s approach to supporting this process actually conflicted with the 
capacity development ethos. Essentially, the Project Manager proposed that UNDP must use its 
influence to pressure BiH’s Council of Ministers
120
 to adopt a ‘memo of understanding’ that 
formally recognised CSFs as institutions of municipal governance. The logic was that once 
BiH’s Council of Ministers formally recognised these forums, municipal assemblies throughout 
the country would then be required to recognise the model and that this would in turn create a 
formal framework to support local CSFs throughout the country. While approaching the Council 
of Ministers provided the Safer Communities team with a seemingly straightforward plan for 
promoting institutionalisation, it embodied a top-down approach to imposing reforms through 
informal political back channels rather than democratic political processes.
121
 
This ‘top-down’ approach to institutionalisation reflected the Project Manager’s disillusionment 
with domestic political institutions and process in BiH.  During a team meeting about the issue 
of sustainability, I confronted the Project Manager with the idea that using UNDP’s influence to 
steer policy making through domestic political institutions conflicted with its capacity 
development ethos. The Project Manager and Project Associate quickly corrected me and 
suggested instead that ‘we are not about imposing’ but rather that ‘we need to make the relevant 
cantons and entity-level bodies impose it for us’ (par. personal communication, ‘Project 
Manager’ and ‘Project Associate’, 22 February 2011). This response illustrates the extent to 
which the power politics that shaped this contact zone compelled the Safer Communities team 
to selectively interpret UNDP’s capacity development ethos to support its own agenda and 
                                                     
120 
Annex 4, Article V, Section 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement states that BiH’s Council of Ministers is 
responsible ‘for carrying out the policies and decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ and for 
‘reporting to the Parliamentary Assembly’. 
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On 7 February 2011 I attended a meeting between the Safer Communities team and an influential 
representative from the state-level Council of Ministers. During this meeting, the Project Manager 
introduced the Safer Communities project to this representative and proceeded to explain how the 
Council could support it. During the meeting, the representative appeared to be confused about 
what the Project Manager expected the Council to do regarding the issue. The Project Manager told 
the representative that they should review some published material on CSPs provided by the Safer 
Communities team and Saferworld and present it to the Council at the next meeting. The attempts 
by UNDP to use its influence to compel the Council of Ministers to develop a formal document that 
would recognise CSPs was ultimately unsuccessful and following the meeting, it was discussed that 




hierarchical positioning within this emerging nodal assemblage. In other words, the capacity 
development ethos compelled the Safer Communities team to outwardly disassociate the 
interests of UNDP from its prescriptions for implementing the project. ‘Legitimately’ 
transposing this agenda upon the domestic political architecture of BiH therefore require UNDP 
to utilise the same techniques of governmentality as those utilised by the EU as a regional 
security actor working to advance its hegemonic interests in the Western Balkans (see Chapter 
Two; also Walters and Haahr 2005).   
Generating local ownership remained a priority for the Safer Communities team however the 
nature of the relationships between the Community Policing Advisor and representatives of four 
CSFs
122
 regarding procedural issues and the implementation of different project activities raised 
doubts about whether the forums could effectively operate without this hierarchical relationship 
with UNDP once they had been recognised by their respective municipal assemblies. These 
concerns were particularly apparent during our February meeting with CSF members from 
Zenica. One of the forum members noted that the local media was creating negative publicity 
with regards to the forum by suggesting that it was not transparent and publicly accountable in 
its decisions.  In order to address this problem, this individual suggested that ‘UNDP should 
step in to influence the media to do their job better’ (personal field notes, 09 February 2011) 
which implied that they viewed it as UNDP’s responsibility to address this issue rather than that 
of the forum. Later in this meeting, the Community Policing Advisor posed the question of how 
this forum would survive once UNDP was no longer supporting the project. A senior police 
officer and CSF member responded that the forum’s results and successes up to this point were 
directly attributable to UNDP’s involvement. Another CSF member explained that UNDP 
involvement is so important because ‘compared to local NGOs, UNDP is widely recognised as 
being neutral and not affiliated with and political parties’ (Ibid).  
After the meeting, the Community Policing Advisor explained that these responses were 
disconcerting because they indicated that local political elites in Zenica associated the 
credibility and authority of their CSF with UNDP’s involvement in the project (personal 
communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 9 February 2011). In other words, the 
Community Policing Advisor believed that measured coercion was necessary for managing 
these forums because it was normal in BiH and expected by CSF members who had worked for 
autocratic institutions of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and subsequently 
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under the direction of international organisations like the Office of the High Representative in 
BiH (OHR) (personal communication, ‘Community Policing Advisor’, 9 February 2011). For 
this reason, the Safer Communities team rationalised the practice of mobilising domestic 
political elites to support its agenda through a utilitarian logic which held that coercion was 
necessary for generating and ultimately sustaining policy outputs that reflected the public 
interest due to the limited governing capacities of domestic political institutions. This view also 
prompted the Safer Communities team to consider whether it would be necessary to sustain this 
Safer Communities project as a contact zone so that it could continue to provide local CSFs 
with access to different sources of financial and technical support.  For this reason, the capacity 
development goal of sustaining these CSFs became conflated the idea of sustaining the actual 
project.  
8.2.2 …or Sustaining the Safer Communities Project? 
Another dimension of sustainability that affected the project involved UNDP’s desire to sustain 
its own role as the administrator of this contact zone. UNDP’s capacity development ethos 
constituted a powerful source of influence on the habitus of the Safer Communities team who 
believed that UNDP was the only international organisation in BiH that was qualified to 
effectively administer this contact zone in accordance with local interests. This belief reflects a 
romanticised auto-biographical description of UNDP staff by the organisation’s historian who 
writes:  
‘The overwhelming majority of UNDP staff have been people who passionately believe in the 
goals of the organization, individuals who have overcome daunting obstacles- and often the 
conventional wisdom of the day –to develop hundreds of initiatives…Such creative results came 
about because UNDP has attracted people who not only believe in what they do, but who have 
been able to be creative in times of crisis, and been willing to put themselves on the line…’ 
(Murphy 2006: ix) 
 
This is to suggest that UNDP’s capacity development ethos can also be studied as an important 
source of institutional hubris which is rooted in UNDP’s ontological insecurity described in 
Section 7.1. In other words, a capacity development mandate affords UNDP with a significant 
degree of flexibility with regards to the types of projects that it seeks to initiate however this 
flexibility also implies that UNDP is replaceable. In order to survive, UNDP as a development 
organisation must therefore encourage its staff to develop competitive project proposals 
designed to attract non-core funding and once it receives this funding, manage for results. I 
encountered evidence of this competitive culture in April 2011 when the Project Manager 




currently being developed by another UN agency in BiH. The Project Manager could not 
provide details of which agency was developing this bid, the nature of its proposal or the 
sources of funding that it was targeting but it was clear that this news was unwelcomed by 
members of the Safer Communities team who had spent the past three months struggling to 
develop a viable proposal to extend the project (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 12 
April 2011). In the end, both of these proposals were subsequently amalgamated into a single 
multi-agency project bid for additional seed funding from UNDP’s Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery core budget (see Sub-section 8.1.3) but the example suggests that the UN 
development system embodies a plurality of interests.   
It is also important to consider that strong incentives also exist for international development 
workers at UNDP to use results-based management (RBM) to extend their projects. Murphy 
(2006: 348) suggests that this is achieved through a creative problem solving mentality which is 
encouraged by senior UNDP managers and achievable due to a limited donor presence ‘on the 
ground’. The implication of this dynamic is that mission creep is not only problematic for 
UNDP but an important feature of its institutional habitus.  
The prospect of mission creep was particularly evident in relation to the individual motives of 
some members of the Safer Communities team to prolong their employment with UNDP. 
Essentially, strong disincentives existed for members of the Safer Communities team to 
discontinue the project or concede their oversight of this contact zone to a competitor because 
this would effectively lead to the termination of their contracts. During a private conversation 
that I had with a member of the Safer Communities team, I asked this individual what they, as a 
BiH citizen hoped to achieve through their work with UNDP. This individual responded that 
given the seemingly insurmountable challenges facing BiH on a macro-political level, they were 
just ‘happy to draw a pay-cheque’ (personal communication, January 2011).  
8.2.3 The Future of Safer Communities 
As of March 2012, the future of the Safer Communities project in BiH remained uncertain.  
Even if UNDP’s proposal for core funding was successful, changes in project personnel and the 
emergence of new security nodes (i.e. through prospective collaborations with UN agencies) 
promised to generate new pressures within this contact zone. It is also questionable whether the 
Safer Communities project can ultimately generate and sustain local ownership of CSFs given 
domestic funding constraints and the absence of a domestic institution or actor to provide these 




project, the Safer Communities team also anticipates that CSFs will need to actively seek out 
new sources of funding and partnership in order to subsidise project activities but it is clear that 
this would serve to establish new contact zones within this this nodal assemblage that may fail 
to appreciate the important of local ownership (personal field notes, 8-10 February 2011). 
 In terms of the functionality of these localised security nodes and the partnerships that they are 
said to foster, important questions also exist about how these forums can be rendered publicly 
accountable and transparent. The documented presence of extensive political corruption in BiH 
(e.g. Donais 2003) and the enduring role of informal political networks as important sources of 
power and social capital in BiH (United Nations Development Programme 2009b) raise an 
important question about the democratic responsiveness of these nodes and the desirability of 
the security outcomes they generate.
123
  The task of developing a functional accountability 
mechanism to oversee the activities of these CSFs once UNDP has withdrawn its support must 
therefore be addressed before it is possible to determine whether these outputs represent a 
positive contribution to BiH’s security landscape or a harmful phenomenon.   
 
8.3 Discussion 
The perceived need for the Safer Communities project to appeal to the interests of the EC as a 
prospective donor and the extent to which this influenced the team’s translational activities 
highlights some important issues about the responsiveness of this contact zone to hierarchical 
pressures for structural alignment. The prospect of securing additional non-core funding for the 
project served to passively introduce a powerful new supranational stakeholder into this contact 
zone and the EC’s significant economic resources allowed it to indirectly influence the shaping 
of the project’s conceptual and programmatic contours through the translational activities of 
local international development workers at UNDP. This analysis is therefore illustrative of the 
processes of neo-liberal governmentality (Ryan 2011) introduced in Chapter Two and it 
provides empirical support for the argument that powerful donors can use their substantial 
resources to indirectly align police reforms with the aims of neo-liberal globalisation (Ellison 
and Pino 2012). It also illustrates how certain events and processes (in this case the prospective 
influx of non-core funding into an active contact zone) have a momentarily profound effect on 
the habitus of international development workers and render their translational activities 
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responsive to the ‘security politics’ (Loader and Walker 2003: 16) of global liberal governance. 
This possibility, and the frequency with which it is said to occur, forms the basis of Ellison and 
Pino’s (2012) argument that international police development assistance projects are invariably 
tainted by the same structural inequalities that characterise the international development 
system.  Aspects of this analysis thus appear rather fatalistic.  
While these critiques do not preclude the prospect that domestic stakeholders may ultimately 
benefit from the outputs generated by these policing reforms, they do suggest that important 
governmental processes are themselves problematic due to their inaccessibility and lack of 
responsiveness to local interests. The example of Safer Communities highlights the fact that the 
power politics which underpin the institutional work of multilateral international development 
organisations in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH  is inevitably skewed 
towards supranational and institutional interests rather than those of local citizens and this 
implies that the nodal cartography for security governance in these contexts is characterised by a 
democratic deficit that holds significant implications for the prospect of ultimately establishing 
locally accountable and democratically responsive nodal assemblages that can independently 
govern security as a ‘public good’ (Loader and Walker 2001; 2003).      
Beyond this fatalistic assessment, this chapter has also presented a nuanced account of the 
relationship between liberal state-building and policing reforms, one which highlights the added 
benefit of exploring these power relations through a nodular framework and in relation to the 
conceptual framework of policy translation. As Johnston and Shearing (2003: 146) suggest, 
governance cannot be reduced to ‘the mere power of one agent over another’ but rather it exists 
as ‘a varying relationship between agents’.  A key implication of this claim is that security 
governance in weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH cannot be reduced to  purely 
hierarchical terms and this implies that the presence of asymmetrical power structures, self-
interested donors, and the myopic prescriptions of policy entrepreneurs need not translate into 
undemocratic policing outcomes (Ibid: 147).  
Deconstructing the nodal politics that shaped Safer Communities has therefore highlighted the 
dynamic character of power and governance within this nodal assemblage and identified ways 
in which seemingly disempowered actors and institutions were able to capitalise on their unique 
positioning in networks of governance (Wood and Shearing 2006: 98) in order to structure the 
contours of emergent contact zones like Safer Communities in relation to their own habitus. The 
fact that members of the Safer Communities team were momentarily compelled to examine the 




the Western Balkans illustrates the significant role that hegemonic structures of global liberal 
governance play in shaping the local governance of policing.  However, the Safer Communities 
team’s reflexivity allowed it to anticipate the long term impact of policy alignment on local 
populations thus illustrating the meditational capacities of the international development 
worker. In this example, the international development worker used their creativity and limited 
knowledge of the international development system to establish a new ‘space’ for pursuing the 
project with limited interference from powerful donors and thus retaining a habitual emphasis 
that reflected the ethos of capacity development work.  
It was also apparent from this case study that international development workers might 
potentially use policy translation to foster more democratically responsive forms through their 
support of local partnership-based policing models. This is based on the fact that CSFs are 
potentially valuable frameworks for supporting ‘discursive democratic’ forms of security (see 
Section 3.4). With reference to the pilot phase of the Safer Communities project, this 
translational function was primarily evident in relation to the team’s periodic use of 
participatory policy analysis and policy sharing while identifying and pursuing locally 
responsive policy outputs including CSFs and various project activities. It is also worth 
considering that the philosophy of community policing and the related concept of community 
safety partnership provided field operators with important institutional frameworks for 
delivering security in ways that are democratically responsive to local communities.  
As discussed in Chapter Seven, a local capacity development ethos plays an important role in 
structuring the habitus of the international development worker who is compelled to embrace 
the rhetoric of grass roots participation, local ownership, and empowerment as the preferential 
outcomes for their work.  While difficult to achieve in practice due to the lack of clarity 
regarding how these outcomes might be measured and structural pressures within the UN 
development system that compel international development workers to manage their projects for 
outputs or ‘results’, these outcomes are potentially compatible with Dryzek’s (2002) 
prescription for deliberative democracy which he presents as an impugnation to the inaccessible 
and impenetrable formal institutions of liberal governance
124
 This was particularly evident with 
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 Bender and Knaus’ (2007: 24) characterisation of BiH as an ‘international protectorate’ suggests that 
its formal institutions of governance are primarily responsive to the interests of supranational 
powers whose presence constitutes an additional layer of transnational governance that is structured 
in relation to the transnational political economy of the EU. This implies that these domestic 
institutions have limited autonomy compared to those of advanced liberal democracies while their 
questionable functionality in relation to the established architecture of governance in BiH suggests 




the Safer Communities project which was aptly described by the Project Manager as a ‘perfect 
metaphor for the work of UNDP’ (personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 17 February 
2011).  This characterisation was illustrative of the team’s belief that the Safer Communities 
model represented a viable framework for improving the responsiveness of both policing and 
governance to the needs of local communities. 
While it is important to acknowledge the ‘educative’ and the ‘community-generating’ potential 
(Barber 1984) of the Safer Communities model as a mechanism for supporting deliberative 
democracy, its value as a platform for supporting democratically responsive policing can be 
analysed in relation to the ideas that:  
 ‘…the procedure of public deliberation improves the fairness of democratic outcomes…’ 
‘…public deliberation contributes constructively to the practical rationality of democratic 
outcomes…’ 
 ‘…deliberative democracy elucidates an ideal of democracy that is most congruent with ‘whom 
we are’…’ (Cooke 2000: 950, 952,954). 
 
This is to suggest that citizen security forums can in theory improve the procedural fairness of 
policing and security governance by rendering these processes transparent and accessible to 
broader segments of the community. Procedural fairness represents an important means of 
legitimising policing outcomes (Cohen 1997: 73; referenced in Cooke 2000: 950) as well as an 
important mechanism for rationalising them. The idea that CSFs as nodes of deliberative 
governance might also contribute to more rational policing outcomes therefore corresponds with 
the second qualifier for democratically responsive policing: ‘efficiency’, ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘delivery of service’ (See ‘Table 2 Democratic Policing and Responsiveness’). It also links with 
Marenin’s (1998: 169) emphasis on ‘congruence’.  
Cooke (2000: 953) argues that deliberation provides a basis for compromise and action but  
notes that the outcomes generated from such compromises are can only be viewed as legitimate 
if they can be justified in relation to ‘an epistemic standard of rationality’ (Cooke 2000: 953; 
also Habermas 1996). The issue of congruence is particularly important in the context of weak 
and structurally dependent societies because powerful global actors play an important role in 
dictating this ‘epistemic standard of rationality’ so that it is congruent with the interests of 
global liberal governance. Insofar as CSFs might improve service delivery by supporting 
collaborations between the police and other municipal institutions in ways that reflect local 




outcomes that reflect ‘whom we are’ (Cooke 2000: 954). However, if these forums are 
compelled to define their ‘epistemic standard of rationality’ in ways that conflict with or negate 
local interests and needs, both responsiveness and procedural fairness are sacrificed.
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The capacity of the Safer Communities team to use policy translation to buffer this contact zone 
from the EU’s security interests in the Western Balkan therefore suggests that international 
development workers can actively foster nodes of discursive democracy despite having limited 
resources at their disposal. The discursive character of CSFs was apparent from the fact that the 
SACBiH project initiated the Safer Communities project in order to improve cooperation 
between community police officers and municipal authorities at the local level. CSFs 
constituted governing nodes at which different security actors could hold each other accountable 
for their role in delivering security (i.e. ‘horizontal responsiveness’; see Kuper 2007). This 
collaborative platform was also determined by UNDP to be necessary for improving the 
capacity of these institutions to respond to the local security needs of local citizens (i.e. ‘vertical 
responsiveness’; see Kuper 2007).  UNDP’s technical and financial support for these five CSFs 
thus established or sustained these nodes of discursive governance and provided local 
politicians and practitioners with the opportunity to collectively address enduring public safety 
issues like stray dogs that were indeed congruent public expectations of general order policing. 
In the following chapter, I build upon this assertion by exploring the ways that field operators 
utilise policy translation to selectively implement externally-defined prescriptions for 
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 One must consider however that the outcomes generated by governing processes that are not 
procedurally fair may still appear to be legitimate or rational to disempowered citizens if these 
citizens are disinterested in policy making processes. They may also consider incongruent 




Chapter Nine: Community Policing as an Operational 
Strategy 
 
Policy translation effects externally generated police reform initiatives at various stages of 
transmission. The previous chapter examined the ways in which seemingly relatively 
disempowered actors working for a mediatory, multi-lateral international development agency 
attempted to mitigate intense structural pressures for policy alignment by creatively translating 
the conceptual and programmatic prescriptions for Safer Communities to correspond to existing 
pockets of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) core funding that would preserve 
their capacity development mandate. Chapters Nine and Ten present a second empirical case 
study that accounts for the translational capacity and inclinations of members of a public police 
organisation who represent the recipients of an externally defined programme of police reform. 
An ethnographic study is used to examine the implementation of the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation’s (SDC) prescriptions for community policing in Sarajevo 
Canton. My analysis focuses on an apparent disconnect between the rhetoric underpinning these 
strategic prescriptions and the diverse range of associated practices that I encountered during 
my observation of two different community policing specialist units.  
In Chapter Nine, I provide contextualisation for this case study by briefly reviewing relevant 
policing structures in Sarajevo Canton and the SDC’s model of community policing. Drawing 
on my ethnographic observation and follow-up interviews with local police officers and project 
workers from the SDC, I then proceed to examine the operational effectiveness of this initiative. 
Analysed as an episode of policy transfer, my analysis suggests the SDC’s efforts to facilitate 
community policing reforms in Sarajevo Canton struggled to generate results that were 
consistent with the SDC’s designs and expectations for community police work in Sarajevo 
canton. My evaluation of two specialist units further suggests that while one of the teams 
(RPZ1) was partially successful in translating the SDC’s prescriptions for ‘problem solving’ 
into contextually-relevant practices, other units struggled to replicate their successes due to a 
lack of enthusiasm for community policing and limited support from supervisors and 
colleagues. This analysis highlights the mediatory capacity of local practitioners while further 
suggesting that the concept of policy translation provides a useful framework for exploring the 
agentive capacity of these officers.  




Before I elaborate on the SDC’s role in introducing community policing to Sarajevo, it is 
necessary to briefly review the complex organisational structure of the Sarajevo Canton Police 
and to review the development of community policing in this context.
126
 As previously noted, 
the policing landscape in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is highly fragmented with the effect 
that each of the ten Cantons in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) has its own 
police force and police structure. This means that the accountability structure of policing in 
FBiH is decentralised and in Sarajevo Canton the police form part of the Canton’s Ministry of 
the Interior (MUP KS). The Minister of the Interior serves as the head of the Sarajevo Canton 
Police and is responsible for overseeing the internal rules and policies for the provision of 
policing in the Canton. The MUP KS also maintains a Regulation of Job Classification 
document that officially recognises and defines the specific duties and responsibilities of 
different roles within the Sarajevo Canton Police (see Appendix 2). While the MUP KS is 
responsible for proposing any changes to the Regulation of Job Classification document, these 
changes must ultimately be approved by the Cantonal Assembly. At the time of my research, the 
role of community policing specialists was not formally recognised by this document and 
therefore these officers lacked an organisational mandate within the Sarajevo Canton Police. 
This lack of formal recognition was identified by both the SDC and community police 
specialists as a major obstacle to the successful implementation of the SDC’s prescriptions 
(field notes, 7 March 2011; interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 26 June 2011). 
Below the Minister of the Interior, the Sarajevo Canton Police has its own Police Commissioner 
who is appointed by an ‘Independent Board’ including ‘two representatives of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and five members from amongst the citizens’ to serve a four-year term ‘with the 
possibility of extension for one more term of office’ (quoting Office of the High Representative 
2002). The Police Commissioner is responsible for overseeing operational aspects of policing 
and for ensuring that police work is performed in accordance with the stipulations of the 
Regulation of Job Classification.  As an organisation, the Sarajevo Canton Police features a 
central hierarchy that includes various administrators and managers who operate under the 
Police Commissioner and central units that provide coverage for specific policing functions for 
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 This section does not discuss the status of plural or private forms of policing in Sarajevo. This is due to 
the fact that the public police remain the primary source of security for citizens in Sarajevo Canton 
despite recent growth of the city’s private security sector which focuses primarily on the 
commercial and diplomatic sectors. At the time of this research, multi-agency policing initiatives 
such as citizen security forums (CSF) had also yet to be established in Sarajevo Canton. Nor does 
this section provide a comprehensive overview of this large and complex policing organisation. 
Further information on police structures in Sarajevo Canton for can be found on the Sarajevo 




the entire Canton. These units include the ‘Office of the Commissioner’, ‘Crime Police’, ‘Legal, 
Personnel and Logistics’, and ‘Uniformed Patrol’. Uniformed Patrol is responsible for 
coordinating patrol activities throughout the canton however the day-to-day management of 
patrol work is coordinated through five different sectors. Geographically, the composition of 
these sectors is rather diverse and this produces evident variation in terms of the different 
approaches to uniformed patrol that are conducted throughout the Canton. Sectors 2 and 3 
correspond with two of the City of Sarajevo’s urban ‘municipalities’ while Sector 1 incorporates 
two urban municipalities and Sectors 4 and 5 provide coverage for a number of outlying towns 
and villages (see ‘Table 3: Brief Descriptions of MUP KS Police Sectors’).  
 
Table 3: Brief Descriptions of MUP KS Police Sectors127 
Sector 1 Covers two neighbouring urban municipalities in the city centre including ‘Old 
Town’ (Stari Grad) and the city’s commercial and government centre 
(‘Centar’). Sector 1’s headquarters is based in Centar with a satellite station 
based in Stari Grad.   
Sector 2 ‘Novo Sarajevo’, an urban municipality in the city centre that is mainly 
residential. 
Sector 3 ‘Novi Grad’ is the largest municipality in BiH by population. Many residents 
live in Yugoslav-era apartment complexes.  
Sector 4 Includes outlying urban towns of Ilidža and Hadžići.  
Sector 5 Includes rural towns of Ilijaš and Vogošća. 
 
Each Sector has a Chief and every station has a Commander and two Shift Commanders. Below 
these senior managers there is a cadre of mid-level managers and sergeants who are responsible 
for overseeing various administrative and supervisory functions. Finally, the ‘rank-and-file’ 
officers based at each station include a mix of uniformed patrol officers, traffic officers, 
criminal investigators for low profile incidents and support staff.
128
 The majority of rank-and-
file police officers at each station are assigned to sector-based patrol work which, depending on 
the geography of the officer’s beat and the station’s resources, may be conducted by foot or by 
car.  While most patrol officers spend a significant portion of their time out in the ‘community’ 
and have received some training on community policing by either international organisations 
like the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) and the US International 
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 I have randomised the numbers assigned to the RPZ units so they do not necessarily correspond to 
those of the sectors described in this table. This is to help preserve the anonymity of individual 
officers. 
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Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) or at the Police Academy in 
Sarajevo, the consensus amongst reformers and local researchers was that sector-based patrol 
officers had either failed or neglected to incorporate the philosophy of community policing into 
their routines (see Deljkić and Lučić‐Ćatić 2011 180-181; also Gill 2010a: 5 referenced in 
Appendix 2). 
In recognition of the evident limitations of generating reforms through a philosophy-based 
approach to community policing, back in 2008 the SDC supported the MUP KS in piloting two 
community policing specialist teams that would subsequently operate out of Sectors 3 (Novi 
Grad) and 1 (Centar/Stari Grad). An informal position was also created within the central 
‘Crime Police’ unit for a community policing coordinator (henceforth ‘RPZ Coordinator’) who 
oversaw the work of these units, supported their ongoing development (with significant 
assistance from the SDC) and promoted their role throughout the Canton. In 2009, the original 
RPZ Coordinator was replaced by the current RPZ Coordinator, a veteran from before the war 
who prior to taking up this post had served on a UN Mission in sub-Saharan Africa.  
In 2010, the MUP KS expanded its community policing project throughout Sarajevo Canton and 
new RPZ units were established in the remaining sectors. The original team that was based in 
Sector 1 was also split into two separate units that subsequently operated out of smaller 
municipal police stations.  Individual officers were assigned to these newly created units by 
different sector chiefs or station commanders who were afforded a significant degree of 
discretion with regards to their selection criteria because the RPZ specialist role had yet to be 
officially recognised by the Regulation of Job Classification at this point. While most of these 
senior officers acted on the advice of the SDC and selected young, enthusiastic and in some 
instances highly educated officers to staff these units, others chose to capitalise on their 
discretion and staff the RPZ teams with undesirables including veteran officers close to 
retirement, poor performers or difficult to manage individuals (personal communication, 
‘Community Policing Advisor’, 17 March 2011).
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 The competing approaches to staffing these 
                                                     
129  The practice of staffing community policing posts with veteran or out-of-favour officers is 
documented in the Anglo American literature however; no empirical consensus exists with regards 
to which staffing approach is most effective. Rather, the existing research indicates that enthusiasm 
is generally an important determinant of whether community policing initiatives will be 
operationally effective from a police stand-point. Notably, Greene’s (2000: 341-342) research on 
community policing in Philadelphia (USA) suggests that ‘rookie’ officers are better equipped for 
problem-oriented community police work than veteran officers because they are open-minded. This 
sentiment was also expressed by members of the SDC and the officers from RPZ1 when discussing 
the suitability of their colleagues from RPZ2 (personal field notes, ‘RPZ1’, 21 March 2011). 
However, a functional justification for assigning veteran officers to RPZ roles can also be found in 




units affected the two community policing specialist teams that I studied. RPZ1 was comprised 
of two male graduates in their 30’s with degrees in ‘criminalistics’; a female officer in her late 
20’s; and an experienced male officer in his 40’s who had previously delivered lectures on 
community policing at the Police Academy in Sarajevo. To contrast, RPZ2 was staffed by a 
veteran male patrol officer in his late 50’s, a female officer in her late 30’s and a male officer in 
his early 40’s who had previous worked as a uniformed patrol officer and served with the 
tactical response unit prior to the community policing assignment.   
The SDC continued to provide training and support for these units until the end of 2010 but it 
began to withdraw from the project in January 2011 and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator and the 
experienced RPZ units subsequently took on the primary role of expanding the programme and 
supporting the ongoing development of the newly established RPZ units through training 
activities. They also assumed primary responsibility for promoting the project and the RPZ role 
both within the police organisation and to external audiences (see Chapter Ten). At the start of 
my research in early 2011, the consensus amongst my colleagues at UNDP, representatives of 
MUP KS, and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who served as my institutional gatekeeper for this 
research was that RPZ1 had been highly successful in implementing the SDC’s strategic 
prescriptions while RPZ2 had struggled by comparison (personal communications, 23 February 
2011 and 4 March 2011).  One of the initial aims of my research was therefore to identify the 
various factors that contributed to the success of RPZ1 and the shortcomings of RPZ2 as this 
was identified by the RPZ Coordinator to be a significant question with implications for how the 
MUP KS would eventually define the role of community police officers in the Regulation of Job 
Classification (personal communication, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 4 March 2011).  I revisit this 
question in Section 9.3 however it is first necessary to introduce the SDC’s strategic 
prescriptions for community policing in Sarajevo Canton.  
9.2 Community Policing: The Swiss Way 
The SDC’s prescription for community policing in Sarajevo Canton emphasized ambiguous 
concepts like ‘security marketing’ and ‘transactional analysis’ which represented  
amalgamations of popular community policing practices in Switzerland and Anglo-American 
contexts. The SDC published a summary of these prescriptions in a 2010 Manual for 
Community-Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Swiss Agency for Development and 
                                                                                                                                                           
with the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy were ‘generally less aggressive in their policing 




Cooperation 2010; henceforth ‘Manual’).
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 Analysing the SDC’s model in relation to the 
established, Anglo-American community policing literature reveals that these concepts were 
designed to provide local police in Sarajevo Canton operational frameworks for problem 
solving (Goldstein 1979, 1990) and knowledge brokering (Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 70-71). 
The lack of specificity surrounding these concepts meant however that successful 
implementation ultimately depended on the ability of local police officers to use their local 
knowledge and discretion to successfully translate ‘security marketing’ and ‘information 
sharing’ into contextually relevant practices.  
The Manual describes community policing in relation to its ‘Peelian’ origins but it calls for  
police organisations to implement community policing programmatically, as an operational 
strategy carried out by specialist teams (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 
18-19). The Manual also identifies problem solving as the primary function of community 
policing and suggests  that these specialist teams should play a proactive role in identifying 
local problems and developing solutions through partnership-based practices involving  
‘sustainable problem-solving’ methodologies such as ‘security marketing’ and ‘SARA’ 
(‘Scanning, Analysis, Response, Assessment’). The Manual does not provide a clear definition 
for ‘security marketing’ but it does include a fifteen-page guide designed to help local police 
officers achieve a ‘security marketing process’ (Ibid: 65- 80). A quick analysis of this ‘guide’ 
indicates that ‘security marketing’ is consistent with Goldstein’s (1979: 236) description of 
policing as a ‘problem-solving process’ that involves:  
‘Identifying these problems in more precise terms, researching each problem, documenting the 
nature of the current police response, assessing its adequacy and the adequacy of existing 
authority and resources, engaging in a broad exploration of alternatives to present responses, 
weighing the merits of these alternatives and choosing among them.’ (Goldstein 1979: 236)  
 
Along these lines, the Manual proposes that the first step for ‘achieving a Security Market[ing] 
process’ involves identifying the ‘causes of insecurity of the population’ based on the 
perceptions of community police officers (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 
2010: 65 -66).  Step two involves identifying local problems that affect ‘a large number of 
citizens’ (Ibid: 66). Third, the Manual states that community police officers should conduct a 
group analysis of the issues identified in steps one and two in order to develop ‘an objective 
perspective on the problem’ (Ibid: 66). Drawing from their analysis, step four encourages the 
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 This Manual was published two years after the SDC initiated its community policing project in 
Sarajevo Canton but its content is consistent with the training that was initially provided to the 




officers to ‘realize that they cannot solve the problem alone’ and actively seek out local 
‘partners’ who could contribute to addressing the problem ‘in a sustainable way’ (Ibid: 67). Step 
five advocates collaborating with these partners to develop and implement an appropriate 
solution to this problem and step six calls on the officers to evaluate ‘the result of the actions 
taken’ (Ibid: 65-67). 
The distinction between ‘security marketing’ and ‘SARA’ is not entirely clear but the concepts 
appear to represent alternate methodologies for implementing ‘problem-oriented policing’. 
While ‘security marketing’ appears to provide community policing specialists with a 
methodology for addressing ‘complex security problems’ (Ibid: 81), the Manual also advocates 
the utility of basic ‘methods’ like ‘SARA’ for the officers to use when ‘solving local problems 
of lower intensity’ (Ibid: 81).  The Manual also neglects to clearly distinguish between 
‘complex security problems’ and ‘problems of lower intensity’ meaning that this distinction was 
left to the judgment of local police officers.  
While the Manual includes a heavy emphasis on problem-solving, it also promoted the idea of 
community policing as a form of ‘knowledge work’ (Ericsson and Haggerty 1997) designed to 
communicate risk to internal and external stakeholders. The Manual refers to this practice as 
‘intelligence sharing’ and suggests that community policing specialist teams should take the 
lead in presenting the local intelligence gathered via ‘security marketing’ and ‘SARA’ to 
colleagues throughout the organisation and partners in the community (Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation 2010: 56). The SDC’s emphasis on community policing as 
‘intelligence sharing’ also exhibits elements of what has become known as ‘intelligence-led 
policing’ in Anglo-American contexts (Maguire and John 1995) however, the SDC’s concept of 
‘intelligence sharing’ was not explicitly oriented towards targeting prolific or high risk 
offenders. Rather, the SDC advocated this information brokerage function as a means of 
fostering local cooperation and partnerships in the community that could be used to address 
holistic security problems with the help of local institutions and actors. 
To perform this ‘intelligence sharing’ function within the police organisation, the Manual states 
officers should maintain an ‘affairs board’ within their station that lists recent incidents and 
events and that the officers present their analyses of these findings to their colleagues during 
daily briefings (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 54). It also suggests that 
community policing specialists should work directly with station managers and supervisors to 
streamline communications and by-pass hierarchical reporting procedures that restrict the flow 




function with external stakeholders, the Manual calls for community policing specialists to 
‘know their area/sector of responsibility and the citizens living there’ (Ibid: 39) so that they can 
establish a functional network of partners throughout the community. Specifically, the Manual 
states: 
‘Community policing officers should contact all citizens, whatever their social status, origin, 
culture and lifestyle might be. The should also partner with other stakeholders, mainly from the 
social and educational areas which requires (sic) good knowledge of stakeholders…Community 
policing officers will be asked various questions, which will not always be related to their scope of 
competences, but anyhow the attitude of service to the population should be a guide. CP officers 
will make efforts to find solutions, resorting to the partners’ competences and services.’ (Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010: 46) 
 
This emphasis on partnership and accessing local knowledge is therefore suggestive of what 
O’Malley and Palmer (1996) have previously described as ‘post-Keynesian policing’ in Anglo-
American contexts. Theorising the significance of partnership-based community policing, 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 70-71, 73) reference the work of Stenson (1993) in writing that 
community policing constitutes a particularly important ‘institutional methodology for 
communicating risk management’ that is significant because it ‘constitutes the police as 
professional experts… [possessing]…abstract knowledge about risk that is valuable to others’. 
This idea is inherent to the SDC’s emphasise on ‘intelligence sharing’ which recognises that 
appealing to community values and interests through positive, non-adversarial interactions is 
particularly important for establishing police legitimacy and re-affirming the traditional role of 
the public police as an important institution for risk communication in the community. 
Establishing a network of contacts is also important in relation to this idea of policing as risk 
communication because it promises to afford the police what Ericson and Haggerty identify as 
‘[improved] connections with the communications circuitry of other risk institutions’ (Ibid: 72). 
The idea that a functional network of partners could enhance the capacity of the police to 
generate intelligence and perform knowledge work is also suggestive of neo-liberal 
governmentality and Garland’s (1996) concept of ‘responsibilization’. In this case, a state 
institution with limited governmental capacities was advised by the SDC to enrol local partners 
to contribute to the governance and provision of policing by participating in intelligence sharing 
practices. The SDC’s advocacy of responsibilization is also evident from the Manual’s concept 
of ‘transactional analysis’ a practice that involved ‘lead[ing] people to a direction enabling them 
to abandon negative or limited thinking schemes’ and to encourage individuals to reflect on 




in every-day (sic) behaviour’ (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2012: 31). By 
promoting these introspective transformations, the Manual suggests that community police 
officers can ‘create their own spaces of manoeuvre’ and ‘[increase] their professional capacities’ 
(Ibid: 31). This is further suggestive of Garland’s (1996: 11) idea that the mentalities of 
activated and motivated citizens and institutions can be aligned with the those of the state with 
the effect that ‘the centralized state machine is rendered more powerful than before, with an 
extended capacity for action and influence’ (Ibid: 11). In the case of the SDC’s community 
policing strategy in Sarajevo Canton however, this process is designed to align local mentalities 
with those of an international development agency rather than the public police. As Ryan (2011: 
155) argues, promoting a partnership-based, community policing model in a country like BiH is 
conducive to the establishment of ‘complex assemblage of thin blue lines’ designed to activate 
an array of local institutions and actors as important agents of glocally responsive policing.   
While the concepts of ‘security marketing’ and ‘intelligence sharing’ played an important role 
in structuring the mentalities of community policing specialists in Sarajevo Canton, it was 
ultimately left to the discretion of local police officers to translate these prescriptions into 
practice.  An interview with a Project Associate from the SDC involved with both the 
development and implementation of the project  revealed that these concepts were intentionally 
left vague so as to encourage local police officers to take ownership of them and adapt them to 
address local circumstances (interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’ 22 June 2011). While this 
decision can be partially accounted for by the fact that the SDC subscribed to a ‘capacity 
development’ ethos similar to that of UNDP, it is also important to consider that there were 
pragmatic reasons for the SDC to leave its prescriptions fairly ambiguous. Most notably, the 
SDC recognised that local knowledge was necessary for successfully adapting these 
prescriptions into a functional community policing strategy and that there could be no one-size-
fits-all approach to implementing these prescriptions.
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 However, as the remainder of this 
chapter indicates, translating these concepts into an effective operational strategy for community 
policing in Sarajevo Canton was difficult in practice and success varied between the two RPZ 
units that I observed. In the following section, I account for the obstacles that confronted 
officers working to operationalize the SDC’s prescriptions and in Chapter Ten, I elaborate on 
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 This SDC’s recognition of the need for local practitioners to use interpretation and negotiation to adapt 
generic prescriptions for community policing into local relevant practices also reflects the Scottish 
Government’s approach to promoting community policing between its eight regional police forces. 
Specifically, Henry and MacKenzie (2012: 317) describe how ‘the Scottish Government published 
the Community policing and engagement principles…against which Scottish police forces should 
refine their practice’ but that these prescriptions were ‘not intended to be prescriptive about the 




how officers from RPZ1 used ‘dramaturgical translation’ to incorporate the SDC’s prescriptions 
into an effective presentational strategy.  
 
9.3 Community Policing as an Operational Strategy 
In this section, I examine the shortcomings of community police work in Sarajevo Canton as an 
operational strategy designed to ‘improve the quality of life’ (Swiss Agency for Development 
and Cooperation 2010: 24) for local citizens. I do so with an analysis that focuses on the 
primary strategic function of community policing that was identified by the SDC: problem 
solving. For the SDC, the key determinant of whether community policing was successfully 
implemented as an operational strategy in Sarajevo Canton was the question of whether these 
efforts consistently generated outcomes that addressed public sources of insecurity. My analysis 
suggests that they did not but that one of the two specialist units (RPZ1) was at least partially 
successful in using the SDC’s prescription for ‘security marketing’ to structure their work. 
Ultimately, however, their ability to generate actual ‘results’ or outcomes through security 
marketing was restricted due to a lack of support from municipal agencies that either failed to 
recognise the role of community police officers or refused to do so. By comparison, the second 
unit (RPZ2) struggled to incorporate this problem solving function into its operational routine 
due to limited support from senior managers and individual resistance or confusion regarding 
what security marketing actually entailed. Based on this analysis, I argue that the SDC’s 
prescriptions for community policing had not been successfully operationalised at the time of 
my research and that the officers’ use of ‘security marketing’ and the ‘SARA’ methodology did 
not generate holistic, partnership-based solutions to local problems.   
Problem solving was identified by the SDC as the primary function of community police work 
and accordingly, concepts like ‘security marketing’ served as important scripts designed to 
inform the work of RPZ officers in Sarajevo Canton. While the officers from RPZ1 embraced 
these scripts and used them to inform their daily routine for community police work, their 
counterparts in RPZ2 either neglected or struggled to do so. The evidence that I encountered of 
RPZ1’s efforts to employ security marketing to address recurring issues throughout their 
municipality was abundant and it was clear that the SDC’s prescriptions and training had a 
significant effect upon their proactive approach to policing. Maintaining regular contact with 
various ‘partners’ throughout the municipality represented RPZ1’s primary strategy for 




the police and members of the community was necessary for generating trust and which in turn 
would facilitate information sharing and cooperation in addressing these problems (field notes, 
22 March 2011). This proactive approach to problem identification was encouraged by the 
team’s Station Commander who suggested that ‘some people are still afraid to report crimes and 
that this is a problem that will take many years to resolve in order to improve public perceptions 
of the police and their willingness to engage with them’ (par. interview, ‘RPZ1 Commander’, 4 
April 2011). Accordingly, the officers from RPZ1 held regular meetings with ‘partners’ 
representing diverse segments of the community including municipal officials, community 
leaders, school directors, charity workers, small business owners, and private citizens.
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Given the diverse range of actors that RPZ1 classed as ‘partners’, these encounters frequently 
served to draw attention to problems that did not fall within what these officers recognised as 
the traditional roles of the police. For example, one of the officers from RPZ1 informed me of a 
meeting with a local community representative who complained about a problem with broken 
street lighting and the failure of the municipal office to resolve this issue after repeated requests 
(personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 9 March 2011).  The officer explained that this was not 
really his responsibility as a police officer but as a community police officer, he often had to 
step in to deal with this ‘stuff’ because nobody else follows up. The officer went on to suggest 
that having a police officer serve as an advocate for these kind of issues is beneficial because in 
theory, he believed that it made the municipal authorities more likely to act on public 
complaints. With reference to this specific incident however, the officer acknowledged that his 
meeting with an administrator at the municipal office failed to resolve the issue but rather 
prompted the administrator to ask the officer ‘why is this your business?’ (Ibid).  The response 
of the municipal official in Sarajevo Canton illustrates the significance of bureaucratic inertia 
and cultural resistance as impediments to partnership-based community policing and this 
obstacle is well-documented in Anglo-American contexts (e.g. Crawford 1999: 107-108; 
Greene 2004) and in Western Europe (e.g. Terpstra 2008: 219). Lacking formal recognition for 
the RPZ role from the Regulation of Job Classification document, the officer from RPZ1 
suggested that they struggled to articulate a convincing response to this question (personal 
communication, ‘RPZ1’, 9 March 2011). 
RPZ1’s failure to initiate a solution for the municipality’s stray dog problem population also 
highlights the difficulties these officers faced in translating the SDC’s prescriptions for security 
marketing into an effective operational strategy. This was evident from the proceedings of a 
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 I had the opportunity to attend and observe a number of these meetings during my field work with 




community meeting that I attended with two of the team’s officers that was organised following 
an incident where a small child was attacked by a stray dog in front of a local school. The two 
officers began the meeting by informing the parents that they were well aware of the problem 
and that they were actively working to resolve it. To demonstrate their commitment to the issue, 
they presented a ‘project report’ for the stray dogs issue that they had clearly invested a 
significant amount of time in developing over the past two years. The report included a record 
of all of the complaints that the police in this municipality had received about issues relating to 
stray dogs as well as copies of numerous formal letters that the officers had previously sent to 
the municipality office informing it of the problem and requesting a response.  When the 
officers suggested that they were powerless to resolve this issue without support from the 
municipalities in the form of funding allocated for the construction of a stray dog shelter, the 
room became increasingly hostile towards the officers and visibly dismissive of their ‘specialist’ 
function (field notes, 22 March 2011). 
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While the officers from RPZ1 were able to use security marketing as a means for identifying 
local issues and initiating partners throughout the community, their ability to actually generate 
multi-agency commitments  to resolve these issues was largely restricted due to a lack of 
cooperation from municipal officials. Effectively, budgetary constraints and disagreements over 
which municipal agency was responsible for addressing the problems prevented the officers 
from RPZ1 from actually delivering results while also creating powerful disincentives for 
municipal agencies to even recognise the authority of community police officers lest they be 
held accountable for their lack of responsiveness or cooperation. This illustrated the refusal of 
different municipal agencies to accept responsibility for public safety issues, an attitude which 
severely restricted the operational effectiveness of community policing.
134
  Similar issues were 
experienced by members of another RPZ unit operating on the outskirts of Sarajevo. One of the 
officers described how the team brought a complaint from a local school director about broken 
street lighting to the attention of their municipality’s public works office but the administrator 
refused to acknowledge the agency’s responsibility for repairing the street lights and instead 
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 This hostility was evident from the fact that members of the public were interrupting the officers and 
shouting at them while one of the officers would later tell me that one attendee commented that if 
the police failed to act, he would take it upon himself to shoot the dogs (field notes, 22 March 
2011).   
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 Similar problems relating to inter-agency cooperation and the unwillingness of municipal authorities to 
recognise the authority of community police officers is documented in relation to the Chicago 
Alternative Policing Strategy by Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 162-163).  Lyons’ (2002) research also 
draws attention to the possibility that weak partnerships or partnerships that attract only limited 
interest from the community may actually increase the exclusionary effects of local policing and 




suggested that this was a problem of the Ministry of Culture because the complaint had been 
lodged by a school official. When the officers later approached the Ministry of Culture about the 
problem, the received a similar response with the effect that the issue was never actually 
resolved (interview, ‘RPZ4’, 4 April 2011).
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 Similar concerns regarding the lack of authority 
of community police officers to generate responses from municipal actors were noted in 
UNDP’s Baseline Assessment (2010) report and the SDC’s external review (Wisler and Traljic 
2010), both of which proposed that developing community safety partnerships represented the 
best solution to this issue because it promised to promote transparency and public 
accountability.  
For the officers from RPZ2, implementation was even less successful from an operational stand-
point. Part of the problem was that their operational routines were defined primarily by their 
Sector Chief and Station Commander who regularly deployed these officers for ‘traditional’ 
policing jobs such as working protests or demonstrations in the city centre or providing security 
for visiting diplomats. While not enthusiastic about community policing, RPZ2’s Sector Chief 
was also not overtly dismissive or critical of this role. Rather, this individual viewed community 
policing as a secondary police function that did not represent a priority due to the sector’s 
limited resources and personnel.  Thus, the Sector Chief argued that deploying the officers from 
RPZ2 for protests and diplomatic protection duties was a strategic decision as ‘[the officers] are 
used as go-betweens between the patrol officers and the citizens [and] they are not involved 
with repressive activities’. The Sector Chief went on to justify this decision in suggesting that 
‘policing protests is … part of the work of the police in the community’ and that ‘these officers 
are supposed to talk with people and reduce tensions’ (par. interview, ‘RPZ2 Chief’, 5 April 
2011).   
Drawing from Skogan’s (2008: 24) discussion of institutional resistance to community policing 
reforms from middle and top-level police managers in the United States, it is necessary to 
consider that resource constraints may not have been the only explanation for why the officers 
from RPZ2 were restricted by management from operationalising the SDC’s prescription for 
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 In this particular example, the officers from RPZ4 did not discuss the role of senior departmental 
colleagues in supporting their attempts to bring this issue to the attention of the public works office 
or the Canton’s Ministry of Culture. An earlier conversation with officers from RPZ1 suggests 
however that many senior officers were hesitant to intervene by approaching senior-level 
counterparts at other municipal agencies because they did not recognise the value of doing so or 
alternatively, they lacked the incentive to do so. This was particularly evident in relation to the 
work of the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who chose to utilise his time engaging with local members 
of the community and citizens instead of capitalising on his senior rank to develop a network of 
powerful contacts throughout the city that could be held accountable for their agencies’ lack of 




security marketing. Specifically, Skogan argues that middle and senior police managers may be 
resistant to community policing and problem-oriented policing models because they afford a 
significant degree of discretion to rank-and-file officers and this is seen to erode the ability of 
senior officers to exercise hierarchical control over their subordinates out in the field. While the 
officers were permitted to schedule their community policing activities around their public order 
policing duties, this arrangement was problematic in practice because of the frequent and 
impromptu nature of protests and diplomatic visits to the sector. In other words, the officers 
from RPZ2 were hesitant to schedule meetings with established or prospective ‘partners’ in the 
community because of the risk that they might be forced to cancel at the last minute (personal 
communication, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 4 March 2011).  
Thus, the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator and the officers from RPZ1 identified managerial support 
as the primary reason for why the officers from RPZ2 struggled with implementation. One of 
the officers from RPZ1 explained, ‘the most important person is the chief because the chief 
makes all the station’s strategic decisions so if he doesn’t care about CBP or know about CBP it 
won’t work’. The officer elaborated on this claim by suggesting that if the chief does not 
support community policing, ‘CBP teams will not have money or resources to do their job well’ 
and adds that ‘if the chief is made to recognise the benefits of CBP approach as a problem-
solving tool, they will facilitate it’ (par. personal communications, ‘RPZ2’, 7 March 2011 and 9 
March 2011).  According to the RPZ Coordinator, RPZ2’s first Sector Chief failed to support 
community policing and his replacement had only recently started to accept the need for the unit 
to enjoy greater operational autonomy but struggled to address the scheduling issue due to the 
sector’s shortage of uniformed personnel (interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011). 
The extent to which scheduling issues restricted the officers from RPZ2 from identifying local 
problems was evident from a series of encounters that I observed between the officers from 
RPZ2 and various ‘partners’ in the community who did not appear keen to make use of the 
unit’s problem-solving function. During an impromptu patrol, my interpreter Adnan and I 
accompanied one of the officers from RPZ2 to a series of unscheduled meetings with a secretary 
for neighbourhood community centre or ‘mesne zajednice’ (MZ);  a bet shop owner; a school 
director; and the chief psychiatrist at a methadone clinic.  None of these individuals revealed 
any ‘problems’ but rather, they repeatedly emphasised that ‘everything is ok’ (field notes, 14 
March 2011). It was evident from these exchanges that these individuals had little interest in 
presenting their problems to this officer, perhaps because they did not believe that the officer 




the MZ secretary informed the officer that diplomats at a nearby embassy were illegally parking 
their cars on a side street and that this was creating traffic problems for local residents. They 
commented however that when she previously brought this matter to the attention of the police, 
they responded that they were incapable of resolving it because they could not tow vehicles with 
diplomatic plates or issue fines to the embassy. The MZ secretary then explained that there had 
been some issues with drug dealing in the neighbourhood but suggested that it was ‘not really a 
problem’ because ‘everybody knows who is responsible and parents tell their kids to avoid 
them’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ2 and MZ Secretary 2’, 14 March 2011). On the 
basis of this assurance, the officer from RPZ2 did not appear to be interested in probing the 
matter.  
The next day, an encounter between all three officers from RPZ2 and an MZ secretary at 
another community centre highlighted how individual resistance to, or confusion about, the 
nature of the RPZ role restricted the ability of these officers to establish functional partnerships 
throughout their sector. At the beginning of this meeting, the officers introduced me as a 
representative from UNDP and instructed the MZ secretary to discuss their relationship with the 
officers from RPZ2 for my benefit. The individual responded that ‘the partnership between the 
[community centre] and the police is ok, but it could be better’. When asked to elaborate on why 
the ‘partnership’ was lacking and how it could be improved, the individual responded that 
‘[RPZ2] could visit more often’ but refused to elaborate further in the presence of the officers. 
This comment prompted an exchange of words in Bosnian between the secretary and the 
officers regarding a complaint that the secretary had filed and which the officers from RPZ2 had 
yet to follow-up on (field notes, 15 March 2011). After the meeting, Adnan explained to me that 
a number of local residents complained to the secretary about underage drinking and loud music 
coming from a local café. The secretary then brought this matter to the attention of one of the 
officers from RPZ2 at their previous meeting but the officer neglected to intervene. Based on 
this explanation, I asked one of the male officers from RPZ2 for his take on the matter and his 
response was that it was not a job for the police but rather ‘the job of environmental police’ 
(par. personal communication, ‘RPZ2’ 15 March 2011). The officer’s response evidences 
resistance to the RPZ role by at least one of the officers assigned to the unit. 
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 Previous conversations between the other male officer from RPZ2 and I suggest that this individual 
was outwardly dismissive of community policing however the sole female member of the unit 
appeared to be both knowledgeable and enthusiastic about the assignment. It was clear however that 
this officer lacked the authority to take on a leadership role within the unit as she was the least 
experienced officer and this restricted her ability to incorporate the SDC’s prescriptions into the 




Also problematic was the fact that the officers from RPZ2 had failed to establish meaningful 
contacts amongst a sizable Roma population that resided in their sector.
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  More significant was 
the fact that they appeared to be disinterested in doing so.  As one of the officers explained: 
‘…they have their own system and culture which the police do not understand and that whenever 
there is a problem they prefer to handle it themselves….[we] are called to deal with a problem but 
when they get there the people pretend like nothing happened making the police look like idiots’ 
(par. personal communication with ‘RPZ2’, 14 March 2011) 
  
Similar sentiments were expressed by the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who excused the team’s 
inattention to the Roma population by suggesting that ‘we believe that people are people and we 
respect their processes of life’ but went on to describe their culture and lifestyles as 
criminogenic: ‘young [Roma] kids start as beggars, then they become thieves, then they get 
involved with drug smuggling or prostitution and then maybe they become murderers’ (par.  
interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011). The RPZ Coordinator’s comments reflect the fact 
that the country’s Roma population is viewed as deviant by the BiH public.
138
 It also supports 
the idea that the officers from RPZ2 were highly selective in terms of how they defined the 
boundaries of the community they were willing to police and that the local Roma population 
was not included in this definition because they constituted social ‘others’. 
While this dismissive attitude was problematic from a moral standpoint, it also restricted the 
unit’s ability to perform their problem solving role because it prevented them from identifying 
problems that affected or were caused by a ‘deviant’ population.
139
  This was particularly 
problematic because it meant that these officers did not work to address social issues that are 
said to affect Roma communities in the Balkans such as gender-based violence against Romani 
women and the exploitation of Romani children. Although poorly documented in NGO reports, 
the prevalence of gender-based violence in Roma communities is described by Hedina Sijercic, 
a Romani journalist who grew up in this particular neighbourhood in Sarajevo: 
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 Hedina Sijercic, a Romani journalist who grew up in Sarajevo describes how two different Roma 
populations have historically existed in BiH, the Gureti-Chergash who would leave their homes 
during the summer and the Thanesko Gurbeti who maintained permanent residences. This example 
focuses on the latter group which had long maintained a permanent community in Sarajevo’s City 
Centre since before the war (Sijercic 2007).    
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 I had previously encountered similar views expressed by various friends and colleagues after revealing 
the location of my apartment in Sarajevo in what was generally considered to be a ‘gypsy 
neighbourhood’.  
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 I encountered anecdotal evidence of this attitude during a meeting between one of the RPZ2 officers 
and a local secretary from a community centre. After the secretary explained that a local resident 
recently went to the police to report the theft of his newly purchased shower unit from his home, the 
officer laughed and casually explained  how ‘gypsies steal strange stuff which they try to sell off at 




‘Along with all this society’s discrimination, our women suffer from domestic discrimination in their 
families as well. They work at home, rear the children, beg, and work for the men who are mostly 
alcoholic (sic). Our women also have cleaned other houses, and worked, and their husbands take 
this money to buy first alcohol and then food for the family. Men often beat the women and kids. 
Kids beat their mothers too, and often some of the men (sic) family members beat the women 
too.’ (Sijercic 2007)140 
 
While it was evident that the officers from RPZ2 were aware of these problems, their attitudes 
suggested that they did not consider them to be their responsibility. For example, during one 
conversation about the issue of gender-based violence in Roma communities, one of the officers 
suggested that it is more common for the Roma to call the police when ‘wives beat their 
husbands’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 14 March 2011). A second officer nodded in 
amusement and it was clear that neither had fully considered the reasons behind this 
observation. Specifically, they did not appear to recognise that Roma women might have been 
actively prevented from reporting these incidents to the police by male relatives who in turn 
could use the threat of police intervention to enhance their own intimidation and control. It is 
further apparent that these officers neglected to address this complex issue through the SDC’s 
security marketing methodology. This was problematic for the operational success of 
community policing in the sector because it undermined the SDC’s belief that ‘[t]he main goal 
of community policing is to improve the quality of life’ by ‘solving problems in a sustainable 
manner’ (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2010).  
 
9.4 Discussion 
As an operational strategy, the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing in Sarajevo Canton 
appeared to have had a limited impact insofar as community police officers either failed to 
generate results through a partnership-based approach or struggled to incorporate the methods of 
‘security marketing’ or ‘SARA’ into their operational routines.  A similar conclusion was 
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 During my fieldwork, it was not uncommon to see unsupervised, visibly malnourished children (even 
infants) begging in the city centre. In the evenings, the children would then hand their money over 
to their guardians or handlers. During an interview with an RPZ officer from a different sector, I 
learned that the police were well aware of this problem but believed that there was little they could 
do to address it. Instead, the officer explained that many of these ‘beggars’ travel to Sarajevo from 
neighbouring countries like Serbia.  Furthermore, the officer noted that it was very difficult to take 
coercive action against the guardians of these children because they would simply relocate to 
another part of the country instead of paying their fines or attending meetings with social services.  
Addressing this problem through social services was also impractical because so many of these 
individuals were not actually BiH citizens and they were not entitled to public benefits or support 




published by the SDC’s external evaluation team which stated that the work of RPZ officers 
was generally limited to producing ‘outputs’ such as project reports or scheduled meetings 
rather than ‘outcomes’ (Wisler and Traljic 2010). In this respect, one might argue that the 
initiative was a policy failure or characteristic of an unsuccessful policy transfer. While the SDC 
attributed these operational shortcomings to the amount of time that the officers spent 
promoting their work to the public and also to problems with generating support from potential 
partner agencies (interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011), the officers from RPZ1 
provided me with an alternative explanation for why they had yet to achieve results: the SDC’s 
expectations were unrealistic from the start (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).  
This is not to imply that the SDC believed that local officers could merely function as 
intermediaries and unproblematically adapt an off-the-shelf model of community policing for 
use in Sarajevo Canton. In fact, it was clear from my interview with an SDC Project Associate 
that the team was well aware of the challenges inherent to promoting community policing 
reforms in developing and transitional societies around the world (interview, ‘SDC Project 
Associate’, 22 June 2011). The problem was that the SDC appeared to equate the mediatory 
function of local police practitioners with a simple process of adaptation rather than one that 
would also require cultural and structural transformation.  
The officers from RPZ1 actively embraced their mediatory role but they recognised that 
adapting the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing into a successful operational strategy 
in Sarajevo Canton would take time.  Reflecting on their recent visit to Switzerland to observe a 
variant of the SDC’s community policing model in action, one of the officers from RPZ1 
suggested that ‘yes, it all works but [the Swiss] do not have a lot of problems to begin with’. 
This conveys the officer’s recognition that operationalising community policing in Switzerland 
was inevitably different from the prospect of operationalising it in BiH. Unlike BiH, 
Switzerland did not continue to suffer from deep-rooted social divisions and structural problems 
linked with a recent history of conflict.
141
 The officer went on to explain that ‘CBP is a very 
good idea in terms of relationships and partnerships and building high levels of trust but the way 
we get to it is not the same’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011). This 
sentiment was echoed by a second officer working in another sector in the city centre who 
suggested that there is a different mentality in Switzerland to start with: ‘people respect the rules 
and take responsibility for their problems whereas in Bosnia they do not’ (par. interview, 
‘RPZ3’, 5 April 2011). 
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 This notion that community policing is likely to be most effective in stable, ‘affluent, ethnically 




These difficulties suggest that international development workers from the SDC played an 
important role in structuring the mentalities of local RPZ officers but that this would only have 
a limited impact in determining how the officers would translate these mentalities into culturally 
and contextually relevant practices. Furthermore, it suggests that the SDC lacked the ability to 
shape the mentalities of the BiH public and partner institutions directly. Rather, they depended 
on local RPZ officers to promote this governmentality through a practice that I identify as 
‘dramaturgical translation’ in the following chapter. Thus, analysed as a translational process 
rather than a transfer, this case study illustrates the capacity of local police officers to 
strategically transform conceptual and programmatic aspects of policing and security 




















Chapter Ten: Dramaturgical Translations for 
Community Policing in Sarajevo Canton 
 
This chapter synthesises the concept of policy translation with Goffman’s (1956) work on 
dramaturgy to introduce an alternative framework for analysing how and why local practitioners 
selectively mediate externally defined prescriptions for policing into contextually and 
subculturally appropriate practices. Section 10.1 introduces the dramaturgical metaphor with a 
review of Goffman’s (1956) seminal work The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life and 
proceeds to examine its applicability to our understanding of police work in the Anglo-
American context through a discussion of Manning’s (1977) Police Work. Manning suggests 
that police subculture is an important determinant of how presentational strategies are utilised 
by police practitioners and I argue that the posited existence of a ‘transnational subculture of 
policing’ (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012)
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 supports the transferability of the dramaturgical 
metaphor as a framework for understanding the organisational sociology of the police in 
transitional democratic societies like Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). 
In Section 10.2, I apply the concept of dramaturgical translation through my analysis of 
community policing as a presentational strategy in Sarajevo Canton. Specifically, I examine 
how performances and audience segmentation were utilised by a team of community policing 
specialists (RPZ1) to address certain operational deficiencies described in the previous chapter. 
My analysis focuses on two secondary functions of community policing prescribed by the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC): information sharing and transaction analysis.  
Selectively incorporating elements of the SDC’s model of community policing into strategic 
performances represented an important exercise in policy translation because it allowed the 
officers from RPZ1 to project their own definitions of the RPZ role to segmented audiences and 
achieve recognition and acceptance from sceptical colleagues and supervisors which in turn 
validated their projected definitions. For ‘internal’ audiences within the Sarajevo Canton Police, 
the officers from RPZ1 worked to communicate the value of community policing by linking 
their role with established subcultural definitions of police work, specifically the idea of 
policing as ‘crime fighting’. Conversely, performances to ‘external’ audiences including 
members of the community, partner agencies, international organisations, and the local media 
were used to promote a softened, non-adversarial definition of the RPZ role. These 
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performances were intended to distinguish these officers from their oft criticised colleagues and 
portray them as diligent and approachable problem-solvers. 
My ethnography suggests that dramaturgical performances afforded the officers from RPZ1 
operational autonomy and the discretion necessary for operationalising community police work 
as they saw fit. Dramaturgical translation not only allowed these officers to sustain their tenuous 
role as RPZ specialists but most importantly,  it also empowered them to redefine the 
operational habitus of community policing so that it would reflect their collective interests in 
this contact zone. The same could not be said of the officers from RPZ2 whose flawed 
performances threatened to undermine the progress realised by their counterparts from RPZ1. 
Section 10.3 concludes this chapter by discussing the significance of dramaturgical translation 
with respect to the capacity of local practitioners to negotiate the contours of reforms during the 
implementation process. Accounting for both the productive and damaging potential of 
dramaturgical translation illuminates the role that seemingly disempowered police practitioners 
play in mediating police reforms. While my observation of the officers from RPZ1 is indicative 
of the potentially productive function of dramaturgical translation by local police practitioners 
in terms of creating a space for pursuing partnership-based policing conducive to democratically 
responsive policing outcomes. The fact that other RPZ officers from Sarajevo Canton struggled 
to replicate this success raises additional questions about whether individual agency may itself 
generate new types of harm through translation. Addressing this prospect is useful for 
highlighting the indeterminate nature of policy translation with respect to the outcomes that it 
may generate and the extent to which flawed performances and the idea that the misuse of 
dramaturgical translation may actually generate undesirable consequences.  
 
10.1 Dramaturgical Translation 
This section introduces the concept of dramaturgical translation by reviewing Goffman’s (1956) 
The Presentation of the Self. It proceeds to discuss the relevance of dramaturgy to the study of 
modern police organisations through a discussion of Manning’s (1977) Police Work in which it 
is argued that strategic performances and audience segmentation represent important 
components of modern policing. I introduce the synthesized concept of ‘dramaturgical 
translation’ as a framework for exploring how local police officers transformed the SDC’s 
strategic prescriptions for community policing into a dynamic presentational strategy targeting a 




framework for exploring the translational character of police reforms because it highlights the 
structured, agentive character of relatively disempowered local police officers as ‘performers’.  
10.1.1 The Presentation of the Self 
Dramaturgy involves managing the perceptions and expectations of others for the purpose of 
sustaining or advancing a definition of oneself (Goffman 1956). The mechanism of control 
described by Goffman involves structuring audience perceptions through strategic interactions, 
projected definitions and the concealment of alternative definitions that might otherwise serve to 
contradict this projection. Social actors and teams of actors are therefore described by Goffman 
as ‘performers’ insofar as every social interaction and setting requires them to take on a social 
role. Every social role embodies a front which includes a setting, an appearance and a manner. 
Collectively, these elements provide the audience with recognisable cues and shape their 
responses to the presentation and the presenter.  
Performances benefit performers insofar as they provide these social actors with a means of 
outwardly structuring their relations with others however Goffman (1956:23) adds that they also 
benefit the audience by providing recognisable idealisations and a ‘reaffirmation of the moral 
values of a community’. For a front to be outwardly credible, its setting and the appearance and 
the manner of its performers must be coherent. Inconsistencies prompt the audience to question 
the authenticity of the entire performance and this in turn generates questions regarding the 
legitimacy of its performers (Ibid: 16). In presenting a front, Goffman writes that an individual’s 
‘performance will tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of the 
society, more so in fact than does his behaviour as a whole’ (Ibid: 23). This suggests that there 
is an inevitable disconnect between an individual’s outward projection of the self and their true 
behaviour.   
The posited disconnect between the projected definition of the self (‘front region’) and one’s 
actual behaviour suggests that actors must consciously work to conceal what Goffman (1956: 
70) labels their ‘back region’. Maintenance of the front region and the back region are mutually 
dependent in the sense that the front serves to obfuscate the back while the actions, the 
behaviours and the values associated with the back region enable actors to maintain their fronts. 
‘Since the vital secrets of a show are visible backstage and since performers behave out of 
character while there, it is natural to expect that the passage from the front region to the back 
region will be kept closed to members of the audience or that the entire back region will be kept 




Managing impressions therefore serves as an important strategy for preserving a projected 
definition of the ‘self’. One tactic for managing impressions involves audience segregation 
because different audiences have different expectations about what constitutes a legitimate 
performance (Goffman 1956: 42). Segregation is achieved by adapting one’s front to address the 
diverse expectations of different segments of the audience and by maintaining this separation 
through ‘proper scheduling’ which serves to limit the risk that a specific discrepancy will ruin 
the credibility of the entire performance for the entire audience (Ibid: 84). Managing 
impressions also influences the behaviour of individual actors backstage given that the threshold 
between front regions and back regions is never fixed.  For this reason, Goffman suggests that 
teammates are compelled to incorporate elements of their front into their backstage behaviour in 
order to ‘sustain the impression that [they] can be trusted with the secrets of the team and that 
[they are] not likely to play [their] part badly when the audience is present’ (Ibid: 79).  The need 
for performers to project their front to both external and internal audiences suggests that the 
dramaturgical metaphor can also be used to account for how individual members of an 
organisation define and negotiate their roles with respect to subculture. 
Goffman’s (1956) argument that a front must ultimately resonate with the audience’s 
preconceived notions of a given role and that actors must work to manipulate this collective 
representation suggest that dramaturgy constitutes an important mechanism for negotiating what 
Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 142) label symbolic power, ‘through which relations of force 
between the speakers and their respective groups are actualized in a transfigured form’. While 
performances are coercive insofar as the presenter uses a front to convince an audience of the 
authenticity or the objectivity of their projected definitions, they are also subject to reciprocity 
in the sense that a performance will only be successful if it is accepted by the audience. In other 
words, the audience is empowered by its capacity to reject a performance and to thereby 
discredit the performers. One must therefore consider that performances are not wholly 
reducible to an actor’s self-interest or their behavioural inclination towards self-
aggrandizement
143
 but that they are inevitably shaped by the performer’s perceptions of the 
audience’s expectations of a given role
144
 as well as contextual variables ranging from tangible 
constraints to situational norms.  A successful performer must therefore be attuned and 
responsive to the expectations of the intended audience as well as the contextual circumstances 
surrounding their presentation. 
10.1.2 Dramaturgy and Police Work 
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Manning’s (1977) application of the dramaturgical metaphor to the study of public policing 
highlights the ways in which a public organisation and its members use presentational strategies 
for the purpose of enhancing their perceived legitimacy and to mask their coercive orientation 
and operational deficiencies. Manning recognises that the police function as the coercive 
mechanism of the state and takes this as the starting point for his analysis that the police 
symbolise ‘Leviathan enacted’ (Manning 1977: 4).
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 Manning presents a functionalist argument 
which suggests that the police represent the guarantors of social and political order within a 
modern society and that it is in relation to their symbolic ‘capacity to deter citizens from 
committing acts that threaten the order they are believed to symbolize’ that they derive a 
‘powerful instrumentality’ and institutional legitimacy (Ibid: 6). Manning summarises this 
idyllic ‘myth’ of modern policing in the following terms:  
‘The police have become controlling factors in everyday life; they construct in many respects the 
meanings imputed to social control and to social order; they are implicitly trusted and invested 
with legitimacy in nearly all segments of society; and they control the available information by 
which citizens construct at least some measure of their notions about the quality of life.’ 
(Manning 1977: 10) 
 
The reality of public policing in modern (and subsequently in post-modern
146
) societies is 
markedly different from this idyllic representation and it is in relation to the evident disconnect 
between the ‘public’ and the ‘private meanings’ of police work that the ontological insecurity of 
modern police organisations and their practitioners becomes visible. Manning writes that one of 
the preeminent ‘institutional contradictions of the structural position of policing in Anglo-
American societies’ is that the legitimacy of this institution is linked with its perceived capacity 
to oversee the maintenance of general order but this function of policing is inevitably 
compromised by the institution’s law enforcement function which requires it to ‘act in the 
interest of the powerful and the authoritative against those without power and without access to 
the means of power’ (Ibid: 6).  In other words, Manning suggests that by working to maintain 
general order, the police are actually performing a specific order maintenance function that 
inevitably contributes to the marginalisation of certain segments of society (Ibid: 111). The 
conflation of the general and the specific ordering functions of public policing effectively 
undermine the projected ‘myth’ that this institution is responsive to the public.  
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 Manning (2010) incorporates these arguments into his later work while also takes into account various 




While this law enforcement function might appear to render the police accountable to the 
interests of the powerful, Manning acknowledges that in practice the police enforce laws 
selectively due to the significant degree of discretion that is afforded to police practitioners 
working at all levels of this organisation (Ibid: 6; see also Goldsmith 1990; McBarnet  1979; 
Walker 2000).  The decision to enforce a specific law amounts to a decision to ‘use the law to 
legitimate an organizational decision’ argues Manning (1977: 111) who concludes that this 
selective law enforcement capacity renders the police ‘above the law’ rather than its servants. 
This implies that while the activities of modern police organisations contribute to the 
preservation of a status quo that serves the interests of the powerful, this is not their primary 
function or objective. Rather, Manning suggests that the primary objective of modern police 
organisations is self-preservation or institutional survival for the purpose of ‘maintain[ing] the 
deference granted by others’ (Ibid: 33). Manning concludes that police work is ultimately 
responsive to an institutional subculture and suggests that ‘[t]he significant others of the 
policemen – in social psychological terms, those to whom they address their actions, and from 
whom they expect rewards and sanctions – seem to be their fellow officers in considerable 
measure’ (Ibid: 15). 
It is in relation to these institutionally-structured definitions of modern policing that Manning 
applies the dramaturgical metaphor to police work. His analysis suggests that police subculture 
roughly equates with the ‘back regions’ of modern police organisations while the various 
presentational strategies that police practitioners utilise to convey their enduring relevance and 
function generate various fronts (Ibid: 32). Accordingly, Manning writes that ‘[t]he police are 
dramatic actors and they must wrestle collectively and individually with the salient dramatic 
dilemmas of their role and occupation’ (Ibid: 17). Important presentational strategies utilised by 
Anglo-American police organisations generally focus on the ‘mandate and mission of the 
organization’ argues Manning  and include ‘the professionalism rhetoric’ and ‘the utilisation of 
scientific management systems’, ‘the bureaucratic ideal’, ‘technology’, and ‘crime statistics’ as 
prominent examples (Ibid: 34, 127-138). In describing the presentational value of 
professionalism, Manning writes that ‘[e]xternally, professionalism functions to define the 
nature of the client, to maintain social distance with the clientele, and to define the purposes, the 
conventions, and the motivations of the practitioners’. ‘[I]nternally’, he adds that 
professionalism ‘functions to unify the diverse interests and elements that exist within any 
occupational or organizational group’ (Ibid: 129). This accounts for why employing 
presentational strategies and projecting them to external audiences allows the police to ‘mediate 




public view and also how the internal projection of presentational strategies via police 
subculture provides the organisation with an important source of cohesion and control over its 
members.  
Internal cohesion and control within an organisational setting serves as a necessary prerequisite 
for effective external dramaturgical performance but this can be problematic given ‘the actual 
process and patterns of social interaction that can be observed in a police department’ (Manning 
1977: 139-140).  This has to do with the fact that the ‘organizational realities’ and ‘shared 
assumptions’ that ultimately structure police officers’ perceptions and dramaturgical projections 
of the police mandate and police work are continuously negotiated in the back region through 
police subculture. This implies that police subculture cannot be viewed as static but rather it is a 
contested field and Manning argues that various ‘interactive arenas’ exist within this 
organisation such as ‘the domain of procedural rules’ or institutional norms (Ibid: 40).  
These ‘interactive arenas’ can be analysed as contact zones because they represent important 
loci at which police work is defined, contested and constructed through social and symbolic 
interaction. The collective meanings that emerge from these contact zones affect the operational 
habitus of policing and thus, the ways in which police officers perform police work for internal 
and external audiences alike. It is therefore necessary to consider that dramaturgical projections 
of police organisations cannot be reduced to the ‘rational depiction of instrumental aims’ but 
rather, these performances serve as institutionally-constructed veneers which mask the 
negotiated character of police subculture as a contact zone. 
While Manning (1977) applies the dramaturgical metaphor to account for police work in the 
Anglo-American context, his emphasis on police subculture as the primary source of internal 
cohesion and control suggests that this dynamic effects modern, bureaucratic police 
organisations in other contexts.  The transferability of this sociological framework is supported 
by Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012: 26) work which acknowledges that police subcultures are 
partially shaped by local contextual circumstances but argues that ‘there remains a family 
resemblance among subcultures of policing around the world’ meaning that a ‘transnational 
subculture of policing’ exists.  This is to suggest that the subculture of each police organisation 
fosters its owns definitions for police work which reflect cultural, contextual and situational 
factors but that these definitions are also similarly constructed with respect to the institutions’ 




Manning (1977) suggests that it is the need for this institution to maintain a cohesive front that   
renders the police resistant to externally imposed changes (Ibid: 336).  He further distinguishes 
between ‘two general modes of policy’ that effect police organisations: ‘informal, tacit, 
inarticulated responses to the dilemmas of policing’ and ‘formal policy…dealing with external 
issues’ (Ibid: 342).  It is the significant degree of individual discretion afforded to police 
practitioners and the lack of transparency characteristic of police work that enables individual 
officers to implement formal policies selectively and in ways that advance their interests within 
this organisational setting. Thus, in order for formal policies to gain purchase within this 
interactive arena and affect the operational habitus of police work, they must be incorporated 
into the ‘domain of procedural rules’ (Ibid: 40). 
Lacking access to these contact zones, international reformers inevitably struggle to participate 
in these negotiations and are thus reliant on members of the police organisation to champion 
their proposals. Accordingly, these champions take on an important translational function as 
they are left to selectively interpret the reformer’s prescriptions for change and promote them 
within these interactive arenas in ways that reflect their own interpretations and interests. One 
can therefore analyse the processes by which police reforms are introduced to police 
organisations and incorporated into the operational habitus of police work as policy translations. 
Studying internationally-driven police reforms as policy translations promises to elaborate on 
the micro-politics of why these initiatives often fail to generate their intended outputs and 
outcomes.  
In linking the dramaturgical metaphor to Lendvai and Stubb’s (2007) work on ‘policy 
translation’ and Pratt’s (1991) discussion of ‘contact zones’, I define ‘dramaturgical translation’ 
as the process of purposively manipulating the perceptions and expectations of others for the 
purpose of advancing or sustaining a projected definition of one’s self, role or situation. Before I 
proceed to apply this framework to my analysis of community policing in Sarajevo Canton, it is 
necessary to acknowledge that the dramaturgical metaphor is not the only possible framework 
for pursuing a constructivist analysis of police reforms as policy translations. With my analysis, 
I merely wish to demonstrate that a symbolic interactionist approach is particularly well-suited 
for examining the ways in which local police practitioners shape ‘interactive arenas’ or ’contact 
zones’ that define the habitus of police work in Sarajevo Canton and BiH.
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theory and acknowledges the possibility that social and political actions and interventions can 





10.2 Community Policing as a Presentational Strategy 
The concerted efforts of community police officers in Sarajevo Canton to promote their function 
to internal and external audiences represented an important translational exercise that can be 
analysed using Goffman’s (1956) dramaturgical metaphor. The work of these officers was 
evidently dramaturgical insofar as the diverse range of practices and activities that officers 
engaged in were all designed to manage impressions (Ibid: 132), achieve acceptance and to 
‘sustain the definition of the situation that [their] performance[s] fostere[d]’ (Ibid: 87). In this 
section, I explore the ways in which the officers from RPZ1 successfully translated their 
‘information sharing’ function into an effective dramaturgical performances that served to 
generate subcultural acceptance for their role amongst colleagues, increase their authority, and 
preserve their autonomy within this organisational context. I argue that this was achieved by 
using strategic performances and audience segmentation to link the community policing role 
with an ‘internal’ communications function (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) that complemented 
existing subcultural definitions of police work as ‘crime fighting’.  With the remainder of this 
section, I examine the extent to which the team utilised dramaturgy to enhance their operational 
mandate for community policing through their interactions with external audiences including 
local ‘partners’ throughout the community and international organisations. Collectively, these 
internal and external performances afforded the officers from RPZ1 the ability to negotiate and 
construct a functional platform for carrying out community police work in ways that reflected 
their individual and collective interpretations of the RPZ role. 
10.2.1 Performing for Colleagues  
In attempting to demonstrate their instrumental utility to colleagues and supervisors at their 
station, the community police officers from RPZ1 utilised their ‘information sharing’ role as 
part of an effective presentational strategy that involved linking abstract values like ‘trust’ and 
‘partnership’ to established subcultural expectations of police work. This involved generating 
intelligence that would actively contribute to the stations’ crime fighting activities. RPZ1 
                                                                                                                                                           
becoming’ (Henry and McAra 2012: 341).  This concept was formally introduced to the 
criminological lexicon in a special issue of Criminology & Criminal Justice published in September 
2012 and I have not had the opportunity to fully-integrate its specific terminology into my analysis 
or to fully explore its conceptual linkages to the police translation literature. The idea of ‘negotiated 
orders’ does however appear to be entirely compatible with the structural-constructivist 
epistemology advocated by Bourdieu (1989) and Lendvai and Stubbs (2006) and thus, a promising 





utilised a number of different methods to present their intelligence to colleagues including a 
crime map and a daily affairs board that were prescribed by the SDC. During my first day of 
observation with RPZ1, one of the officers explained that the team was currently using a colour 
coded system to map out recent incidents of automobile thefts and a string of recent bet shop 
robberies in the municipality. The officer explained that bet shops presented ‘easy targets’ for 
armed robbers because they would keep about 30,000 KM
148
  on premises yet their owners 
neglected to provide any security or to purchase CCTV cameras because this money was 
insured and it was therefore more economical to simply write off these losses. Using the crime 
map, the officer explained that the team was able to work with its station commander to identify 
clusters of activity and to strategically position uniformed patrol officers near potential hot spots 
as a means for preventing future incidents (field notes, 7 March 2011). 
It was also evident that the officers from RPZ1 drew upon this network of partners to generate 
criminal intelligence on specific incidents.  This was evident in relation to another event that I 
observed: an attempted bank robbery that took place approximately 200 meters from the police 
station where we were sat drinking coffee. My field notes record the incident: 
‘Our discussion is then interrupted by a call over the radio...An armed bank robbery is in progress 
a few blocks away. The room becomes very tense. We wait for a while as the officers listen to the 
call. After a few minutes of listening they decide to respond. “Come on they say.” [Two officers] 
run ahead while I follow about 20 paces behind with [a third officer]. We are on the hunt for an 
armed robbery suspect… 
…We reach the team's car and drive a few blocks, get out and walk over to the scene of the 
incident, all the time the officers are scanning for possible suspicious individuals. The mood is 
tense but their guns are not drawn so I assume this means that they do not think the suspect is a 
threat if confronted. We stand around for a while, [two of the officers] talk with other [colleagues] 
who arrived at the scene before [we return] to the car and drive around in search of the 
nondescript subject….One officer notes that if the suspect isn't found [RPZ1] will go around and 
ask for information.  
[Later that day] We sit around drinking coffee for a while when all of a sudden [the] three officers 
start getting a bunch of phone calls. Then they start calling people. About 10 minutes later, 
without much sense of enthusiasm or achievement one of the officers announces, ‘that was a 
local shop owner who called …He gave us intelligence on the attempted bank robber from earlier. 
We know who he is now’. I ask the officer would he have given this information to any patrol 
officer. ‘No, because he doesn't trust that they will keep his identity secret’ he said. (field notes, 7 
March 2011) 
[The next day one of the officers] states that once they received the information yesterday, they 
filed a report with the criminal investigation/intelligence unit which should lead to an arrest very 
soon.’ (field notes, 8 March 2011) 
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From an interactionist perspective, the decision of the officers from RPZ1 to respond to this 
incident was significant as it allowed the officers to communicate to their audience (rank-and-
file colleagues) that they were still real police officers. Their presence on the scene was not 
essential and nor was it expected but it allowed the officers to publicly reaffirm their credibility 
as police officers and communicate the idea that community police work and ‘traditional’ police 
are compatible and complementary. Their guns represented important props for the 
performance, referent symbols of police identity meant to outwardly display their legitimate 
status and coercive powers as police officers.   
RPZ1’s decision to respond to the incident and draw upon their contacts to generate intelligence 
in support of a criminal investigation was also intended to convey the strategic utility of 
community policing to their colleagues because it highlighted the unique capacity of RPZ 
officers to solicit sensitive information from the public. Key to this performance was their 
capacity to exercise discretion in treating an informant’s call as an anonymous tip. The message 
that this sent to colleagues was that knowledgeable informants were willing to come forward 
with intelligence when dealing with RPZ specialists because their discretion meant that they 
could be trusted not to file an official report or subsequently force the informant to make an 
official statement. While it was true that patrol officers were not actually required to include 
personal details of an informant in their incident reports, one of the station supervisors for RPZ1 
suggested that many people were still hesitant to report incidents to regular police officers 
because they were not aware of this fact. Thus, the officer suggested that the public continued to 
associate their practices with the Yugoslav system whereby the personal details of an informant 
were required information. RPZ officers were for this reason more successful in soliciting this 
information from the public because they promoted the idea that they could be trusted 
(interview, ‘RPZ1 Supervisor’, 4 April 2011).   
RPZ1 was also successful in brokering information within their station because their Sector 
Chief had initially afforded them the operational autonomy necessary for developing a network 
of partners throughout the community that fed them this type of intelligence.  Using this 
network to contribute to ‘traditional’ policing activities provided the officers from RPZ1 with a 
strategy for validating the ‘specialist’ label that the SDC ascribed to them. It also helped the 
officers from RPZ1 to differentiate their role from that of ‘traditional’ sector based patrol 
officers who continued to function as neighbourhood police officers in Sarajevo Canton yet did 
so using a model of response-based policing which seemingly prevented them from developing 




The practice of presenting the role of community policing to colleagues in ways that would 
resonate with existing subcultural understandings and expectations of policing was important 
for three reasons. First, translating vague and unfamiliar concepts like ‘security marketing’, 
‘information sharing’ and ‘transactional analysis’ into practices that complemented established 
subcultural roles for police work rendered them accessible to other police officers who began to 
accept this function and were subsequently less dismissive of the significant degree of discretion 
afforded to RPZ1. This meant that the officers from RPZ1 could continue to enjoy their 
operational autonomy while simultaneously retaining their credibility as police officers in the 
eyes of their colleagues.  As one of the officers from RPZ1 described, it was previously the case 
that many of the patrol officers assumed that community police officers would use their time to 
‘go and drink coffee at a shopping centre’ however these performances allowed the officers to 
convey the fact that even seemingly recreational activities formed an important part of the 




Second, these performances served to legitimise the role of RPZ officers in the eyes of senior 
managers who otherwise struggled to incorporate the preventative and partnership-based 
orientations of community policing into existing performance management systems utilised by 
the Sarajevo Canton Police. Lacking a functional methodology for measuring the impact of 
community policing within their stations, it was evident from the experience of other RPZ units 
that station commanders were disinclined to provide these officers with necessary resources 
unless they were confident that this expenditure would have a positive impact on communicable 
police statistics or generate positive media coverage in relation to high profile incidents. RPZ1’s 
success in translating the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing into an adjunct to the 
traditional crime fighting mentality enabled the officers to secure additional resources that 
further enhanced their productivity and thus allowed them to spend more time dealing with 
‘partners’ in the community’.  For example, RPZ1’s sector chief allowed the team to use his 
personal laptop to type up problem reports and to develop a local manual for community 
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 A conversation with one of the officers from RPZ1 indicates additional reinforcement of the idea that 
community policing was real police work was achieved during an SDC sponsored team building 
event the previous summer where patrol officers and community police officers from RPZ1 
participated in various activities and exercises that, according to one member of RPZ1, ‘helped to 
improve understanding of the CBP role’ with the effect that ‘now the patrol officers see [us] as full 
colleagues, not ‘others’’ (par. personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011). The officer did not 
provide specific details of what these exercises actually involved but it is likely that they were 




policing that complemented the one which was published by the SDC.
150
 Having access to this 
computer was also significant because it allowed the officers to avoid waiting in long queues in 
order to use one of the limited numbers of shared computers at their station (personal 
communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).   
Third, these performances ensured that the officers from RPZ1 continued to enjoy a significant 
degree of operational autonomy that enabled them to conduct community policing on their own 
schedule. This meant that the officers were flexible in terms of the hours that they worked and 
this flexibility afforded them the opportunity to regularly attend local community meetings that 
would often take place outside their normal working hours.
151
 This autonomy allowed the 
officers to designate their own operational priorities, in this case implementing the SDC’s 
‘Civilian Courage’ programme in local schools to promote ‘transactional analysis’.  
One of the earliest priorities prescribed for community policing in Sarajevo Canton by the SDC 
involved youth outreach because, as one RPZ officer explained, ‘youth do not respect the 
police, especially teenagers in Grades 6, 7 and 8’ (interview, ‘RPZ3’, 5 April 2011).
152
 By 
promoting positive interactions between community police officers and school children at an 
even younger age, the SDC believed that these officers could potentially alter the perceptions of 
future generations of citizens towards the police and work to correct its tarnished, adversarial 
image. Building on their notion that partnership represented a necessary component of 
community police work, the SDC also envisioned that these interventions would serve to 
communicate values like personal responsibility and the consequences of individual actions to 
these children in an effort to promote greater responsibility amongst members of the 
community. This belief was evidently shared by an officer from RPZ1 who suggested, ‘these 
kids are at a crucial junction where in 2-5 years they will choose whether they become citizens 
or criminals’ (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 15 March 2011). Accordingly, the SDC hired 
an ‘organisational psychologist’ from Switzerland to develop a curriculum for these officers to 
implement in local schools that was based on the ‘theory’ of transactional analysis with its 
notion that ‘human beings are essentially good’, ‘everyone has the ability to think’ and ‘humans 
can influence their own fate and can, therefore, influence the outcome of events’ (Swiss Agency 
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 The process of the local officers taking initiative in creating their own handbook for the RPZ role in 
Sarajevo Canton was particularly symbolic of their ability to redefine this role in relation to the 
local  rather than international frameworks for community policing. 
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 The ‘normal’ working hours for community police officers were from 07:30 – 16:00 however these 
meetings would frequently take place between 18:00 and 19:00 (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 
7 March 2011).   
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for Development and Cooperation 2010: 30).
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 This programme was titled ‘Civilian Courage’ 
and it consisted of a number of games and trust building exercises that were designed to be 
implemented by RPZ officers in local schools. 
In March 2011, I attended one of the ‘Civilian Courage’ sessions organised by three of the 
officers from RPZ1 at a local primary school. The officers began the session by greeting 
approximately 20 students aged between 10 and 12 years old and distributing promotional hats 
and t-shirts featuring the ‘Civilian Courage’ logo that had been paid for by the SDC.  Following 
two ice breaker exercises, the officers introduced a third activity that required the children to 
critically reflect about different types of harms:  
‘A scale '0', '25', '50', '75' and '100' is laid out on the floor in the centre of the room in order of 
increasing relevance/severity. All the groups are given a [behaviour] (theft, rape, etc) and they 
are told to indicate using the scale on the floor how severe it is. The first group to go has 'rape'. A 
boy proceeds to place his paper on '50' and this stirs up some debate. I turn to [one of the 
officers] and tell him that I think this exercise is a bit problematic because these kids are very 
young and probably do not really understand what rape really means. He nods and shrugs his 
shoulders…As the kids each place their card with a violent action on the floor, [another officer] 
stands in the middle and leads a discussion about the activity and challenges [the students] when 
they don’t rate [an issue] highly enough. By the end of the exercise every option is being ranked 
at 100…The only issue which provokes any real debate between the kids is 'boxing' with many of 
the girls indicating that it is violent while the boys seem to suggest it is a sport.’ (field notes, 9 
March 2011) 
 
My observation of this exercise suggests that the officers demonstrated initiative in terms of 
taking the lead in coordinating these exercises and using the occasion to interact with the 
children however it also led me to question the value of this exercise as a method for conveying 
the underlying themes prescribed for transactional analysis. In other words, if one were to 
analyse this interaction as a form of neo-liberal governmentality, it did not appear to be 
particularly effective. Notably, the officers’ role in facilitating the discussion and correcting the 
students appeared to negate the purpose of the actual lesson which was to encourage the 
students to actively reflect upon hypothetical issues like ‘rape’ or ‘boxing’ in a critical and 
empathetic manner. I subsequently raised this concern with one of the officers from RPZ1 who 
acknowledged the challenges that the team faced in attempting to implement this programme 
yet remained adamant about their reasons for doing so: 
‘….many of these kids, they lack family structure, many due to the war which destroyed many 
families and created single parent situations….CBP officers work to show these kids a normal life 
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and the risks associated with criminal behaviour….the real challenge is convincing them of the 
negative aspects of a criminal lifestyle given the reality of life in BiH where they see criminals 
driving around in Mercedes with girls while citizens are forced to work long hours and at the end 
of the month their paycheck is never enough.’ (par. personal communication with ‘RPZ1’, 
15 March 2011) 
 
This suggests that the officers lacked the specialist knowledge to successfully translate the 
‘Civilian Courage’ programme into age and context appropriate lessons and it is therefore 
difficult to gauge whether they actually made a meaningful and long term impact in terms of 
shaping the mentalities of local school children. Analysed as a series of performances, however, 
the officers’ decision to devote their time to implementing the Civilian Courage programme 
demonstrated their ability to capitalise on the operational autonomy that their internal 
performances had afforded them as a platform and shape definitions of police work inherent to 
the RPZ role.  
Ever circumspect with their performances, the officers from RPZ1 recognised that their work 
with schools was potentially problematic in that these performances appeared to contradict their 
attempts to portray community police work as real police work. Specifically, the officers from 
RPZ1 were aware of their emerging reputation as ‘school police’ amongst colleagues and senior 
police managers working at other police stations in the Canton (personal communication, 
‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2012). Within their own station, however, they were able to maintain their 
credibility as real police officers while continuing to perform as ‘school police’ due to the 
support of their station chief. Effective use of ‘impression management’ (Goffman 1956: 132) 
also helped them to convey that the time they spent on ‘Civilian Courage’ did not affect their 
ability to use their intelligence sharing role to support ‘crime fighting’.   
10.2.2 Performing for the Community 
Goffman (1956: 42) writes that performers must segment their audiences and alter their 
performance in relation to their diverse expectations.  While the officers from RPZ1 worked to 
translate their information sharing function into practices that might resonate with the existing 
subcultural understandings of police work held by their colleagues and supervisors, they were 
careful to adjust their performances when dealing with partners in the community. These 
external projections were designed to differentiate their RPZ role from the image of their patrol-
based colleagues in the Sarajevo Canton Police. This process involved making informal visits to 
different ‘partners’ and maintaining open channels of communication that these individuals 




efforts were focused on school administrators
154
, the officers also engaged with a variety of 
other organisations including community centres, local businesses, religious institutions and 
local charities. For example, one of the officers explained how the team had built a relationship 
with ‘a Catholic theology school, a large church and several mosques in the municipality’ and 
that the leaders of these institutions, who were provided with the officers’ personal mobile 
phone numbers, would come to them ‘all the time’ with problems (par. personal 
communication. ‘RPZ1’, 8 March 2011).
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Another example of RPZ1’s efforts to promote community policing through relationship 
building that I observed first hand involved assisting a local charitable organisation that 
provided day care services and socialisation for residents of the municipality with various 
mental disabilities including children and adults. According to the charity’s director, the 
organisation was struggling financially and its income was limited to the profits it generated 
from the sale of handmade crafts and foreign donations. While the officers were open about the 
fact that they lacked the influence to persuade the Cantonal government to step in and provide 
financial support for the organisation, they were able to assist the organisation in other ways 
such as requisitioning police vehicles for collecting supplies, driving children with disabilities to 
picnics and they even took the lead in organising a charity concert that helped to raise money 
for the organisation and promote its work amongst a number of senior police officers and 
officials from the Ministry of the Interior (MUP KS) that attended (field notes, 7-8 March 
2011). The interactions that I observed between the officers and the staff and users of this day 
centre indicated that this partnership was well-established and could accurately be described as 
a ‘friendship’.
156
 It also demonstrated that these officers were willing to actively promote non-
adversarial relations and partnership with segments of the population that were socially 
excluded or ignored by the police.
157
 
From an operational standpoint, it was not immediately evident what was the strategic value of 
this particular partnership for the officers from RPZ1 given that the police were in no position to 
address the financial problems that affected this organisation as the organisation itself did not 
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 During my first week of observation with RPZ1, I attended meetings with school administrators at six 
different schools throughout the municipality (See Appendix 1, Table A1.4). 
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 The officer did not specify whether the church was Catholic or Orthodox and nor did they elaborate on 
the specific nature of these problems. 
156
 This was the term that one of the officers from RPZ1 used to describe the team’s relationship with this 
charity (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011).  
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 Following one of the meetings that I attended between the officers from RPZ1 and an administrator for 
the charity, the officers also explained that the organisation provided support for individuals 
experiencing post-traumatic stress from the war (personal communications, ‘RPZ1’ and ‘Charities 




appear to be a hotbed of criminal intelligence. While it was evident that the officers had taken a 
genuine interest in the organisation and had wilfully decided to prioritise this relationship, one 
of the officers explained that even seemingly tangential partnerships served an important 
communicative function because they helped to improve trust and promote the idea that these 
specialists were approachable and different from regular patrol officers. He explained, if people 
‘see you are interested when there is not a problem, this will build trust….you must always go 
though, not just when you need something’ (added emphasis added personal communication, 
‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011). In other words, the officers from RPZ1 recognised that it was 
necessary to devote a significant amount of time to substantiating their ‘specialist’ identity in 
the eyes of the community and that this needed to be achieved by creating opportunities for non-
adversarial encounters between the public and the RPZ officers.  Without this foundation of 
trust, the officers believed that they would struggle to solicit relevant intelligence when it 
mattered and this would in turn prevent them from marketing their utility to departmental 
colleagues. Accordingly, these performances enabled the officers to strategically project their 
approachability and their service orientation throughout the community. It was also apparent 
that the officers enjoyed these performances and genuinely believed that engaging ignored or 
excluded segments of the community was essential for promoting an accessible image for the 
Sarajevo Canton Police. 
10.2.3 Performing for an International Audience 
The officers from RPZ1 also adjusted their presentational strategy when dealing with 
international organisations including the SDC and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP). Rather than presenting these organisations with an idealised image of community 
policing and suggesting that the unit was fully operational, the officers were keen to draw 
attention to the organisational and structural obstacles that they had experienced and what they 
determined to be threats to the sustainability of this reform. Specifically, they frequently spoke 
of their lack of formal recognition by the Regulation of Job Classification (see Appendix 2) as 
the major impediment to their ability to achieve results with security marketing and they also 
emphasised the importance of operational discretion and supportive senior managers as 
necessary preconditions for the successful implementation of community policing (field notes, 4 
March – 12 April). The issue of sustainability also informed the presentational strategies utilised 
by these officers when interacting with international audiences because the officers knew that 
attracting support from organisations like the SDC and UNDP would serve to strengthen their 
mandates, enhance their access to limited departmental resources and afford them significant 




Somewhat ironically, it was the ‘advanced’ community police officers from RPZ1 and the 
Canton’s RPZ Coordinator who were forthcoming about the challenges they faced. By 
comparison, the officers from RPZ2 were less willing to concede that they might benefit from 
additional support, despite their evident operational deficiencies and scheduling issues. 
The main problem, according to both the officers from RPZ1 and the RPZ Coordinator, was that 
sector chiefs held the power to structure whether and how RPZ officers defined their roles.  
While support from their sector chief was recognised to be a valuable asset for the officers from 
RPZ1, the fact that this individual was held in high regard by the newly installed Minister of the 
Interior was a source of concern for these officers who believed that their Sector Chief might 
soon be promoted to the role of Commissioner.  Their fear was that his replacement might then 
fail to recognise the instrumental value of community police work and that this could jeopardise 
the implicit agreement which afforded them flexible and autonomous working conditions in 
exchange for intelligence (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 7 March 2011; interview, ‘RPZ 
Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).  
These concerns were amplified during my final interview with the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator 
who explained how days earlier RPZ1’s highly supportive Sector Chief had indeed been 
promoted to Chief of Criminal Investigations. The RPZ Coordinator explained that while the 
Chief’s replacement was the Station Commander who was already familiar with community 
policing and accepted this agreement, the individual slotted to replace the Commander was 
‘likely to be brought over from the traffic unit’ meaning that they had limited experience with 
community policing. The RPZ Coordinator suggested that this was problematic because the new 
Commander would be the one to deal with the officers from RPZ1 on a day-to-day basis (par. 
Interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).
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Given that the role of RPZ officers remained informally and perhaps tacitly defined in each 
sector, these officers believed that their progress could only be sustained if the RPZ role was 
formally incorporated into the Regulation of Job Classification (interview, ‘RPZ5’,7April 
2011).  The prospect of the officers achieving this formal recognition without support from an 
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Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 92) also identify changes in leadership as a threat to community policing 
programmes in American cities; however, their discussion focuses on political actors. They write, 
‘[i]n many cities, there has been pressure for rapid implementation of, and quick results from, 
community policing so that incumbents can enjoy the political benefits of the program during their 
term of office’. They also observe that ‘[p]olitical and department leadership changes also threaten 
the success of community policing, as new leaders sweep out the policy debris left behind by old 
ones and institute new programs in their stead’. Building on these claims, they conclude that the 
relatively stability of the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy was linked with ‘the capacity of the 




international advocate like the SDC was problematic because they lacked the political capital to 
introduce these changes and to have them approved by the Police Commissioner, the Cantonal 
Assembly and the MUP KS. The officers had previously voiced these concerns to the SDC’s 
external evaluation team which incorporated them into its recommendation that the SDC’s 
community policing project should be extended through 2011 while its team worked towards 
‘regularizing the CP officers status’ within police organisations throughout BiH (Wisler and 
Traljic 2010: 16). They wrote,  
‘[Due to] [t]he lack of an official status within the organization, with definitive terms of reference, 
rank, numbers….[t]heir involvement in CP activities still depends on the good will of the police 
station chief who might be tempted to request their services for other duties.. New regulations 
should ensure that CP officers are not treated as “second class” police officers and that there are 
enough incentives to keep the best police officers interested in becoming neighbourhood officers. 
Regularizing their status will not just allow Community Policing as a doctrine to be 
institutionalized but will also allowing retaining (sic) the new generation of motivated, experienced 
and skilled officers who were trained by the Project (sic). With a too high turn-over of Community 
Policing officers, the whole philosophy could quickly show poor results and be abandoned 
eventually.’ 159 (Wisler and Traljic 2010: 16) 
 
On the basis of these previous performances and the recommendations they generated, the SDC 
organised a working group in Sarajevo Canton to develop a proposal for introducing these 
changes to the Regulation of Job Classification rulebook in the summer of 2011.
160
 
As a temporary representative of UNDP who was known to be actively working on the Safer 
Communities project
161
, I also represented an audience for the officers’ international 
performances. This was evident from the fact that the officers expressed concerns regarding 
sustainability and the difficulties they encountered in working to develop multi-agency solutions 
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 The report confirms that the officers from RPZ1 and the RPZ Coordinator’s predecessor were amongst 
the interviewees for this national evaluation. While it is impossible to verify whether it was their 
specific interviews generated this recommendation, the excerpt is consistent with the concerns that 
these officers addressed to me as a representative of UNDP during my field work. This report also 
suggests that a similar mentality regarding the importance of achieving formal recognition for 
community policing was shared by other RPZ throughout BiH.  
160
 A Project Associate for the SDC described how these proposed changes were initially approved by the 
MUP KS and the Police Commissioner however ten days later, the Police Commissioner changed 
his stance and sent a formal letter to the SDC which stated that in his opinion, there was no need to 
make these changes. This letter prompted the SDC’s Project Manager to ‘intervene’ and two weeks 
later the Police Commissioner once again changed his stance and decided to approve the changes 
(interview, ‘SDC Project Associate’, 22 June 2011). The changes were subsequently approved by 
the Cantonal Assembly and in July 2011, the specialist role of community policing was officially 
recognised by the Sarajevo Canton Police (Atlantic Initiative, 2011). 
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 I had previously discussed the idea of community safety partnerships in relation to the Safer 
Communities project with both the RPZ Coordinator and two of the officers from RPZ1 at a summit 




to local problems and that they influenced my own view of the field and my own activities as a 
policy translator. Specifically, it impacted the recommendations that I included in two reports 
that I developed for the Safer Communities project during the final weeks of my internship with 
UNDP. 
 The first report was the evaluation report that I submitted to the RPZ Coordinator in April 
2011. In the report, I asserted that in order for community policing to be sustainable, sector 
chiefs must be required to recognise the role of these officers and to afford them greater 
flexibility in terms of their work style given that requiring them to work ‘events such as 
protests…undermines both their professional identity and their capacity to manage their time 
and schedule effectively’ (United Nations Development Programme 2011, ‘internal document’, 
p. 7; see Appendix 2). The second report was my policy brief for the Deputy Mayor of Grad 
Sarajevo. I drew upon my field work with the officers from RPZ1 to evidence the potential 
benefits of introducing the Safer Communities model throughout the city of Sarajevo.  
Specifically, I wrote that establishing these forums might create an impetus for municipal 
agencies to respond to local issues that were brought to their attention by local RPZ officers. I 
wrote: 
‘Based on the findings of a recent assessment of CBP activities (see parallel document 'From 
CSP to CBP')162 in Grad Sarajevo, it is our recommendation that a citizen security forum be 
established in [RPZ1’s municipality] at the earliest possible convenience as the municipality's 
CBP team have already established a functional network of partners throughout the community 
that could be easily integrated into the CSP model. It is clear to us that launching this forum 
would help to reinforce the authority of these CBP officers in the eyes of their partners as well as 
to enhance their capacity to respond to less conventional community safety issues that they 
regularly encounter during the course of their duties. For example, such a forum would provide 
the officers with a functional venue for addressing issues such as stray dogs or poor street 
lighting as it would serve to enhance the transparency of this problem-solving process and create 
additional pressures on key service providers to respond to the community's needs in a timely 
manner.’ (DRAFT Policy Brief… 15 July 2011) 
 
The limited impact of my recommendations indicates that the RPZ officers overestimated my 
influence as a policy translator on their behalf but the examples are useful for highlighting the 
susceptibility of seemingly empowered institutional actors to the dramaturgical performances of 
relatively disempowered local police officers.
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 In this case, I never received an 
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 See Appendix 2. 
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The idea that a researcher functions as a translator is described by Churchill (2005: 3) who describes 
‘the ‘ethnographer’s mind …as a transitional space which in the act of translating field data into an 
analytic report (1) poses unique challenges to the ethnography’s claims for providing an accurate 




acknowledgement of receipt for the first report submitted to the RPZ Coordinator and my 
recommendations were ultimately omitted from the final version of the second report by the 
Safer Communities Project Manager.  
10.2.4 Flawed Performances 
While the officers from RPZ1 were highly successful in using dramaturgy to translate the 
SDC’s prescriptions for community policing in ways that advanced their own agenda, other 
units struggled to replicate their success. This was particularly evident in relation to RPZ2 
which struggled to convey its utility to colleagues and supervisors given that it had struggled to 
establish a network of partners in the community (see Section 9.3). This created a seemingly 
insurmountable paradox whereby the officers from RPZ2 could not establish a functional 
network of partners without support from their sector chief yet the sector chief was unlikely to 
provide them with this support because they could not provide him with a compelling reason to 
do so. Policy translation provided the officers from RPZ1 with a strategy for overcoming this 
dilemma as they were able to market their information sharing function as a model of 
intelligence-oriented policing. The officers from RPZ2 were restricted from capitalising on their 
translational potential and therefore experienced the effects of a growing subcultural rift 
between their unit and their rank-and-file colleagues who were openly dismissive of their 
limited attempts to implement the SDC’s prescriptions.  
One of the officers from RPZ2 who had previously been part of an intervention team described 
how former colleagues would regularly mock them about community policing because they 
considered it to be ‘a very easy job’ that had little to do with policing (personal communication, 
‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2011).
164
 Another member of RPZ2 suggested that since taking on this 
community policing role and working as part of a team, their identity as a police officer had 
suffered because the team-based style of work prevented this individual from regularly 
socialising with former colleagues from patrol and this created a social barrier (personal 
communication, ‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2011). After discussing this rift with one of the officers from 
RPZ1, I learned that this officer had initially experienced similar issues but that they were able 
to improve their relationships with colleagues by working to actively demonstrate the value of 
their work to colleagues (personal communication, ‘RZ1’, 21 March 2011).  
                                                                                                                                                           
survey research cannot’.  In this case, my affiliation and my ongoing role with the Safer 
Communities project also made me a policy translator. 
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 Elsewhere Wood et al. (2004) account for the emasculation of the community policing role as 
hegemonic contestation designed to reaffirm traditional cultural values and definitions of police 




While the officers from RPZ1 actively used internal performances to continuously convey their 
utility to colleagues, the officers from RPZ2 were overly dependent on common referent 
symbols to reaffirm their status as police officers. This was evident from a conversation that I 
had with two of the officers from RPZ2 about whether community police officers should wear 
different uniforms and carry a gun. My argument at the time was that wearing the same 
uniforms as patrol officers was problematic because it made it difficult for members of the 
public to differentiate between these two different roles. I also suggested the carrying a gun also 
appeared to be irrelevant for community police work and that it potentially conflicted with the 
non-adversarial image that the officers were trying to present. However, the officers were 
dismissive of my suggestions and it was evident that they were protective of their uniforms and 
their firearms because without these symbols, they feared that they would lose the respect of 
their colleagues and an important source of authority when dealing with members of the public 
(personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 15 March 2011). In retrospect, I am sympathetic to the 
officers’ perspective given that the loss of these props risked delegitimising their status as real 
police officers capable of exercising legitimate coercion in their capacity as problem-solvers.  
This protective mentality and the officers’ unwillingness to fully embrace the role of RPZ 
officers also served to discredit their performances to external audiences. This resistance was 
evident from their unsuccessful attempts to utilise security marketing described in Section 9.3. It 
was also evident from their hands-off approach to implementing the ‘Civilian Courage’ 
programme at a local school. Whereas the officers from RPZ1 took the lead in introducing the 
session and running the activities, the officers from RPZ2 asked the school’s psychologist and a 
teacher to lead the exercises while they walked around the room taking photographs. One of the 
officers would later justify their passive approach by suggesting that both the psychologist and 
the teacher had already received their certificates in ‘Civilian Courage’ from the SDC so they 
were qualified to lead the session and more capable of doing so because these students were 
only between the age of 8 and 10 (personal communication, ‘RPZ2’, 16 March 2011).  This lack 
of engagement not only prevented these officers from capitalising on this opportunity to present 
a positive ‘front’ to potential partners and young citizens but it also conflicted with the 
performances of their colleagues from RPZ1. 
Restricted by their paradoxical inability to gain the acceptance of either their colleagues or 
members of the public, the officers from RPZ2 devoted a significant part of their free time 
working to mask these deficiencies using shallow and unconvincing dramaturgical 




‘advanced’ as their colleagues from RPZ1. I witnessed one such performance during a meeting 
attended by all of the RPZ units in Sarajevo. The meeting was organised by the Canton’s RPZ 
Coordinator and held at RPZ2’s station. As members of one of the two most experienced RPZ 
units in the Canton, the officers from RPZ2 were asked to present their work to their colleagues 
in order to share their ‘best practices’ and demonstrate the potential uses and benefits of security 
marketing. The flaws of this performance as perceived by the other officers in the room were 
evident from their incredulous and discourteous reactions to the presentation by RPZ2’s most 
veteran officer.  
During this presentation, the officer reviewed a number of RPZ2’s ‘project reports’ using a slide 
show to demonstrate the extent to which the team had previously incorporated the security 
marketing method into their routine. It was clear however that the officer’s attempts to illustrate 
their different examples actually served to discredit this performance because they relied upon 
highly stylised photographs of the three officers participating in various public relations events 
that appeared to have little to do with the issues the officer was actually describing. Rather, 
these photos showed the officers posing with each other during different media events and 
members of the public participating in activities like ‘Civilian Courage’ but they failed to show 
the officers interacting with members of the community. The audience’s scepticism was evident 
from its laughter which ultimately prompted the RPZ Coordinator to dismiss the officer from 
the podium and finish the presentation himself (field notes, 17 March 2011).  
While the officers from RPZ1 partially attributed the shortcomings of their colleagues from 
RPZ2 to their questionable suitability for the RPZ role (personal communication, ‘RPZ1’, 21 
March 2011), it was also evident that directorial issues also served to discredit their 
performances. For RPZ in Sarajevo Canton, the RPZ Coordinator assumed the role of the 
director but appeared to be more interested in attracting an audience than actually staging a 
compelling show. Lacking the authority to assert the autonomy of the RPZ units within their 
stations and the organisational influence necessary to compel their sector chiefs to do so, the 
RPZ Coordinator defined his role primarily as working with these RPZ units to generate 
publicity for their work through public engagements and media events. During our final 
interview, the RPZ Coordinator openly compared his role to that of a ‘king’s jester’ because he 
would ‘go around and entertain people in order to sell people on [community policing]’ 
(interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).  
The instrumental rationale underpinning the RPZ Coordinator’s emphasis on promotional 




of community policing and that this awareness would translate into a public mandate that would 
in turn support the work of these officers. Accordingly, all of the RPZ units participated in 
various media events that were organised by the RPZ Coordinator such as a parade for the 
Sarajevo Kids Festival, a social networking event known as a ‘human library’ that was 
organised by a local student art-house cafe, and an open day for local school children at the 
headquarters for the Sarajevo Canton SWAT team which was organised in partnership with the 
European Union Police Mission (EUPM) (field notes, March, June-July 2011). The RPZ 
Coordinator readily acknowledged that individual RPZ units needed to continuously 
demonstrate their operational effectiveness to the public in order to sustain this front yet he 
continued to advocate this promotional strategy despite his recognition of the operational 
shortcomings of a number of RPZ units that either lacked support from their superiors or had 
failed to embrace their role as RPZ officers (interview, ‘RPZ Coordinator’, 13 April 2011).  
 
10.3 Discussion  
Dramaturgical translation represents an important mechanism of ‘policy translation’ for 
recipients of micro-level police reforms in developing and transitional societies.  In other words, 
dramaturgy provides these practitioners with a ‘process of formation, transformation and 
contestation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 15) through which they can mediate externally-defined 
models in ways that advance their individual and collective interests within an organisational 
setting. Dramaturgical interactions and audience segmentation enabled the officers from RPZ1 
to translate the SDC’s prescriptions for community policing into concepts, norms and practices 
that advanced their individual and collective interests within this organisational setting. These 
meanings became ‘institutionalized in terms of the abstract stereotypical expectations to which 
[they gave rise]’ (Goffman 1956: 17). In this respect, the interactions between the officers from 
RPZ1, their colleagues, supervisors, various partners and international organisations can all be 
analysed as ‘interactive arenas’ (Manning 1977: 40) equivalent to contact zones because these 
negotiated spaces allowed the officers to use their performances to construct a desirable 
definition of community policing that was ultimately accepted by colleagues and supervisors.  
With reference to Johnston and Shearing’s (2006) model of nodal security governance, it was 
also evident that these officers were able to strategically use dramaturgical performances to 
navigate hierarchical power structures in ways that served to amplify their status and power 




prescribed information sharing function into risk communications that were accessible to 
colleagues who subscribed to narrow subcultural definitions of police work (Ericson and 
Haggerty 1997). This afforded them operational autonomy, enabled them to operate out with 
established performance management systems, and allowed them to bypass the chain of 
command in utilising security marketing. Dramaturgical performances to external audiences 
were also important because they allowed the officers to successfully contrast themselves with 
the bureaucratic and adversarial image of the Sarajevo Canton Police and to affect the work of a 
powerful international organisation such as the SDC.  
In seeking to elaborate on the ways in which ‘creativity’ and ‘problem-solving’ enable field 
operators to act as policy mediators, one must first account for their contributory function to 
glocally-responsive forms of local policing. I argue that the notions of ‘field operators’ as 
‘knowledge workers’ and ‘policing’ as ‘risk communications’ (Ericson and Haggerty 1997) are 
key to understanding the important function of these local actors in potentially mitigating 
potential harms associated with neo-liberal globalisation. Specifically, my case study illustrates 
that forms of intra-organisational knowledge work have an important impact on dramaturgical 
translations than affect the contours of externally-defined prescriptions for reform.    
While global policing is essentially a macro-structural theory of control in the age of 
globalisation, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 73-77) acknowledge that the ‘global cops’ and 
international liaison officers who perpetuate this paradigm and work to advance its agenda(s) 
utilise ‘glocal’ networks to do so. As noted in Chapter Three, these glocal networks are 
populated by an array of actors who collectively foster these transmissions, yet do so 
selectively. From the perspective of the policy entrepreneurs who contribute to the global 
dissemination of Western models of policing, field operators including local police practitioners 
represent the ‘end users’ of knowledge exchanges.
165
  In other words, the ‘global cops’ who 
pursue glocally-responsive police reforms aspire to align the habitus of local field operators 
with the interests and mentalities of global policing and global liberal governance. Construed as 
neo-liberal processes of governmentality, their actions are said to allow powerful global 
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 This assertion is based on Brogden and Nijhar’s (2005: 3) discussion of the ‘export’ of Western 
policing models and the lack of data on the impact of these models/reforms. The absence of such 
data is indicative of an underlying mentality whereby reformers view their role as improving the 
operational capacities of local practitioners rather than contributing to improvements in the 
governance of security as a public good. Accordingly, the reformer is less concerned with the 
effects that their models have on local communities but rather the ability of local practitioners to 
implement them effectively.  This mentality is evident from the SDC’s 2010 evaluation report (see 
Wisler and Traljic 2010) which was clearly oriented towards measuring effective implementation 




architects of global liberal governance like the European Union (EU) to manipulate local 
security politics from a distance (Ryan 2011). Police reforms pursued in the context of neo-
liberal globalisation can therefore be analysed as mechanisms for managing and controlling risk 
at the ‘glocal’ level. This process is essential for the preservation of global liberal order in the 
age of globalisation. It is also indicative of a glocalised variant of Ericson and Haggerty’s 
(1997) discussion of policing as a risk communication in the age of neo-liberal governance. 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997) argue that the societal function of the public police has been 
fundamentally transformed in response to the underlying mentalities of neo-liberalism and that 
contemporary policing serves as a form of ‘knowledge work’.
166
 ‘Policing’, they write, ‘consists 
of the public police coordinating their activities with police agents in all other institutions to 
provide a society-wide basis for risk management (governance) and security (guarantees against 
loss)’ (Ibid: 3)’. This emphasis on coordination implies that knowledge work occurs through 
networks amounts to a process of linking various nodes for the purpose of generating a cohesive 
basis for social order. 
Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 26) identify both an internal and an external dimension to policing 
as knowledge work.  Within the police organisation, they argue that knowledge work focuses on 
‘[ensuring] that knowledge is provided in proper form’ through paperwork and documentation 
exercises ‘with an eye toward ‘covering ass’’ (Ibid: 21). Externally, Ericson and Haggerty, they 
add that contemporary policing is increasingly structured by ‘external demands for knowledge’ 
whereby ‘the police not only distribute knowledge widely but also make their own actions 
highly visible in producing that knowledge’ (Ibid: 26-27).
167
 Police officers are therefore 
described as ‘knowledge workers’ insofar as they serve as important agents of risk 
communication in networks of institutions that are collectively responsible for governing 
security (Ibid: 19).
168
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 Subsequent work by Brodeur (2010: 3) challenges the idea that various agents of policing function as a 
cohesive network however, the functionalist logic of Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997) theory is most 
consistent with that of Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) theory of global policing.  My emphasis on 
mediation and translational processes provides empirical illustration of both accounts however it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to address this debate in fuller detail.  
167
 The emphasis on making this knowledge work ‘highly visible; is suggestive of Manning’s (1977) 
discussion of the dramaturgy of police work.  
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 Ericson and Haggerty (1997: 25) write that ‘[a]n institution consists of the relations, processes, and 




Ericson and Haggerty’s (1997: 29) discussion of policing in the ‘risk society’ theorises greater 
connectivity between public police organisations and ‘externally driven social purposes’.
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With reference to the paradigms of global liberal governance and global policing, neo-liberal 
globalisation accounts for one such ‘externally driven social purpose’ that has significant 
implications for domestic institutions of governance in weak and structurally dependent 
societies. This is particularly evident in relation to externally-driven police reforms which Ryan 
(2011: 68) describes as part of ‘a strategy to produce consensus’ whereby ‘[t]he police officer, 
in theory, is therefore positioned as a nodal point in a network of thin blue lines that, if 
adequately connected, can bind an entire society so that it becomes one thinking unit’. This 
suggests that externally-defined models for glocally-responsive policing including community 
policing and problem-oriented policing provide the architects of global policing (i.e. ‘global 
cops’) with important platforms for instilling the mentalities and practices of risk-oriented 
governance into the habitus of local police organisations. It is through these processes that 
Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 99) argue that the ‘script’ of global policing, with its neo-liberal 
mentalities, ‘transnational’ insecurities and Manichean worldview, becomes instilled within ‘the 
foundational structures of policing in local communities’. With reference to Ericson and 
Haggerty’s (1997: 71) analysis of community policing, one can therefore infer that global 
policing, as a ‘contemporary risk institution’ for global liberal governance, threatens to 
‘constitute, absorb, and even extinguish traditional communities’ with the local police 
practitioners or ‘field operator’ playing an important  role in fostering this process.  
It is evident that the SDC’s programmatic emphasis on ‘security marketing’, ‘SARA’ and 
‘information sharing’ as the key components of its community policing model are consistent 
with the idea that community policing functions (or is intended to function) as a strategy for risk 
communication. Specifically, this model emphasises prevention and the use of technology (e.g. 
‘crime mapping’) to improve the communication of risk both internally within the police and to 
external actors.  Security marketing was particularly important in this respect as it provided the 
RPZ officers with a professional basis for improving their communications network with 
external stakeholders in the community and demonstrating their value as ‘knowledge workers’. 
However,  I argue that the difficulties that the SDC encountered in translating their designs for 
community work into what its workers identified as an effective operational strategy and the 
varied success of different RPZ units working to incorporate elements of these prescriptions into 
effective performances highlights the important mediatory function of ‘field operators’.  
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My analysis of this case study suggests that the RPZ units tasked with implementing the SDC’s 
prescriptions did so in ways that improved their internal stature within the police organisation. 
For example, the ‘peerless’ officers from RPZ1 were selective in how they utilised security 
marketing and information sharing and my analysis of their use of community policing as a 
presentational strategy illustrates the extent to which their habitus was primarily responsive to 
‘internal’ institutional factors (i.e. ‘subculture’) rather than ‘externally driven social purposes’ 
(Ericson and Haggerty 1997: 29) or a subculture of transnational policing. By using 
dramaturgical translation to gain credence from colleagues and supervisors, the officers from 
RPZ1 were able to take ownership of the SDC’s prescriptions and implement them in ways that 
reflected their local knowledge of the community.  For the officers from RPZ1, this allowed 
them to focus on their relations with local schools and devote a significant amount of time to 
non-adversarial activities such as transactional analysis.   
One must further consider that certain articulations of community policing are also consistent 
with deliberative processes and potentially permissive to democratically responsive policing 
outcomes (see Section 3.4). Elsewhere, for example, Aitchison and Blaustein (2013) observe 
that there is a degree of overlap between democratically responsive policing and certain 
philosophical articulations of community policing, particularly in terms of mechanisms which 
stimulate local input into policing priorities and require police to take account of these. A prime 
example can be found in Banton's (1964) The Policeman in the Community which describes the 
seemingly mythical, symbiotic relationship between the police officer and the community via 
the symbolism of the 'bobby-on-the-beat' (also Loader 1997).  Also, Walker (1993: 39) accounts 
for ‘community policing’ as ‘a fundamental redefinition of the basic police role’ which 
prioritises ‘[general] order maintenance and quality of life problems’ over a ‘‘crime attack’ 
model’ suggestive of Bittner’s (1978) classic characterisation of policing as coercive.  
It is undeniable that policing as an institution must always embody a certain degree of coercion 
but we must also recognise that police practitioners enjoy significant discretion in actually 
determining when and how this coercion is exercised. This reasoning compels Goldsmith 
(original emphasis 1990: 91) to argue that we can embrace police discretion as ‘a potential 
resource in the formulation of rules governing police powers and practices’. While this case 
study is not explicitly concerned with rule-making, it does illustrate the ways that seemingly 
disempowered officers from RPZ1 used dramaturgical translation to promote a more inclusive 
and locally responsive model of policing in Sarajevo Canton. Specifically, RPZ1 was successful 




resonated with internal and external audiences. This established a necessary platform for the 
officers to define their own priorities and the operational autonomy to devote their time and 
resources to less adversarial activities. Maintaining an active presence in the community 
allowed them to engage in information sharing practices that improved the vertical 
responsiveness of the MUP KS.  
However, evidence of the capacity of RPZ officers in Sarajevo Canton to foster improvements 
in the horizontal responsiveness of policing was lacking.  Part of the problem was the absence 
of established accountability mechanisms that the RPZ officers could use to hold their 
municipal counterparts responsible for delivering on their commitments. While the ‘partnership’ 
model has been criticised for its ‘instabilities’ (Hughes and Rowe 2007), specifically in terms of 
the perceived risk that centrally defined performance targets might serve as the primary drivers 
of security governance rather than ‘community-oriented work’, it is necessary to consider that in 
the context of Sarajevo Canton, these CSFs might also have helped to ensure that the work of 
RPZ officers remained congruent with local expectations of general order policing. In other 
words, CSFs could have constituted an important mechanism for structuring the habitus of RPZ 
officers and for rendering them accountable to transparent, deliberative processes. Finally, the 
absence of an institutional framework that formally defined the role of RPZ officers in the 
Regulation of Job Classification also meant that the operational discretion exercised by officers 
from RPZ2 may have actually counteracted the progress achieved by their colleagues from 
RPZ1. 
Labelling the dramaturgical translations of the officers from RPZ2 ‘counterproductive’ implies 
that their inability or unwillingness to engage with the SDC’s prescriptions prevented these 
officers from successfully adapting the concepts of ‘security marketing’ and ‘information 
sharing’ into effective performances. Thus, while my observation of RPZ1 indicated that 
dramaturgical translation serves a potentially productive function in enabling local practitioners 
to adapt externally-defined models for police reform into the foundation for a contextually-
relevant operational strategy, the experience of the officers from RPZ2 highlights the extent to 
which dramaturgical translation can amplify the spoiler effect of certain actors working to 
implement these models. Insofar as effective performances and audience segmentation enabled 
the officers from RPZ1 to thrive as institutional champions for this reform, the dramaturgical 
mishaps of the officers from RPZ2 and the Canton’s RPZ Coordinator threatened to undermine 




various audiences and amplified the operational inconsistencies of community policing 
throughout the Canton.  
The officers from RPZ1 recognised the potential consequences of their colleagues’ flawed 
performances and they feared that the amplification of operational deficiencies would have a 
negative effect on how different audiences responded to community policing. These flawed 
performances were determined to represent a threat to the credibility of community policing as a 
non-adversarial policing philosophy and undermine the capacity of RPZ officers to act as 
empowered champions of this reform. With respect to external audiences in the community, the 
concern was that RPZ2’s mishaps would undermine the emerging reputation of the officers 
from RPZ1 as capable problem solvers.  Finally, for international audiences, these flawed 
performances were problematic because of the perceived risk that the SDC and other 
international organisations might withdraw their support for the initiative if they interpreted 
these flawed performances as evidence of policy failure. 
With the officers from RPZ2, it is still worth considering that these performances were not 
responsive to a glocal subculture but rather local police subculture which created pressures for 
institutional inertia which Skogan and Hartnett (1997: 71) have identified as an important 
organisational impediment to community policing reforms in the United States. Thus, while 
elements of what Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) label a ‘subculture of transnational policing’ 
are likely to influence the habitus of local police officers, particularly through externally-driven 
police reform processes, its influence is not deterministic of local policing practices, mentalities 
or policy outcomes. While the performances of the officers from RPZ2 were flawed and 
potentially counterproductive, they nonetheless illustrate the capacity of ‘field operators’, as the 
end users of externally-driven police reforms, to shape policy outputs and the outcomes that are 
said to contribute to the glocally-responsive policing structures.  
Dramaturgical translation thus afforded these local police practitioners and their colleagues 
from RPZ1 with a means of ‘transform[ing], translat[ing], distort[ing] and modify[ing] the 
meaning or the elements’ (Latour 2005: 39) of the SDC’s prescriptions via their role in 
implementing them.  This is consistent with Crawford and Jones’ (1995: 20) claim that 
‘creativity is an important aspect of working within the tensions and oppositions that exist 
between different agencies and that are the product of differing organizational practices, 
cultures, priorities and management structures’.  It also conveys the important role that 
seemingly disempowered actors can play in affecting positive change.  However, the experience 




may also generate ‘unaccountable working practices’ of indeterminate or undesirable moral 
























Chapter Eleven: Conclusion 
 
With this thesis, I have introduced the concept of policy translation (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006) 
to the criminological literature and presented it as an innovative framework for analysing the 
important transformational processes that mediate glocally-responsive police reforms in weak 
and structurally dependent societies like Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). To this effect, I have 
argued that the concept is useful for highlighting the capacity of policy makers and criminal 
justice practitioners to act as ‘mediators’ rather than ‘intermediaries’ (Latour 2005: 39; see 
Section 4.3). Applying this concept to my case studies challenges established theoretical 
accounts of the structural relationships between liberal state-building and police reform (Ryan 
2011) and those which link international development assistance to police reforms (Ellison and 
Pino 2012). It also raises further doubts about the pervasive influence of police reforms as 
technologies of neo-liberal governmentality and securitisation. With this final chapter, I briefly 
revisit the four research questions posed in my introduction and I reflect upon the significance 
of policy translation as a policy mechanism for negotiating the contours of glocal policing in 
BiH.  
 
1. What evidence is there to support the claim that processes of ‘translation’ 
account for the differences between international policy inputs and 
domestic outcomes in the field of community oriented policing in BiH? 
 
Policy translation is useful for analysing the important transformational processes that 
contribute to the mediation of glocally-responsive police reforms in weak and structurally 
dependent societies like BiH. My case studies of the Safer Communities project and the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation’s (SDC) community policing initiative in Sarajevo 
Canton illustrate the asymmetrical and coercive power structures introduced in Chapters Two 
and Three however my analysis suggests that structures are poor predictors of policy outputs 
and outcomes. In other words, the localised effects of internationally driven police reform 
processes and the policy outcomes that they generate cannot be readily inferred or predicted in 
relation to the international political economy of global liberal governance or the motives of 
archetypical architects of global policing identified by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012; see 
Section 3.1). Rather, these outcomes exist as the products of translations. They are mediated, 




contours are shaped by the habitus of translators. These translators are themselves responsive to 
factors such as institutional culture and local contextual circumstances. This finding is 
consistent with Johnston and Shearing’s (2003: 92) argument that there is no necessary 
‘correspondence between mentalities, the objectives, institutions and technologies associated 
with them, and governmental ‘outcomes’’ (see Sections 1.1 and 3.5).  
The two translational roles that I have identified with my case studies include the ‘international 
development worker’ as a variant of the ‘diplomat’ archetype previously identified by Bowling 
and Sheptycki (2012: 88) and the ‘field operator’. The translational capacity of the international 
development worker was evident in relation to the Safer Communities team’s ability to 
negotiate the structural pressures of the international development system in order to establish a 
functional ‘contact zone’ through which it could continue to implement the Safer Communities 
model in accordance with the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) capacity 
development ethos (see Chapter Eight). For the ‘field operator’, also referred to as the local 
police practitioner, dramaturgical interactions provided a platform for translations. 
Dramaturgical translations allowed the officers from RPZ1 to adapt the SDC’s prescriptions for 
community policing into a series of performances that appealed to a variety of audiences whose 
support for the reform was determined to be a key ingredient for its long-term success. 
Conversely, the flawed performances of the officers from RPZ2 demonstrated the translational 
abilities of resistant or constrained field operators (see Chapter Ten) and thus supports the idea 
that policy makers and criminal justice practitioners function as ‘mediators’ rather than 
‘intermediaries’ (Latour 2005: 39), even when their translations are problematic or potentially 
harmful. 
 
2. Does the translation work of local actors serve to mitigate the potential 
harms of externally imposed policy frameworks? 
 
The idea that reforms and policy transfers designed to establish glocally-responsive policing in 
weak and structurally dependent societies may be harmful was introduced in Section 3.1. 
Briefly, my review accounted for Bowling and Sheptyki’s (2012) argument that the actors who 
shape global policing are responsive to a common subculture of transnational policing. This 
subculture is in turn said to influence prescriptions for police reform in developing and 
transitional countries around the world (Ibid: 22). Bowling and Sheptycki go on to suggest that 




worldview premised on the notion that it is in fact possible to distinguish between ‘good-guys’ 
and ‘bad-guys’ (Ibid.: 94). Linking their claims to Duffield’s (1999; 2007) discussion of the 
security-development nexus, this review determined that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
this subculture of transnational policing appears to derive its hegemonic definitions for that 
which is ‘good’ from that which contributes to, or at a minimum does not conflict with, the 
interests of global liberal governance. In this respect, it was argued that the paradigm of global 
policing ‘serves and protects’ the poly-centric interests of global liberal governance just as a 
‘democratic’ police service is said to ‘serve and protect’ the interests of citizens in advanced 
liberal democracies (see Section 2.1).   
In practice, however, the adversarial and coercive function of modern police organisations in 
advanced liberal democracies is well established, particularly in the Anglo-American tradition 
of police sociology (e.g. Bittner 1978; Reiner 2000; Terrill et al 2003). Work by Bowling and 
Phillips (2002) and Hall et al (1978) further illustrates that the discriminatory outlook of modern 
police organisations contributes to the criminalisation, exclusion and marginalisation of 
individuals and communities cast as ‘others’.
170
 Thus, insofar as it is possible to construct a 
functional analogy between the positive contributions of global policing and modern policing in 
advanced liberal societies, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012;  also Sheptycki 1998: 66) suggest that 
one can also compare their coercive orientation and their repressive effects. Global policing is 
therefore ‘iatrogenic’, argue Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 94) because it serves ‘to reinforce a 
global sense of insecurity’ that ‘props up the notion that the transnational-state-system can 
containerize security’. Archetypical actors associated with this ‘subculture of transnational 
policing’ are said to render glocally-responsive policing an iatrogenic phenomenon by fostering, 
disseminating and reinforcing harmful mentalities and technologies that embody this Manichean 
worldview (Ibid: 92).  
While Bowling and Sheptycki’s (2012) theory of global policing is pessimistic in its outlook, 
the authors recognise that certain archetypical actors may in fact play a valuable role in 
mitigating the harms inherent to this subculture. In other words, they recognise that the 
‘subcultural drama of policing can be shifted’ by capable and willing actors such as ‘field 
operators’ who, ‘when successful…[prove] the claim that policing is centrally about facilitating 
the building up of civil society and fostering the conditions under which liberal democratic 
society can flourish’ (Ibid: 92). The same can be said of the ‘diplomat’ who has the ‘ability to 
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 Specifically, Bowling and Phillips’ (2002) work on ‘stop and search’ in the UK illustrates the enduring 




see things reflexively from others’ points of view’ and their ‘ability to think creatively and solve 
problems’ (Ibid: 100).  
My research supports this optimism by indicating that elements of a ‘subculture of transnational 
policing’ and the motives of self-interested donors play a limited and perhaps minimal role in 
structuring the habitus of both international development workers and local police practitioners. 
My first case study demonstrated that international development workers at UNDP derived their 
habitus primarily from a capacity development ethos (see Section 7.3) that emphasised the use 
of ‘reflexivity’ which Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 88) describe as ‘the capacity to step 
outside of one’s own narrow world-view and frame of reference in order to see things from 
another’s perspective’. This was significant because it compelled the Safer Communities team 
to invest their limited resources in supporting project activities that addressed locally-defined 
needs (see Sub-section 7.2.4).  For the ‘field operators’ from RPZ1, strategic performances 
reflected the need for the officers to utilise audience segmentation meaning that their habitus 
was responsive to a number of sources and not just the interests of the SDC or the Swiss 
Government. In this case, the need for the officers from RPZ1 to achieve recognition for the 
RPZ role rendered their habitus primarily responsive to local police sub-culture of policing and 
this in turn shaped local definitions for community police work (see Section 10.3).  
While policy translation challenges the idea of a pervasive and influential ‘subculture of 
transnational policing’ with respect to police development assistance projects, one must also 
recognise that translation may potentially generate previously unanticipated harms. In other 
words, my thesis challenges structurally deterministic critiques of the harmful effects of global 
policing and international police development assistance programmes but it also recognises that 
there is no guarantee that human agency will contribute to beneficial or desirable outcomes. It is 
for this reason that my analysis of my first case study recognised that uncertainties remain 
regarding the long-term functionality, sustainability, and operational accountability and 
transparency of citizen security forums (CSF) established by the Safer Communities team (see 
Section 8.2). Similarly, my second case study drew attention to the potential consequences of 
inconsistent performances by the officers from RPZ2 which were harmful because they 
undermined and discredited the effective use of dramaturgical translation by their colleagues 
from RPZ1.   
 
3. To what extent do local translators form part of a framework for 





My research further suggests that the concept of policy translation and nodal analysis of police 
reform processes provide alternative frameworks for exploring the ways in which localised 
human agency can potentially contribute to more democratically responsive policing outcomes 
and security governance in weak and structurally dependent countries like BiH.
171
  My first case 
study demonstrated that the capacity development ethos of the international development 
worker can be oriented towards the goal of establishing structures and institutions that foster 
what Dryzek (2002) labels ‘discursive democratic’ governance. This translational inclination 
was particularly evident in relation to the Safer Communities team’s periodic use of 
participatory policy analysis and policy sharing to manage the project during its pilot phase and 
in investing its resources in establishing locally governed policy outputs in the form of its CSFs. 
The ‘discursive’ character of these outputs was also evident from the fact that CSFs constituted 
governing nodes at which different security actors could hold each other accountable for their 
role in delivering security (i.e. horizontal responsiveness: see Kuper 2007). The Safer 
Communities team also anticipated that these forums would improve the capacity of local 
security providers to collaborate and better respond to the needs of local citizens (i.e. ‘vertical 
responsiveness’; see Kuper 2007).  
I have also argued in Chapter Ten that the elements of the philosophy of community policing 
and the related concept of community safety partnerships might provide local police 
practitioners with important habitual templates for performing police work in ways that render it 
more democratically responsive to the needs of local communities (see Section 10.3). Given that 
the function of modern policing is argued to be structurally coercive (Bittner 1978), the 
discretion of individual officers plays an important role in determining when and how this 
coercion is exercised. Too much discretion risks jeopardising the objective and professional 
image of the police however, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012: 92) and Goldsmith (1990: 91) also 
view discretion as a ‘potential resource’ for promoting positive change. The officers from RPZ1 
used their discretion and operational autonomy to promote non-adversarial interactions with 
various segments of the community and this appeared to be conducive to a more inclusive and 
vertically-responsive definition of police work (see Sub-section 10.2.2). Equally, however, the 
capacity of RPZ officers to contribute to improvements in the horizontal responsiveness of 
policing was limited. Lacking official recognition for the RPZ role, the officers lacked the 
influence necessary to hold their municipal counterparts accountable for their actions (or more 
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frequently, inaction). Plural policing nodes such as CSFs might have also provided these 
officers with important mechanism for supporting this partnership-based approach but had yet 
to be tested in the Canton by the time I had completed my research (see Section 9.3).  
 
4. How do the concepts of ‘translation’ and ‘contact zones’ help to develop 
our understanding of the interaction of the policy preferences of powerful 
external actors and the situated knowledge and preferences of domestic 
actors in producing glocal forms of policing? 
 
My research has introduced the concepts of ‘policy translation’ and ‘contact zones’ as tools for 
unravelling the power politics underpinning externally-driven police reform processes pursued 
within the context of liberal state-building projects and international development assistance 
programmes affecting weak and structurally dependent societies like BiH. My analysis supports 
elements of Ellison and Pino’s (2012) work which suggests that police reforms represent an 
important technology of neo-liberal globalisation insofar as they afford the architects of global 
liberal governance with the ability to exercise their ‘coercive and surveillant powers’ (Bowling 
and Sheptycki 2012: 8) from a distance, as well as supporting Ryan’s (2011) argument that 
police reforms constitute important mechanisms of governmentality (Foucault 1991) designed 
to promote securitisation and establish liberal order amidst a set of international norms 
emphasising non-intervention and the enduring significance of political sovereignty in an era of 
globalisation. However, my research also demonstrates the extent to which internationally-
driven police reform projects are mediated by contact zones which foster various opportunities 
for policy transformation via the work of capable and willing policy translators.  
It is with respect to this nodular view of power relations and the agentive capacities of policy 
translators that my research challenges the overly-deterministic character of the existing 
literature. Instead, it suggests that there is indeed hope for fostering outcomes that reflect local 
interests and support the aim of governing security as a ‘public good’ (Loader and Walker 2001; 
2003). This indicates that the glocal effects of neo-liberal governmentalities are less pronounced 
than previously suggested by Ellison and Pino (2012) and Ryan (2011). My case studies further 
demonstrate the ability of the international development worker and the field operator to use 
their relative positioning in relation to contact zones to ‘shift the subcultural drama of policing’ 
(par. Bowling and Sheptycki 2012: 100) in ways that may potentially serve to mitigate the 




democratically responsive forms of policing in otherwise structurally disenfranchised contexts. 
This ability is illustrative of Wood and Shearing’s (2006: 98) arguments that the power 
inequalities inherent to nodal structures can be transformed in ways that ‘improve governance 
processes and outcomes for weak actors’ (see Section 3.5) and that poly-centric power 
structures facilitate participation beyond the formally established democratic institutions of the 
state which, in the case of BiH, are primarily responsive to supranational interests (see Section 
2.2). I conclude therefore that established theoretical accounts of glocal policing are 
unnecessarily fatalistic in their analyses of the implications of police reforms as neo-liberal 
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Appendix 1: Research Overview 
 
Table A1.1 Research Phases 
Phase Dates Description 
1 April/May 
2010 
Preliminary visit to BiH. Meetings with CSS, SDC and UNDP. Access 
strategy identified. 
2 January – 
April 2011 
‘Internship’ with UNDP Safer Communities project. Organisational 
ethnography based on personal involvement with the project and 
attendance at various meetings.  Also conducted a five-week qualitative 
evaluation of community policing in Sarajevo Canton. Authored two 
UNDP project reports based on an evaluation of community policing in 
Sarajevo Canton and a policy brief for introducing the Safer 
Communities model to the City of Sarajevo. 
3 June/July 
2011 
Follow-up visit to BiH. Interviews with SDC and former Cluster 
Coordinator at DFID.  
4 July 2011 – 
May 2012 
Ongoing collaboration with UNDP Safer Communities project via 
Skype and email. Regular updates from Community Policing Advisor 
on project developments and provided with copies of emerging project 
documents in exchange for feedback. 
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1 Safer Communities Project 
Manager and the 
Community Policing 
Advisor, SDC Project 
































2 Safer Communities Project  
Manager, OSCE Manager 




























Policing Advisor and 
Project Associate, SACBiH 
Project Associates (n=2), 
Representatives from EC 
delegation (n=2), 
Representatives from BiH 
Ministry of Defence (n=3),  
Senior Officer from 
Federalna Uprava Policije, 
Senior Officer from 














2 Safer Communities Project 
Manager and Project 
Associate, Representative 
of Council of Ministers 
(BiH), Project Associate for 
Saferworld, Project 












2 Safer Communities 
Community Policing 
Advisor, Bratunac CSF 
members (n=3) including 










2 Safer Communities 
Community Policing 
Advisor, CSS Director and 
Project Associate, 
Saferworld Project 
Associate, OSCE Project 
Associates (n=2), Zenica 
CSF members (n=5) 
including Senior Police 

























Project Associate, OSCE 
Project Associate, Prijedor 
CSF members (n=3) 
including CSF Leader, 
Senior Police Officer and 






2 Safer Communities 
Community Policing 
Advisor, Saferworld 
Project Associate, CSF 
members (n=3) including 










2 Safer Communities Project 






4 April 2011 2 Station Commander for 
RPZ1 and station 
supervisor (translator). 





4 April 2011 2 Community-based police 
officers from RPZ4 (n=2), 
colleague from UNDP 
(translator) 






5 April 2011 2 Sector Chief for RPZ2, 
Adnan Fazlic (interpreter) 





5 April 2011 2 RPZ officer from RPZ3 
(n=1), Adnan Fazlic 
(translator) 





7 April 2011 2 RPZ officers from RPZ5 
(n=2), Adnan Fazlic 
(translator) 







2 RPZ Coordinator for MUP 
KS 





22 June 2011 3 SDC Project Associate SDC [Undisclosed] Semi-
structured 
interview. 
July 2011 3 ‘Experienced Development 
Worker’ in BiH 
[Undisclosed] [Undisclosed]  Semi-
structured 
interview 
26 July 2011 3 Sead Traljic, former Cluster 
Coordinator for DfiD’s 
SSAJP and external 
evaluator for SDC’s 
Community-based Policing 
Project 


























4 Safer Communities Project 
Manager 
UNDP N/A Email 
24 January 
2012 
4 CSS Project Associate CSS N/A Email 
16 February 
2012 








4 SDC Project Associate SDC N/A Email 
 
Table A1.3 Timeline: Safer Communities Project, January 2009 – 
July 2012. 
Date Event 
January 2009 Safer Communities project established as a component of the SACBiH 
Project. 
December 2009 Safer Communities project receives seed funding 
February 2010 SACBiH team hires Community Policing Advisor  
April – June 
2010 
Community Policing Advisor, Project Manager and Cluster Coordinator 
carry out Baseline Assessment (published in June) 
October – 
December 2010 
Access negotiations with Safer Communities Project Manager; Delays with 
SACBiH Project creates distraction from Safer Communities project.   
17 January 2011 Start of internship; Community Policing Advisor on personal leave 
31 January 2011 Meeting with Deputy Mayor for Grad Sarajevo, assigned the policy brief. 
7 February 2011 Meeting with Representative from Council of Ministers. Safer Communities 
team works to generate governmental support for CSP model.  
7 February – 11 
February 2011 
Community Policing Advisor meets with five different CSFs about 




UNDP hosts Igmam summit on youth justice.  
February – 
March 2011 
Community Policing Advisor, Project Manager and I develop various 
concept notes and sustainability reports for Safer Communities project.  
March 2011 Project Manager attends meetings with UNDP senior management to 
discuss future of the Safer Communities project.  
July 2011 Project Manager submits policy brief to City of Sarajevo. 
13 December 
2011 – 18 
December 2011 
I provide feedback to Community Policing Advisor on ‘Concept Note’ to 
link Safer Communities Project with AVPP. 
19 December 
2011 
Community Policing Advisor submits ‘Concept Note’ to UNDP Cluster 
Coordinator for review 
January  - 
February 2012 
Community Policing Advisor and Cluster Coordinator map AVPP 
activities; work to coordinate ‘Concept Note’ / project proposal with other 
UN development agencies 
March 2012 ‘Concept Note’ / project proposal submitted to AVPP 





Table A1.4 Timeline: Qualitative Evaluation of Community Policing 
In Sarajevo Canton 
Date Event(s) 
23 February 2011 Access initiated via conversation with RPZ1 officers and RPZ 
Coordinator at Igmam summit. 
24 February – 3 
March 2011  
UNDP submits formal access request to Minister of Interior for MUP KS 
who accepts the proposal and passes it on to Police Commissioner for 
compliance. Police Commissioner offers his support and designates RPZ 
Coordinator as my official organisational contact.  
4 March 2011 Meeting to discuss access and research plan with RPZ Coordinator, initial 
introductions to RPZ1 and RPZ2, research schedule agreed upon. 
7 March 2011 Day One observation with RPZ1. Key events included morning briefing, 
response to bank robbery, ethnographic interviews with members, visit to 
local charity, and coffee at a shopping centre. 
8 March 2011 Day Two observation with RPZ1. Key events included ethnographic 
interviews with team members, coffee with station supervisor, visits to 
local schools, coffee with patrol-based colleague, response to vehicle 
accident, second meeting at local charity,  RPZ officers pull over a young 
driver and issues him a warning, more school visits.  
9 March 2011 Day Three observation with RPZ1. Key events included meeting with 
station commander, ethnographic interviews with RPZ1 officers, visit to 




Days Four and Five. Observation cancelled with RPZ1 as their schedule 
consisted of ‘Civilian Courage’ training.  
14 March 2011 Day One observation with RPZ2. Key events included ethnographic group 
interview, ‘patrol’ of sector and meetings with different ‘partners’ 
including MZ secretary, bet shop owner, school secretary, and Chief 
Psychiatrist at methadone clinic. 
 
15 March 2011 Day Two observation with RPZ2.  Ethnographic interviews with officers, 
brief encounter with RPZ Coordinator, meeting with second MZ 
secretary, lunch with officers. 
16 March 2011 Day Three observation with RPZ2. Key events included ethnographic 
group interview, implementation of ‘Civilian Courage’, informal meeting 
with RPZ Coordinator. 
17 March 2011 RPZ Meeting attended by all of the RPZ units in Canton Sarajevo. 
Presentation by RPZ Coordinator followed by presentation by an officer 
from RPZ2, interrupted and concluded by RPZ Coordinator. 
21 March 2011 Day Four observation with RPZ1. Key events included ethnographic 
interview, meeting with Sector Chief, meetings with local schools, lunch, 
and administrative work.  
22 March 2011 Day Five observation with RPZ1. Key events included ethnographic 
interviews with officers from RPZ1 and attendance at community meeting 
about the stray dog problem.  
23 March 2011 Day Six observation with RPZ1.  Attended EUPM sponsored SWAT team 




4 April – 13 April 
2011 
Interviews with other RPZ units, station commanders and RPZ Coordinator 
(see Table A1.1). 
























Appendix 2: Unpublished Drafts, Documents and 
Primary Sources  
































Preliminary assessment of 
policing and community 
safety in BiH designed to 
inform the selection of pilot 
municipalities for Safer 
Communities project.  















‘On 27th September 2010 
the United Nations 
Development Programme 
(UNDP), Small Arms 
Control Programme BiH 
(SACBiH) engaged XIX 
Services, a UK based 
consultancy specializing in 
the Evaluation of Policing, 
to undertake an evaluation 
of the level of 
implementation and 
outcomes of the BiH 
Community Policing 
Strategy published and 
rolled out for 
implementation in March 
2007.’ (Gill 2010a: 2) 















Framework for transplanting 






















Draft of a concept note 
intended to link the Safer 
Communities project to the 
issue of social capital which 
was identified as a priority 




























Near final draft of the policy 
brief for the Deputy Mayor. 
This draft is referenced 
because it included specific 
recommendations for 
piloting the CSP model in 





Poll in Bosnia 
and 
Herzegovina: 















‘a quantitative research 
aimed at the collection of 
data on the views 
experiences and attitudes of 
the general population 
concerning security in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and related issues. 
Commissioned by the Safer 
Communities project 














A set of by-laws that defines 
the role of police officers in 
Sarajevo Canton Police.  
 Sustainability 
Plan of Safer 
Communities 



















Early draft of sustainability 
plan for the Safer 
Communities project. This 
draft was rejected by the 
Project Manager. The 
Community Policing 
Advisor continued to 
develop a plan over the next 
twelve months however no 
final version of the 










Appendix 3: Aitchison and Blaustein (2013)  
 





















































































































































































































































































































Appendix 4: Blaustein (2013)  
 
Available online from April 2013 at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/gpas20  
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